In the European public debate, liberalism and laissez-faire often evoked as separate, sometimes even antagonistic categories. The former is referred to when talking about rights, civil liberties and the rule of law; the latter is reduced to a rigid, when not caricatured, economic paradigm associated with the absence of rules and the uncontrolled dominance of the market. This juxtaposition, however, does not hold up either historically or conceptually. The Europe of political freedom is the same Europe that built economic freedom, and to separate them is to weaken both.

Roots of liberalism and laissez-faire

Liberalism was born as a legal-political doctrine, even before it was an economic theory. From Locke to Montesquieu, from Constant to Tocqueville, its backbone is the limitation of power, the protection of the individual, and the division of public functions. But already in these reflections, legal freedom is never purely abstract: it presupposes security of relationships, protection of property, the possibility of undertaking. It is no coincidence that the French Revolution included property among the inviolable rights, aware that without a material basis, formal equality risks remaining a dead letter.

Laissez-faire fits into this trajectory as a coherent development, not a deviation. Adam Smith does not imagine a market without rules, but an order based on norms, institutional trust and individual responsibility. The market is conceived as a space of autonomy, capable of removing individuals from both political arbitrariness and corporate privileges. In this perspective, economic freedom contributes to making civil liberty effective, strengthening its substance.

The 20th century as a watershed

The 20th century, however, calls for a profound rethink. Economic crises, the emergence of structural inequalities and the two world wars challenge the idea that the market alone can guarantee balance and justice. This gave rise to the welfare state, which in Europe was not a break with liberalism, but a historical adaptation of it. The post-World War II constitutions expand the catalogue of rights, including social benefits and duties of solidarity, in the awareness that freedom loses consistency if it is not accompanied by minimum conditions of dignity.

This is where the decisive point lies. European liberalism can no longer be that of the 19th century, but neither can it be dismissed as an ideological residue. The market remains an essential instrument for innovation, growth and social mobility; at the same time, it must be embedded in a regulatory framework capable of correcting its imbalances. European law performs precisely this function: from competition rules to labour protection, from state aid regulation to consumer protection, it outlines a model that does not deny the market, but governs it.

The European Union was born and developed within this tension

The Treaties place economic freedoms at the centre, but progressively add a social and value dimension to them. It is no coincidence that the Court of Justice has repeatedly referred to the concept of a social market economy, a formula that expresses the idea of a dynamic balance between economic efficiency and social cohesion. A Europe without a market would be paralysed by bureaucracy; a Europe indifferent to rights would eventually erode its democratic consensus.