There is one point that has emerged in recent months in the European political debate with a force not seen since the end of the Cold War:Europe must become adult. Autonomous. Sovereign. Able to defend its own borders and interests without depending exclusively on the protective umbrella of the United States. In a single word: independent.

For decades, the Western security architecture has stood on an almost unquestionable assumption: Washington as the ultimate guarantor of European stability. But Donald Trump’s political line – marked by a transactional idea of alliances and a competitive outlook even towards historical partners – has shattered this certainty. It is not just a matter of tactical differences: it is the very idea of an alliance that has changed. And in this scenario, for the first time clearly, Europe understands that it can no longer afford to be an economic power without also being a political and military power.

In this historical passage, two figures emerge who, despite coming from different political traditions, are embodying a possible European trajectory: Pedro Sánchez and Emmanuel Macron.

Beyond the Union blocked by unanimity

The European Union, as it is structured, suffers from an obvious limitation: the principle of unanimity in foreign and security policy. A single state can block crucial decisions. And when this state takes ambiguous or openly pro-Russian positions – as in the case of Hungary led by Viktor Orbán – the mechanism jams.

The result is a paralysis that risks being fatal at a time of wars on the eastern borders and rising tensions in the Mediterranean and the Middle East.

Sánchez and Macron seem to move in the knowledge that Europe, in order to survive, must sometimes go beyond its own procedural constraints. Not against the Union, but beyond its rigidities. Not to break it up, but to resurrect its original political spirit.

Two different leaders, two different lines, one international posture

The differences between the two are evident on the domestic economic front: the Spanish socialist has pursued redistributive policies and strong public intervention; the French president has embodied a liberal and reformist line. But when one turns to foreign policy and European defence, the gaps narrow drastically.

Both share three fundamental assumptions: Europe defends itself in Kyiv;strategic autonomy is not an option, but a necessity; Europe’s international posture must be consistent and credible.

Sánchez: Europeanism without ambiguity

The caricatures of a certain right wing portray Pedro Sánchez as a kind of ‘Fidel Castro of Castile’. But political reality tells otherwise. Spain is now fully included in the coalition of the ‘willing’ in support of Ukraine, without tactical ambiguities or diplomatic double standards.

Sánchez went so far as to declare Spain’s readiness to considersending military personnel to Ukrainian territory as part of a European mission. A statement that breaks a historical taboo for a country with a cautious tradition in military matters. The message is clear: European security cannot be delegated.

On the Middle East front, the Spanish leader maintained a position consistent with his political culture. Faced with the raids by the United States and Israel against targets in Iran, he expressed a clear condemnation of the methods and strategy, rejecting the use of Spanish bases for US operations. A choice that does not stem from anti-Americanism, but from an autonomous reading of European interest and a multilateral vision of international law.

Macron: pragmatism and power

If Sánchez starts out from a left-wing tradition with a strong pacifist imprint, Emmanuel Macron moves from a liberal and ‘statist’ culture at the same time, daughter of the Gaullist tradition. But the point of arrival converges.

Macron was among the first to speak openly about ‘European strategic autonomy’ when the concept still seemed an academic exercise. Today that formula seems almost prophetic.

While declaring his opposition to the US and Israeli raids on Iran, the French president simultaneously strengthened the French military presence in sensitive theatres and relaunched the idea of extending the French nuclear umbrella to other European countries. A historic step: deterrence is no longer just national, but European.

This is a powerful message, especially at a time when American reliability is perceived as variable. If Washington retreats or assumes a competitive posture towards Europe, Paris proposes itself as the fulcrum of a new continental security architecture.

Europe at a crossroads

Sánchez and Macron do not represent an ideological alliance. They represent an alliance of historical awareness. They know that the time for half-measures is over. That Europe can no longer afford to be an economic giant and a geopolitical dwarf.

The war in Ukraine marked a watershed. The tensions in the Middle East are a further test. If Europe does not build its own autonomous defence capability, it risks finding itself squeezed between revisionist powers and increasingly unpredictable allies.

The real political issue is no longer whether to strengthen European sovereignty, but who has the courage to do so. And at this historic moment, two leaders with very different internal economic policies find themselves surprisinglyaligned on the strategic design.

One socialist, the other liberal.
One accused of radicalism, the other of technocratic elitism.

But both aware that their choices do not speak only to Madrid or Paris. They speak to an entire continent.

In a Europe that cannot and must not be an ideological monolith, the different positions of Sanchez and Macron have full citizenship because they move within an identical European vision in which there will always be room for various sensitivities.

Two visions and two positions that originate from different ideal and value bases but that can confront each other without losing sight of the goal of anincreasingly sovereign, increasingly independent Europe, unlike the non-positions taken by some or the vetoes imposed by others for the sole – declared – purpose of harming the European project.

Because today the line between European renaissance and its slow irrelevance does not only pass through Brussels. It passes through the ability of some leaders to act as if Europe were already a political power, even when its institutions are not yet fully so.

The Great Absent: Italy between narration and reality

In this fast-moving scenario, however, there is a stone guest: Italy.

In the domestic narrative, the Italian government is often portrayed as a protagonist at all tables, a bridge between Washington and Brussels, a privileged interlocutor of European conservatives and at the same time a reliable NATO partner. But when one looks at the strategic choices that really mark Europe’s trajectory – military autonomy, overcoming unanimity, building a credible common defence – Rome appears more spectator than driver.

The issue is not the Atlantic positioning, which no one questions. The issue is consistency with the idea of a Europe capable of acting even when the United States takes divergent or openly conflicting paths with respect to European interests. In this sense, the declaration of not wanting to go beyond the principle of unanimity in foreign policy is a clear political signal.

Defending unanimity means accepting that a single state can block strategic decisions on defence and international policy. It means, in effect, giving up on transforming the Union into a fully autonomous geopolitical entity. It is a legitimate position, but one that is difficult to reconcile with the idea of a strong, sovereign Europe that is capable of taking rapid decisions in crisis situations.

North South West East: all directions, no direction

And it is here that the distance with the posture of Pedro Sánchez and Emmanuel Macron is measured. Both, albeit with different accents, seem to accept the idea that Europe must equip itself with more streamlined decision-making tools and an integrated defence capacity, even at the cost of revising consolidated balances. Rome, on the other hand, takes a cautious line that ends up translating into immobilism.

The consequence is a paradox: while Paris and Madrid help outline the architecture of a possible post-American – or at least less dependent on the US – Europe, Italy remains shrouded in strategic ambiguity. It is unclear what the Italian government’s end point is: a Europe of nations jealous of its own vetoes? A renewed but still asymmetrical Atlantic alliance? Or an attempt at permanent mediation that, however, risks being perceived as a lack of vision?

In foreign policy, the absence of a clear direction weighs as heavily as a wrong choice. Because at a time when continental balances are being redefined, not deciding is tantamount to letting others decide.

If Europe is to truly emancipate itself from a strategic dependence that it can no longer take for granted, the confrontation will not only be between right-wing and left-wing governments, or between liberals and socialists. It will be between those who accept responsibility for building a shared European sovereignty and those who prefer to remain anchored to mechanisms that, in fact, limit its emergence.

And today, in the face of this historic choice, Italy – beyond the declarations – does not appear to be among the countries charting a course.