Between the BRP Sierra Madre, China’s latest moves regarding Scarborough Shoal and an increasingly intense naval presence, Manila and Beijing are entering a phase in which any incident could have far-reaching and dangerous consequences.

The Sierra Madre remains at the heart of the conflict

At the heart of the new dispute lies an old Philippine warship which, for over twenty-five years, has served as a military outpost in one of the most contested areas of the South China Sea.

It is the‘BRP Sierra Madre’, a Second World War-era transport ship belonging to the Philippine Navy, which Manila deliberately ran aground in 1999 on the Ayungin Shoal, known internationally as Second Thomas Shoal.

This is a coral reef located approximately 105 nautical miles from Palawan, within the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone. Today, the ship is home to a small contingent of Philippine military personnel and represents Manila’s permanent presence in the area.

The Sierra Madre has now become one of the most tangible symbols of the dispute.
China has been calling for its removal for years, arguing that the vessel was placed illegally on the shoal and accusing Manila of having promised to withdraw it. The Philippines reject this account and maintain that no binding agreement was ever reached to abandon the outpost.

In fact, however, on 23 August, the Philippine armed forces responded to yet another statement from the Chinese embassy, accusing Beijing of seeking to “rewrite history” regarding the ship’s presence.

Spokesperson Roy Vincent Trinidad reiterated that there is no binding commitment to remove it. His conclusion was particularly clear: “We will never abandon the BRP Sierra Madre.”

The ship, therefore, will never be abandoned by Manila.

However, the issue is not merely one of the ship’s physical presence.
The small Philippine contingent stationed there must be resupplied periodically.
And it is during these missions that some of the most dangerous incidents between the two sides have occurred in recent years, with Chinese ships obstructing Philippine operations and, on previous occasions, even using water cannons.

Last July, tensions rose sharply.
On 20 July, during a confrontation in the waters around Ayungin, a Filipino soldier was injured. Manila and Beijing have given differing accounts of the incident, but the episode has brought back into sharp focus a question that is becoming increasingly difficult to avoid: how much longer can this rivalry, characterised by close encounters, continue without an incident leading to an escalation?

The agreement that was supposed to ease tensions

An attempt to avoid precisely this scenario had been made in 2024, when China and the Philippines had reached a provisional agreement on resupply missions to the Sierra Madre.

The agreement, however, has not resolved the underlying issue. Beijing, in fact, interprets the agreement as a mechanism requiring certain forms of coordination and maintains that Philippine operations must be subject to its supervision. Manila disputes this interpretation and asserts that the agreement does not grant China any jurisdiction over its waters nor the right to authorise missions.

Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. has continued to stress the need to keep the dialogue with Beijing open, precisely to avoid miscalculations. The problem is that, whilst diplomatic efforts are indeed continuing, they are proceeding slowly, whilst close encounters continue at sea.

Scarborough, where the issue also takes on an environmental dimension

Around 300 kilometres north-west of Luzon lies Scarborough Shoal, known in the Philippines as Bajo de Masinloc: a formation of rocks and coral reefs surrounding a lagoon in the South China Sea.

It is one of the most disputed areas between China and the Philippines and, since 2012, has been under de facto Chinese control, ensured by the constant presence of Beijing’s Coast Guard vessels.

There is, however, one important difference compared with the aforementioned Ayungin: here, there is no stranded Philippine vessel to physically symbolise Manila’s presence. The dispute centres primarily on control over access to the area, maritime activities and fishing.

In 2016, the arbitral tribunal established under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea ruled that Scarborough Shoal lies within the area over which the Philippines has sovereign rights to resources, whilst not attributing territorial sovereignty over the feature.

The environment also comes into play here. Beijing has established a national nature reserve in the Scarborough area, presenting the decision as a measure to protect the marine ecosystem. Manila has strongly contested the move, viewing it as an attempt to exercise authority that China does not possess.

The environmental issue, however, is not a minor detail here.
The Scarborough Reefs have suffered significant damage over the years, partly due to destructive fishing and the massive harvesting of giant clams. Protecting the ecosystem is therefore a genuine concern. Geopolitical risks arise when environmental conservation becomes intertwined with patrols, access restrictions and the ability to effectively manage the area.

This is one of the most sensitive aspects of this new phase: the environment may become another arena for strategic competition and lead to an ecological crisis.

Manila responds by building up its deterrent capabilities

The Philippines are trying to avoid finding themselves alone in the face of this pressure from China.  

On 22 August,the Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA) with Japan came into force, governing the mutual provision of supplies and services between the two armed forces — a further step building on the broader Reciprocal Access Agreement, which has been in force since September 2025.

This is the other side of Marcos’s policy.
On the one hand, Manila is keeping the channels of communication open with Beijing and continues to emphasise the need for cooperation. On the other hand, it is strengthening its relations with Japan, the United States and other regional partners.

This need not necessarily be seen as a contradiction. For the Philippines, dialogue serves to prevent a crisis from escalating; deterrence serves to make any attempt to change the status quo by force more costly.

The real risk is a miscalculation

To speak today of an imminent war between China and the Philippines would perhaps be an exaggeration. Beijing does not appear to have any interest in turning its pressure into an open conflict, whilst Manila knows that a direct clash would have enormous consequences for its own security and for the entire region.

The danger, however, lies elsewhere.

A collision. A ramming incident. A wounded serviceman. A manoeuvre interpreted as deliberately hostile. An operation carried out without coordination. These are events which, in an environment already saturated with ships, patrols and conflicting claims, can trigger reactions that are extremely difficult to control and predict.

War, therefore, does not appear inevitable.
But the line between provocation and war has become thinner, and the real threat may well be this: that no one deliberately chooses conflict, but that a single incident ends up dragging everyone over the threshold they had been trying to avoid.

In Filipino, they say “Kapag may usok, may apoy”, which means “where there’s smoke, there’s fire”.
A proverb intended for everyday life, but one which takes on an almost literal meaning in the South China Sea: every clash, every ship rammed, is a plume of smoke rising above the disputed ‘shallow, scrubby’ waters .

No one, in Manila or Beijing, seems willing to start an actual fire. But the smoke can now be seen from afar — and it remains to be seen who will be the first to stop fanning the flames and feeding the fire.