For the first time in many years, there is talk of federation again in northern Nicosia. The victory of *Tufan Erhürman, leader of the Republican Turkish Party (CTP), with almost 63 % of the vote, marks not only the defeat of the outgoing Ersin Tatar, but also a political paradigm shift. Where the previous president had strongly promoted the ‘two-state’ line, Erhürman brings back to the centre of the debate the only formula that for decades represented a possible compromise: abi-zonal and bi-communal*federation, recognised by the international community as the basis of the Cypriot peace process.

Behind the figures of the vote – turnout around 65 %, net margin and growing youth participation – lies a deep frustration with the separatist drift. In recent years, the ‘two-state’ policy had isolated Northern Cyprus, aggravating its economic and administrative dependence on Ankara. Double-digit inflation, the devaluation of the Turkish lira, and the perception of an increasingly limited civic space prompted many voters, especially students and professionals, to demand representation that would return to a dialogue with Nicosia and the European Union. Erhürman embodies this demand for normality without questioning the alliance with Turkey.

The political significance of the bi-zonal, bi-communal federation

The bi-zonal and bi-communal federation formula (BZBCF), elaborated in the 1970s and reaffirmed by successive UN resolutions, provides for a single Cypriot sovereignty and citizenship, but with two autonomous entities, Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot, equal in political status and with extensive internal self-government. It is a complex compromise, balancing the security of the Turkish Cypriot community with the international legitimacy of the Republic of Cyprus, a member of the EU.

In recent years, the project had appeared moribund. After the failure of the *Crans-Montana negotiations in 2017, Tatar had closed any space for discussion, promoting instead the idea of two separate states, supported by Ankara. With his defeat, that line loses its main political interpreter in the north. Erhürman does not promise an immediate solution, but proposes a return to the UN table, starting from the basis already agreed upon: a federation with equal powers between the two components, without subordination and with reciprocal guarantees of representation. *Ina regional context marked by new energy and security challenges, the federal idea thus returns as the most pragmatic.

The delicate balance with Ankara

Turkey remains a decisive player. It has supported the ‘two-state’ line for years, convinced that a federation would reduce its control over the north and complicate its energy ambitions in the eastern Mediterranean. However, a certain strategic fatigue is also felt in Ankara. The international isolation of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) translates into rising costs, and young Turkish Cypriots increasingly look to Brussels rather than Istanbul. The October vote was read by many as a call for ‘more autonomy, not less Turkey’.

Erhürman, aware of the delicacy of the relationship, promised loyal cooperation with Ankara, but also asserted the Turkish Cypriot community’s right to decide its own political direction. It is on this fine line of balance that his wager is played: to regain negotiating margins without causing a rupture with the guarantor of security and funding in the north.

The opportunity for Europe

For the EU, the victory of an openly pro-federation president represents a rare diplomatic opportunity. Brussels, which only recognises the Republic of Cyprus, has always maintained indirect contacts with the northern leadership. Now it could concretely support the resumption of talks, also with economic incentives and cross-border projects. According to diplomatic sources quoted by Politico Europe (20 October 2025), the Commission is considering the possibility of extending digital and university cooperation programmes to the Turkish Cypriot community as well, in order to foster economic and cultural convergence.

On the energy level, the prospect of a federation would reduce the risks of shipping accidents and licence overlaps in EastMed. And on the political level, it would give new strength to the argument that a stable Europe begins with the eastern Mediterranean. However, time plays against it: every month of inertia strengthens those in the north and south who consider the division irreversible.

After all, the bi-zonal federation formula is not an abstract federalist dream: it is a minimal architecture of coexistence on an island where every village, border and school still bears the scars of 1974. It does not promise immediate reconciliation, but recognises that two communities, though different, can share a common institutional destiny. After years of mirror nationalism, the northern vote is a bet on that middle way – fragile, imperfect, but the only one still open.

If the south responds seriously and if Ankara does not use the Cyprus dossier as a negotiating lever against Brussels, Cyprus could finally return to the centre of a European federal project, not as a divided periphery but as a laboratory of possible union.