The Trump Doctrine: a sentence for Europe

On 23 January, the US War Department published its National Defence Strategy for 2026.

This document is a clear watershed in international relations, as of today, Donald Trump’s worldview has been definitively crystallised, the red thread linking Trump’s only seemingly haphazard foreign policy sees the light.

The new US posture is proactive (from Department of Defence to War), lethal, decisive, and above all focused exclusively on concrete national interests.

The Trump Doctrine, however, is not an innovation, but a return to the classic. It abandons post-1989 hyper-interventionism to brush up on the Monroe Doctrine but more importantly Nixon’s Realpolitik.

The United States no longer wants to be the world’s lone policeman, but neither does it want to relinquish its role as the global hegemonic power; in fact, it aspires to be thearchitect of a global coalition that delegates the front line to the allies (exactly as in Nixon’s Guam Doctrine), with the aim of wearing down the enemy in an armed peace.

Homeland

Top priority is given to the homeland and the entireWestern Hemisphere.

“We will secure America’s borders and maritime approaches, and we will defend our nation’s skies through Golden Dome for America and a renewed focus on countering unmanned aerial threats.”

“We will guarantee U.S. military and commercial access to key terrain, especially the Panama Canal, Gulf of America, and Greenland.”

It is the geopolitical translation of America First, a historic turning point given that for decades priority was given to external operations; but at the same time of a return to basics, an explicit reference is made to the Monroe Doctrine, of which Trump’s vision is but a corollary.

The inspiration, however, does not only come from Monroe, the Golden Dome is in fact the ideological heir to Raegan’s Star Wars Defence (SDI), same ambition to define the rules of deterrence, but above all the same doubts as to its real feasibility both technologically and economically.

The challenge to China

China is recognised as the second global power. A solid, structural and established geopolitical player, which one must learn to manage (competitive coexistence), not fight.

The goal of the Trump Doctrine is to prevent Chinese hegemony over the Indo-Pacific, and the tool is military deterrence by negation, i.e. developing forces that make it impossible for Beijing to dominate the region.

How can total deterrence in the Pacific be reconciled with priority over the Western Hemisphere?

“Increase Burden-Sharing with U.S. Allies and Partners […] In the Indo-Pacific, where our allies share our desire for a free and open regional order, allies and partners’ contributions will be vital to deterring and balancing China”

The US aims to create a multilateral network of deterrence by increasing the military capabilities of all partners in the Indo-Pacific, i.e. more spending. This network will then be America’s own diplomatic lever : Washington aspires, from an advantaged negotiating position, toget China to accept a balance of power favourable to the US.

The US seeks a favourable balance exactly as it did during the 1922 Naval Conference (setting the balance of power between the American and Japanese fleets at 5:3), when Japan was the problem in the Pacific. Unable to sink the Chinese navy (just as they could not sink the Japanese navy in ’21 without all-out war), they seek to enmesh it in a system of rules and alliances that freezes the status quo to American advantage.

There is one detail, however, that must not be overlooked, in 1922 Japan felt humiliated and this led to war: will China accept to be number 2 or will it turn the table?

Russia and Europe

Russia is described as a ‘persistent but manageable’ threat with no economic capacity to aspire to European hegemony.

This systemic downplaying of the Russian threat has a precise and stated objective: to justify the transfer of the defence burden to the European allies.

Nixon spoke of a Vietnamisation of the conflict, Trump imposes a complete Europeanisation of the conflict.

“Fortunately, our NATO allies are substantially more powerful than Russia-it is not even close. Germany’s economy alone dwarfs that of Russia.”

However, history teaches us that wars are not won by GDPs, in 1940 the combined GDPs of France and Britain far exceeded the Nazi’s, and Paris was occupied in 6 weeks.

This analysis, however, underestimates Russia’s ability to regenerate its armed forces in the medium term, the war economy adopted by Moscow as well as the possible technological and material contribution of China, Iran and North Korea.

The problem being ignored is the European military unpreparedness, on all fronts: technological, industrial, political, decision-making

Until these structural deficits are bridged, the idea of full European ownership will remain fragile and difficult to sustain in the confrontation with Russia.

Just as Kennedy switched from Eisenhower’s Massive Retaliation to Flexible Response, so Trump withdraws conventional flexible response from Europe to focus only on nuclear and cyber deterrence.

Left to ourselves

NSD 2026 is not a warning, but a judgement: American disengagement from Europe leaves us alone, with a war at our doorstep.

It is the EU’s task to develop a political, economic and military structure capable of independently facing the challenges of tomorrow.

In doing so, we must not forget that Europe has a history of failures in military-decision coordination, from the CED, which failed because the French Parliament refused ratification in 1954, to the wars in Yugoslavia.

The facts show us that Europe’s inability to make decisions is structural, and both political and military renewal is needed.

The risk is a new 1954, where European nationalisms once again scuttle any attempt at common defence.