On the night of 3–4 November, American television networks reported that the Democrats had won control of both houses of Congress, an outcome that had occurred only twice in the last fifty years. The President sought an explanation even whilst the votes were still being counted, attributing the result in part to the war with Iran and petrol prices, whilst his entourage shifted the blame onto the candidates, accusing them of not having worked hard enough to get elected.

On this basis, a narrative quickly took hold portraying the vote as the turning point of Trump’s second term. When scrutinised closely, the result paints a more precise and less sensational picture. The House of Representatives has changed to the extent that history would expect for an unpopular president; the Senate has deviated from the norm for reasons specific to the Republican Party; and presidential power has been reduced less than the headlines suggest. The real significance of these elections lies in the two years ahead – a period of cross-vetoes with consequences reaching as far as Brussels and Kyiv.

The voters’ reasons

To understand the result, we must start with what the voters deemed important. The dominant issue was the cost of living, and the war with Iran came into the picture in the most tangible way possible. Restrictions on transit through the Strait of Hormuz have driven up fuel prices, and in September petrol alone accounted for more than half of the rise in inflation. A foreign policy decision has thus become a household budget item, one that comes up every time the car is filled up.

The politically decisive factor concerns where the blame lies. Exit polls show that the economy, once Trump’s strongest area, has become his weak point, and that the majority of voters attribute high prices to his policies rather than to external factors. Trump had won in 2024 by promising to bring prices down, and two years later voters have compared that promise with a rise caused by a decision he made.

However, it would be a mistake to interpret the result as an endorsement of the Democrats, because voters have expressed negative views of both parties and recognise only a barely perceptible advantage for the Democrats on economic issues. The message emerging from these polls concerns those in power, and it is against this backdrop that its significance must be assessed.

The House is within the norm, the Senate is off the scale

The first yardstick is the most enduring constant in American politics. Since the post-war period, the president’s party has lost seats in the House of Representatives in all but two mid-term elections. The scale of the loss depends primarilyon the approval rating of the occupant of the White House; when this falls below 50 per cent , the average loss more than doubles. Trump went into the election with the lowest approval rating ever recorded in exit polls for a president at a mid-term election, and the estimates from election night suggest the shift in the House is on the scale that historical data assigns to such an unpopular president. The House has functioned as a thermostat that reacts to whoever is in power, and to mistake this for an earthquake is to confuse the intensity of a single night with its exceptional nature.

The picture is different in the Senate, where the President’s party loses, on average, between three and four seats. This time, the Democrats have won seats in Texas, Kansas, Ohio, Iowa, the two Carolinas and Maine. In Texas, this marks the Democrats’ first victory in a state-level race since 1994. The economic climate accounts for part of this shift. The rest depends on the way the Republican Party selected its candidates. In May, Trump had caused Thomas Massie to lose the primary to a challenger he had recruited. In Texas, thanks to his endorsement, Ken Paxton defeated the outgoing Senator John Cornyn, even though many Republicans considered Cornyn the safest choice for November. As early as October, some senators were privately blaming Trump for replacing strong incumbents with weak candidates.

What emerges is a paradox of control. Trump dominated the primaries – that is, the mechanism by which the party selects its candidates – yet that dominance did not carry over to the general electorate. The defeat in Texas, the most symbolic of the night, is also the one that bears his mark most directly.

Asymmetric vetoes

This electoral landscape gives rise to the institutional changes that will take effect from 3 January 2027. Together with the House of Representatives, Congress will oversee the budget and investigations. Together with the Senate, it will oversee appointments, including federal judges, who, in the final two years of a term, are one of the few legacies a president can still build. The president, however, retains the power of veto over any bill, which can only be overridden by a two-thirds majority in both chambers, and it is this rule that gives rise to the decisive asymmetry. Over the decades, Congress has delegated broad powers to the executive, ranging from trade policy to emergency response, and to reclaim them it would have to pass laws that the president can veto. The same applies to war powers. The Democratic leader in the Senate promises to deliver results with or without the president, but on the conduct of the conflict with Iran, the new Senate will be able to vote without being able to impose its will.

More decrees, more courts

When Congress blocks legislation, a president tends to govern using instruments that do not require parliamentary approval, such as executive orders, emergency powers and foreign policy measures. When he governs by decree, the opposition and the states turn to the courts. The two-year period of mutual vetoes thus risks becoming a period of legal disputes, with the federal courts and the Supreme Court acting as arbiters. The incentives point in the same direction. The Democrats have no interest in conceding victories to a president whom the Constitution bars from a third term, whilst Trump can benefit from clashes that allow him to portray them as obstructionists.

The mid-term elections as seen from Brussels and Kyiv

For Ukraine, the vote opens up a real possibility, albeit with clear limitations. Trump has suspended direct aid to Kyiv, and the Democrats have promised to put it back on the agenda, as MP Jim Himes assured the Warsaw Security Forum. Thanks to the bipartisan support that Ukraine continues to enjoy in Congress, a new aid package could secure the two-thirds majority needed to override a veto, provided the Democrats can secure the votes of Republicans willing to oppose the President.

The greatest risk for Kyiv lies in the energy sector. On 16 October, Trump suspended the sanctions provided for under the Graham Act and concluded a deal with Moscow on diesel, irritating both Republicans and Democrats, whilst trilateral talks were expected to take place in Abu Dhabi in the first half of November. The logic linking these developments stems from electoral considerations. Whilst the war with Iran has driven up prices, bringing Russian energy back onto the market and presenting an agreement as a diplomatic success offers the president a way to ease the burden, and his political survival ultimately coincides with the weakening of Ukraine’s position. The limitation of this strategy lies with Congress. Sanctions against Moscow are the area where a two-thirds majority is most attainable, and Republican senators who already attribute the defeat to Trump have less reason to follow him.

For Brussels, the consequence is clear, because the Democrats are seeking to block the return of Russian diesel to the world market – the measure that most undermines the European sanctions regime.

The night of 3 November changed who in Washington can say ‘no’, whilst leaving the power to decide in the same hands. For Kyiv and Brussels, this means that, over the next two years, Congress will be better placed than ever before in this term of office to rein in the White House’s decisions.

As long as the institutions hold out

The night of 3 November changed who in Washington can say ‘no’ and left the power to decide in the same hands. It remains to be seen where this balance will lead, with a president who has already pushed the boundaries of his role. He has floated the idea of suspending the elections, has withheld funds approved by Congress and has waived sanctions laid down in law. Cross-vetoes work as long as each branch of government uses its tools with the moderation that Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt, in *How Democracies Die*, call ‘institutional self-restraint’. They become dangerous when each pushes them to the limit.

The US Constitution is robust enough that the rules apply of their own accord. The elections were held on the scheduled date, the President has stated that he accepts the result, and on 3 January the new majorities will take office without needing anyone’s consent. The system is more fragile where its stability depends on the will of those who must obey. The courts called upon to act as arbiters, as Hamilton wrote in The Federalist No. 78, possess neither the sword nor the purse. The next two years will put precisely this part of the system to the test, and for Kyiv and Brussels, its outcome will matter more than any seat won on 3 November.