Tariffs: maybe we haven’t ‘lost’, but our diplomatic style no longer works
There is an image that sums up the nature of the trade agreement reached in Turnberry between the United States and the European Union: Donald Trump sitting next to Ursula von der Leyen, smilingly declaring ‘We made it‘, while the European leader appears tired, diplomatic, almost complicit in a direction that does not belong to her.
This is no ordinary scene. It is yet another episode of a diplomacy turned spectacle, where those who can dictate the timing of the show also impose the rules of the game.
Because what unfolded in Scotland is not a simple trade compromise. It is the plastic manifesto of the new international communicative and strategic order: a president-performer who, amid threats, tweets and spectacularised press conferences, conquers all without ever really negotiating. And a European counterpart who, once again, arrives (at least in appearance) disunited, fragile and without a strong narrative.
The initialled agreement envisaged 15% duties on European goods exported to the US, along with vague unilateral announcements (soon to be retracted by an official Commission document) on more than USD 600 billion worth of EU investments in America, 750 billion worth of energy purchases and unbalanced trade concessions.
Most commentators had no doubts: it is the definitive defeat of the traditional method of European diplomacy and decrees the triumph of performative diplomacy, embodied and perfected by Trump: that made up of symbolic stage sets, public threats and a media strategy that anticipates, accompanies and replaces negotiation.
An agreement that appears unbalanced and shows weak European diplomacy
From a technical point of view, the agreement reached leaves little doubt: the US will impose 15% duties on most European exports, including cars, medicines and manufactured goods. On steel, moreover, it remains with 50% duties. In return, the EU gets the removal of some duties on aircraft, semiconductors, and fine chemicals, but commits to buying large volumes of energy and increasing its investments in the US. Germany, the EU’s largest exporter to the US, only got a reprieve on the automotive issue, while sectors such as pharmaceuticals – historically central – remained in the deal on unfavourable terms.
It can be debated at length whether, on a strictly economic level, a more balanced agreement (with reciprocal European duties against US products) would have been less convenient. But for our exporters, compared to previous duties of 2.5% (before the Trump era), the jump is abysmal.
What is striking, however, is not just the content, but the method. Trump built the agreement on a performative ultimatum: public threats, formal letters, a compressed agenda (’90 deals in 90 days’) and a TV show approach. He raised the level of the conflict, put pressure on the markets and then offered a media-friendly but essentially one-sided ‘way out’.
On the other hand, theEuropean Union appeared paralysed. It lacked a common line, lacked authoritative leadership and lacked, above all, a narrative.
While Trump dictated the timing and manipulated perceptions, Brussels appeared uncertain, wavering, subordinate. Ursula von der Leyen tried to save face by talking about ‘balancing’ and ‘advantageous exchanges on a few strategic sectors’, but the reality is that the main knots remained unresolved – on steel, pharmaceuticals, automotive – or resolved one way.
The result is a new trade arrangement that from Trump’s point of view (though not necessarily from the point of view of American consumers) redistributes advantages to the US while leaving Europe to justify the unjustifiable: an asymmetry that could – and should – have been negotiated differently.
When soft power becomes soft war: Trump and performative diplomacy
The EU-US agreement is not just an economic dossier. It is a lesson in communicative strategy. Donald Trump has systematically applied what we can call performative diplomacy: a mode of action that combines symbolic threat, public narrative, perceptual manipulation and the creation of events with a high emotional impact.
In the logic of performative diplomacy, the goal is not just agreement, but the construction of a narrative frame in which one’s own role emerges as dominant. Trump did not negotiate in the classical sense: he built a stage, disseminated his intentions in the media, generated chaos and then presented himself as the resolver.
It turned the negotiating table into a political platform. It has made the confrontation with Europe a symbolic act, useful to strengthen internal consensus and show strength to the outside world. In this sense, the EU is not only an economic actor: it is a narrative target, useful to demonstrate the weakness of the ‘liberal order’ and the strength of muscular leadership.
The point is not just that Trump has achieved more than analysts expected. It is that he has done so by leaving the other side in the role of the weak shoulder, the static figure who reacts rather than acts.
Von der Leyen, although aware of the importance of compromise, ended up in the role of the ‘schoolgirl’, as one European political commentator put it, while the performer grabbed applause and headlines.
It would seem, therefore, that Europe has remained the last to entrench itself behind formulas such as ‘multilateralism’ and ‘common rules’, while the performers of international politics – from Trump to Modi, from Putin to Xi – are writing a new geopolitical alphabet. An alphabet made up of visibility, chain reactions, time pressure and strategic storytelling.
Classical diplomacy moves slowly. Performative diplomacy strikes, marks, dictates.
This does not necessarily make the latter more effective: just yesterday, for instance, Modi’s India reacted as cautiously as the EU to the Trumpian announcement of 25% tariffs, and among the concessions it is preparing to make is the renunciation of cheap Russian oil purchases (an unwritten clause in the US-EU pact?).
But Europe, if it really wants to be a global player, must learn to play this new game. Without renouncing its values, but knowing that in today’s multipolar world , it is not enough to be right: you also have to know how to tell the story.
The European Union still does not know what it stands for
From this point of view, the problem is not only Ursula Von der Leyen.
It is the entire European institutional set-up that is showing cracks: the Commission is often in the front line without having an army behind it, and what should be collective leadership ends up becoming an alibi for inertia.
National leaders deflect, intergovernmental compromises become swamps, and the Commission remains exposed and powerless. If you choose to appear before Washington in these conditions, you are only working to reduce the damage, not to make your voice heard.
The paradox is that Europe, on paper, possesses all the tools to play a leading role: economic capacity, regulatory power, multilateral experience. But it fails to transform these elements into strategic political power. And in a context where the narrative is as valuable as (or more than) a negotiation, this often means giving up the game.
Finally, it should not be forgotten that performative diplomacy is not an isolated anomaly, but the new geopolitical ecosystem. In it move charismatic actors, who simplify, polarise, dominate the public scene and redefine the categories of power. China does it with its symbolic diplomacy, Russia with structured disinformation, India with spectacularised nationalism.
Even assuming, therefore, that economically the duties hurt Americans more than Europeans, and that in return for the ‘surrender’ on duties Trump has pledged to stay on board the Ukraine boat, none of these practical benefits erase the image and credibility damage Europe has suffered.
The agreement with the United States certifies a lack of vision: that of a Europe that has not yet understood that power today is exercised not only with rules and treaties, but with symbols, words, leadership and strategic conflict. While avoiding greater economic damage, the duties certify a larger political and strategic defeat.
Not only a trade agreement was signed at Turnberry: a (new?) balance between the United States and the European Union was shown to the world, in which the former dictates, and the latter records.
It showed the triumph of a new grammar of power, in which public visibility, strategic pressure, and effective storytelling count more than the substance of the dossiers.
Trump mediatically wins because he is acting out a script that he himself wrote. Von der Leyen mediatically loses because she is forced to act in someone else’s theatre, without ever rewriting the scene.
And Europe, as a whole, fails to speak with one voice, to represent itself as a unified geopolitical subject, to transform its economic strength into contractual and strategic power.
The challenge for Europe is not only to defend its economic interests, but to once again have a recognisable voice in the world. Or it will always be someone else who will speak for it.








