With 454 votes in favour, the European Parliament has called for a continuous naval presence in the Taiwan Strait. The Left is attempting to strike out this passage, whilst it remains to be seen by what means and from which bases such a presence could be sustained; and, whilst Strasbourg votes, Commissioner Šefčovič is travelling to Beijing.

The vote

On Wednesday 7 October, in Strasbourg, the European Parliament adopted the recommendation on EU-China relations, drafted by rapporteur Hilde Vautmans (Renew, Belgium), with 454 votes in favour, 86 against and 110 abstentions.
The text makes no concessions to diplomatic niceties: it identifies Beijing as a decisive factor in sustaining Russia’s war in Ukraine and regards its industrial policy as an existential threat to Europe’s industrial base.

The most closely watched and crucial passage, however, concerns Taiwan. MEPs are calling on the EU to work with Member States and other democratic partners in the region towards closer security coordination, including ‘a continuous naval presence and joint exercises’ in the Taiwan Strait. The ‘One China’ policy and the rejection of any unilateral change to the status quo remain unchanged.

A quantum leap, not just a start

In a sense, it would be inaccurate to describe this as a sudden turnaround: Strasbourg has been siding with Taiwan for years. In 2021, it adopted a recommendation on EU-Taiwan relations by 580 votes; in 2022, a resolution on the Strait by 424 votes; in 2024, one opposing China’s distortion of UN Resolution 2758 with 432 votes, and in July, a text that mentions Taiwan forty-four times. As early as February 2024, a report on common defence had called on Member States to step up freedom of navigation operations in the Strait.

What is changing is the pace, the speed.
No longer just occasional visits, but a continuous presence, coordinated with partners in the region. The draft presented to the House also included the aim of discouraging Beijing from escalation and contingency plans for future scenarios.

It marks a shift from condemnation to a strategic stance. And the text reached us despite intense Chinese lobbying: according to media reports, the rapporteur met with delegations from Beijing six times during the drafting process, and a preliminary version had even removed the term ‘systemic rival’ to accommodate the Socialists, before it was reinstated in the final text.

Who said yes, and who said no?

Taking a hard line, Vautmans herself argued that Europe’s relationship with China ‘cannot continue as it is today’ and that peace in the Strait is a direct European interest.
The EPP has pushed for the EU to bring its weight to bear with Beijing, whilst the ECR has called for an end to strategic dependence on China.

On the other hand, the Socialists were divided: the German, French and Scandinavian delegations supported the hardline stance, whilst the delegations from Spain, Portugal, Italy and Romania abstained, according to the Rapporteur newsletter.

On the opposite side is “The Left”. Italian MEP Danilo Della Valle (M5S) tabled an amendment to remove the reference to a naval presence, warning of the risk of a militarist drift in Asia and arguing that China should be treated more as a partner than as a rival. The amendment was not passed: the wording remains in the approved text. The motion was rejected with 541 votes against, 91 in favour and 13 abstentions.

However, one very practical question remains: where would these ships come from?
The EU does not have its own permanent fleet, and the assets would remain under national control.
France is in a privileged position, thanks to its military presence in its Indo-Pacific territories; Italy demonstrated in 2026 that it could deploy a ship from Taranto as far as Singapore.
But a continuous presence would require rotations, resupply and a logistical effort far more onerous than that of a single transit.

Why voting matters

Stance matters, first and foremost, because the Strait is not an Asian issue: as Parliament itself pointed out in 2022, it is the main route for ships travelling from East Asia to Europe.

It matters because deterrence thrives on credibility, and credibility comes at a cost: a statement carries no risk, but a ship does, and that is precisely what makes it a message.

And Taipei has reacted very positively to this move: its representative to the EU, Shieh Jhy-wey (謝志偉), welcomed Europe’s focus on stability in the Strait. So far, there has been no comment from the Chinese Mission to the EU: it did not respond to the SCMP (South China Morning Post), whilst in 2024 similar texts from the Parliament had been branded as serious interference in China’s internal affairs.

The Strasbourg vote remains a recommendation: it is not binding on the Commission, the Council or the High Representative, and it does not alter the ‘One China’ policy. But a statement can be retracted with a press release; a ship in the Strait cannot. This is the distinction that Parliament has put on the table, and it is now up to the Member States – those that have the ships – to decide whether to act on it.