Mélenchon urges the French to disobey…reality
For years we, the Italians, have scrupulously played the part of Europe’s usual black sheep: the spread perched on our hump, our budgets perpetually in intensive care, and that air of being a special case that forced us to look at our cousins across the Alps the way one looks at a dandy explaining table manners to a bunch of boors.
Then, all of a sudden, the play (almost) reversed the roles.
All it took was a short stroll down the Champs-Élysées to realise that this model pupil is racking up a string of failures so severe that they make the ramshackle finances of our First Republic look like a textbook example of fiscal rigour in the style of Montian economics. France has settled comfortably, with all due honours, into the role of the new ‘canary in the coalmine’ of European fiscal populism. A deficit brazenly above 5 per cent, voracious public spending that gobbles up well over half of GDP, and government bond yields that have happily doubled those of Portugal to join the usual unlucky periphery of the Eurozone.
Whilst the United States exports debt thanks to the dollar’s omnipotence and Japan manages it from the safety of its formidable domestic savings base, denominated entirely in its own currency, France finds itself exposed in the perfect storm of global interest rates without so much as a shred of protection. Paris does not mint the currency in which it borrows: that currency is subject to the strict stability mandate of the European Central Bank in Frankfurt.
The psychological breaking point came on the morning of 9 September 2025: for the first time since the introduction of the single currency, the French spread exceeded that of Italy, reaching a yield of 3.48 per cent compared with 3.47 per cent for our BTPs. That single, humiliating hundredth of a percentage point marked the end of immunity for the continent’s former ‘model pupil’.
France’s macroeconomic figures for 2026 paint a picture of a country that is structurally out of control. INSEE has confirmed that public debt has breached the 3,500 billion euro mark, recording a record increase of over 75 billion in just ninety days: that is more than 800 million euros of new debt accumulated every day. The debt-to-GDP ratio has soared to 117.5 per cent, whilst interest payments alone are set to exceed 74 billion euros a year. France now spends more on servicing its debt than it allocates to national defence, and the Bank of France gloomily estimates that the interest bill will approach 100 billion before the end of the decade.
The Insoumis’s curious ideas on GDP and the market
Paris is no longer a bastion of stability alongside Berlin: it is a fiscal powder keg. And as the first flames began to rise, the French political class saw fit to tackle the emergency armed with a generous supply of petrol.
To understand the cognitive heights at which the prophets of social redemption in Paris operate, it is worth jotting down in your notebook the lessons in advanced theoretical economics bestowed upon us by Jean-Luc Mélenchon.
With the air of an enlightened guru, the leader of France Insoumise dismissed national accounts with a metaphor that deserves an Oscar for comedy:
“GDP is just a monetary measure: I dig a hole, and GDP goes up. I fill it in, and GDP goes up again. I get in my car, crash into a wall, and GDP goes up because the wall has to be rebuilt and the car repaired.”
Brilliant. That’s prize-winning logic. Applying the ‘Mélenchon method’, the key to global prosperity is not innovation or productivity, but a massive, round-the-clock national bumper car ride, entirely subsidised by the state. But the real gem comes on the subject of financial markets: “What market? There is no such thing as a market. There are hedge funds, financial firms and insurance companies. Tell me where they live and I’ll go and reassure them!”
So why go to all that trouble to pay off the debts? The plan devised by LFI together with the reformed investment banker Matthieu Pigasse is ready: to write off or freeze the approximately 600 billion euros of French public debt held by the Eurosystem/ECB into a perpetual, zero-interest debt. You take the portion of the debt held by Frankfurt and ‘throw it into the fire’, to use the sober and delicate words of the Jacobin leader, dismissing the whole affair as a mere ‘accounting trick, a stroke of the pen on money we owe to ourselves’.
The Theatre of the Absurd: when LFI’s leaders fall out with one another
Leaving aside the pipe dream of a selective, cost-free default against the Central Bank, the most laughable aspect of Mélenchon’s proposals lies in their absolute, grotesque internal mathematical inconsistency.
Take, for example, the increase in the minimum wage (SMIC) by decree to 1,700 euros net: raised by administrative decree to over 70 per cent of the median French income, this would cause the cost of social security contribution relief borne by the State to soar by tens of billions, or it would instantly strangle SMEs, wiping out millions of jobs and reducing the tax base for personal income tax and corporation tax to nothing.
Things are no better on the tax front, where LFI is banking on 106 billion in purely fictitious revenue by playing ‘Battleship’ with the figures. It promises 25 billion from wealth taxes (between the ‘Zucman Tax’ and the armchair-style climate wealth tax) and a further 20 from doubling inheritance taxes, treating capital as if it were inanimate objects firmly anchored to French soil. In reality, scrapping the tax relief on the generational transfer of family businesses (the ‘Dutreil Pact’) does not generate revenue: it forces owners to sell off the country’s industrial assets abroad at a knock-down price or to transfer their tax residence a minute before they die, leaving the State with nothing to show for it.
Sixty years of social elephantiasis cannot be cured by wishful thinking, just as consumer prices for petrol or baguettes cannot be frozen by Manzonian rhetoric without the State having to sign blank cheques for differential subsidies to prevent supermarkets from remaining desolately empty. This is not social economics: it is an accounting sideshow.
The absurdity of the stroke of the pen regarding the ECB’s debt
When one realises that fiscal engineering evaporates at the first whiff of reality and structural expenditure shoots through the roof (including 30 billion a year just to bring the retirement age back to 60), that’s when the utter madness of a debt write-off, hatched in Frankfurt, rears its head. It’s a pity that the banking system shows no mercy to amateurs:
- The budget shortfall at the Central Bank: When the ECB bought those 600 billion in French government bonds, it created a corresponding amount of bank reserves on the liabilities side. By writing off the securities from the assets side with a stroke of the pen, the securities disappear but the reserves on the liabilities side remain where they are. The Central Bank finds itself with negative equity and, under a regime of positive interest rates, must continue to pay interest to commercial banks without receiving a single cent from government bonds. To cover the structural losses of its central bank, the state would have to recapitalise it by reaching into taxpayers’ pockets or resign itself to a wave of inflation on the scale of the Weimar Republic.
- The shock of a partial default on private creditors: The remaining 70 per cent of French debt is held by private investors, foreign banks and pension funds. If a state decides to write off 30 per cent of its claims against the ECB by decree, the private markets will interpret the move for what it is: a partial default. The very next day, anyone lending a single euro to Paris will demand astronomical interest rates to protect themselves against future expropriations by the state, triggering a wild surge in the spread and condemning the country to financial strangulation.
- The restriction laid down in Article 123 TFEU: it is precisely to avoid such scenarios that the European Treaties strictly prohibit the direct monetisation of debt.
To proceed unilaterally would be to flout EU law, defy the inevitable veto by Germany and the frugal countries, and bring about France’s de facto expulsion from the eurozone.
The risk of infection and the dilemma facing Europe
Such a unilateral move would not remain confined within the borders of France. In a Eurozone where all budgets are held together with sticky tape, a breach of the rules by the bloc’s second-largest economy would ultimately paralysed the EU institutions themselves. The ECB’s anti-spread shield (the TPI) requires formal compliance with European budgetary constraints: faced with a government determined to ‘disobey’ and already subject to an excessive deficit procedure, Frankfurt would find its hands legally tied. Without a safety net, market mistrust would engulf the entire club of highly indebted countries, reopening the cracks across the continent’s banking balance sheets.
The real problem lies in the systemic nature of this crisis. The Greek bailout cost around 290 billion euros; the French economy is more than ten times larger. Financial resources on that scale simply do not exist in Europe’s stability funds. Furthermore, with over half of its debt held by foreign creditors and an increasing proportion held by ruthless speculators, France’s vulnerability is at its peak.
Mélenchon’s programme and his doctrine of ‘sovereign disobedience’ are not the root cause of the decline, but its most vociferous and extreme symptom. If Paris claims to remedy fifty years of state rigidity by tearing down the Frankfurt rules with the fantasy finance of selective default, the European Union will not be facing yet another round of late-night budget negotiations over croissants and cold coffee, but the most dramatic and definitive day of reckoning in its history.








