On 20 October 2026, the Benghazi Parliament – one of the two parliaments vying for control of Libya – unanimously approved the maritime memorandum signed in November 2019 between Turkey and the then Government of National Accord in Tripoli.
This is the same Parliament that, in 2020, had unanimously rejected that agreement and severed political ties with Ankara.
It is the same Parliament linked to Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar, whom Turkey was fighting militarily until a few years ago whilst supporting the rival forces in Tripoli.

In a single vote, Benghazi achieved three things at once: it ratified a maritime agreement redrawing the exclusive economic zones in the eastern Mediterranean, it put an end to seven years of hostility with Ankara, and it demonstrated that Turkey had succeeded in transforming a controversial and contested memorandum into an instrument of influence recognised by both Libyas.

Turkey welcomed the vote.

Greece and the European Union have declared it null and void.

Italy has not yet made any significant comment.

This silence is the problem.

One agreement, five matches still to be played

The 2019 maritime memorandum is not just a matter of borders. It is a geopolitical lever that Ankara is using simultaneously across five different fronts, and on each of these fronts there are specific Italian interests at stake.

The first is the Libyan one. Saddam Haftar, son of the marshal and a rising figure within the Cyrenaican establishment, recently met with the Turkish Foreign Minister, Hakan Fidan.
What until yesterday was a political impossibility – Turkey engaging with both sides in Libya – is now a reality. Ankara has built bridges where there were once trenches, without any of the other regional players being able to prevent it.
For Italy, which has enormous energy interests in Libya through Eni and regards Tripoli as a pillar of its energy security, this means that its main Libyan counterpart now has an additional channel of communication with a direct competitor.

The second issue concerns energy. The memorandum defines exclusive economic zones that overlap with the areas where Eni, Chevron and other European operators are active. Chevron’s exploration licences south of Crete, which are expected to supply gas to Europe, are located precisely within these disputed areas. If exploration activities commence in those areas, the risk of tensions with Ankara becomes a real possibility.
Eni has been aware of this for years: Turkey has already blocked Italian exploration in Cyprus in the past, disregarding licences granted to other operators.

The third factor is the Egyptian one. Cairo regarded Cyrenaica as one of its key spheres of influence. The vote in Benghazi shows that eastern Libya is prepared to act against Egyptian interests when it deems it expedient.
For Italy, which has built part of its Mediterranean strategy on its alliance with Cairo, this repositioning by Cyrenaica is a sign that requires careful analysis.

The fourth issue concerns Greece. Greece has already declared the vote to be ‘without legal basis’ and has informed its allies that it will take all necessary measures to safeguard its sovereign rights. The rift between Ankara and Athens in the eastern Mediterranean is deepening, and Italy finds itself geographically and strategically caught in the middle of this rift, with interests that overlap with those of both sides.

The fifth working group focuses on digital infrastructure.
Strategic cables such as Sparkle’s BlueMed run through the region; these connectivity infrastructures are of significance not only economically but also in terms of national security.
Any shift in the maritime balance of power in the region has implications for the protection of this infrastructure.

The opponent we’d rather not name

Turkey is a member of NATO. It is a major trading partner. It is an essential partner in managing migration flows in the Mediterranean.
All this is true, and it explains why Rome finds it difficult to describe Ankara for what it is: Italy’s main strategic rival in the Mediterranean.

France is an economic competitor, with whom there are both differences and alliances.
Turkey is something structurally different: a player that uses its position within the Atlantic Alliance as a shield whilst pursuing objectives that directly conflict with Italian interests in the central and eastern Mediterranean.

‘The enemy is Turkish, not French’: this argument, put forward by those who study Mediterranean geopolitics closely, describes a reality that the Italian public debate prefers to ignore.

The doctrine of the ‘Blue Homeland’ – the concept that underpins Turkey’s maritime policy and claims jurisdiction over vast areas of the Mediterranean, the Aegean and the Black Sea – is now a matter of academic debate.

This is an operational strategy that takes the form of maritime agreements, a direct military presence, drilling in disputed waters, the construction of bases and the projection of diplomatic influence.
In Libya, Syria, the Horn of Africa and the Caucasus: Turkey is acting with a strategic coherence that Italy struggles even to understand, let alone counter.

The ISPI analysis has noted that a trilateral arrangement between Turkey, Italy and Libya could be taking shape, covering energy security and maritime jurisdiction. If this scenario were to materialise, Italy would find itself in a role of structural mediation with an actor that has systematically used every agreement as leverage to expand its influence.

Mediating with someone who is overtaking you is a matter of managing decline, not foreign policy.

The knot that nobody wants to untie

The economic interdependence between Italy and Turkey is the real reason why Rome finds it difficult to call Ankara what it is.
In 2024, trade between the two countries stood at around 30 billion euros, with an agreement signed during Erdogan’s visit to Rome in April 2025 to increase this to 40 billion.
Italian exports to Turkey in 2025 reached 13.7 billion euros, with machinery, transport equipment, metals and chemicals as the main items. Italy is Turkey’s leading trading partner in the Mediterranean and its second-largest in Europe after Germany.

Added to this is an even more sensitive issue: that of industrial cooperation in the defence sector.
During Erdogan’s visit to Rome, Leonardo and Baykar Technologies, Turkey’s leading manufacturer of military drones, signed an agreement to set up a joint venture dedicated to the design, development and production of unmanned aerial systems.

The joint venture will be based in Italy and will utilise technologies from both companies.
This is no minor agreement: it is a partnership between Italy’s leading state-owned defence company and the manufacturer of Bayraktar drones – the very same drones that Turkey deployed in Libya to support the Tripoli-based forces against Haftar, and which Ankara uses as a lever of military influence in the Mediterranean.

The paradox is easy to explain. Italy is entering into military co-production agreements with Turkey at the very same time as Turkey is using that military capability to expand its influence in Libya, in areas where Italian interests are directly at stake.

Turkey consistently features amongst the recipients of Italian military exports, which in 2025 reached a record €9.1 billion in authorisations. In essence, a competitor is being built right on Italy’s strategic doorstep, using Italian technology and Italian resources, whilst that competitor is reshaping the balance of power in the Mediterranean to Italy’s detriment.

Let me be clear: this is not a criticism of commercial decisions as such; economic interdependence is a means of exerting influence, not merely a constraint.

The problem is that Italy uses that interdependence as a tool for diplomatic rapprochement, whilst Turkey uses it as a cover to pursue its own strategic expansion. Bilateral trade is growing, defence cooperation is being consolidated, and Benghazi has ratified the maritime memorandum. The two tracks are proceeding in parallel, with Rome appearing to have no strategy for bringing them together to its own advantage.

The weight that doesn’t turn into flu

The Italian paradox in the Mediterranean is clear and well-documented. Italy, France and Greece together account for 41 per cent of Libyan exports, compared with just 0.01 per cent for Turkey. The economic clout of Europe – and of Italy in particular – is incomparably greater than that of Turkey. Ankara secures ratifications, builds bridges and turns controversial agreements into faits accomplis.

The reason for this asymmetry is no mystery. Over the years, Italy has chosen to use its economic interdependence with Turkey as a means of fostering closer diplomatic ties, in the belief that linking Ankara to Italian interests through trade and industrial cooperation would bring stability and influence.

The logic is not wrong in the abstract. The problem is that it only works if both parties use it for the same purpose.

Italy employs soft power: the energy sector, investment and economic diplomacy. This approach has yielded results over time. A player that also employs hard power – such as a direct military presence, imposed maritime agreements and drilling in disputed waters – cannot be countered by soft power alone.

The Mattei Plan is heading in the right direction in its aim to make Italy an energy hub between Europe and Africa. A hub, however, needs a secure perimeter, and the perimeter of the central Mediterranean is shrinking.

What the Benghazi vote makes clear

The result in Benghazi is not merely a defeat for Italy. It is something more subtle and more worrying: proof that Turkey is managing to operate in a coherent and strategic manner in a region that Italy has historically regarded as its own, achieving results that seemed impossible just a few years ago, whilst Rome has been unable to produce an equally coherent response.

Italy has developed such a deep interdependence with Turkey – in trade, industry and diplomacy – that it is structurally difficult to counter its expansion.

It is not a trap she has fallen into: it is a choice, made with a clear rationale, which nevertheless produces a specific side effect.

Anyone who cannot identify their competitor cannot even devise a strategy to contain them. And anyone who fails to devise a strategy to contain them finds themselves, vote after vote, agreement after agreement, having to accept their own decline as if it were inevitable.

Libya is not lost. But it is slipping away.

The Mediterranean doesn’t wait for those who stand still. And Italy, at the moment, isn’t just standing still: it has also come up with very good reasons not to move.