In the ‘game’ of perceptions and diplomacy, sometimes a visit is worth more than a treaty. It is in this context that Beijing’s invitation to the leader of the Kuomintang, a historic party that is now in opposition, fits in: a political signal that speaks as much to Taipei as to Washington. Xi Jinping sends a message to Trump: a deal with Taipei is possible over the straits.

Xi Jinping’s invitation to the Kuomintang leader, Cheng Li-wun (鄭麗文), marks a delicate transition in relations between Taiwan and China.

The visit, accepted and scheduled with stages between Beijing, Shanghai and Jiangsu, is officially presented as an attempt to foster the ‘peaceful development’ (和平發展, hé píng fā zhǎn) of cross-strait relations. But behind this diplomatic formula lies a broader, more devious strategy.

Beijing wants to show that there are alternative interlocutors to the current government in Taipei. In other words, to build the idea that dialogue is possible – provided the ‘right’ partners are chosen.

The Kuomintang: history, identity and ambiguity

The Kuomintang (中國國民黨, Zhōngguó Guómíndǎng) is the main opposition party in Taiwan. Historically linked to mainland China and a protagonist in the Chinese civil war before the retreat to the island in 1949, the KMT maintains a more pro-dialogue stance with Beijing.

Party leader Cheng Li-wun represents this line well, but also its contradictions. An experienced politician with a long parliamentary career, she has often alternated between pragmatic tones and more cautious statements when it comes to sovereignty and security.

Its ambiguity reflects an internal tension: on the one hand, the attempt to keep economic and political channels open with China, on the other hand, the need not to appear too aligned with Beijing in front of an electorate that remains largely distrustful.

The target: Lai Ching-te’s government

Domestically, Beijing’s message is mainly directed at President Lai Ching-te.

To favour meetings with the opposition is, in fact, to question the centrality of the current democratic government. The aim is to wear down the political legitimacy of the executive, suggesting that there are more ‘manageable’ alternatives for maintaining stability in the Straits.

It is a subtle strategy: not direct confrontation, but indirect pressure. Total delegitimisation rather than escalation.

Trump, the logic of ‘deals’ and the image game

Then there is a less visible, but decisive level: that linked to the occupant of the White House, Donald Trump.

The Kuomintang leader’s visit to China comes at a time when Beijing is closely watching Washington’s moves.
Xi knows Trump’s approach well: centrality of direct negotiations, focus on media impact, constant search for quick results to present as a ‘deal’.

From this perspective, showing that there are active channels of communication between the two sides of the Strait becomes a precise and targeted political tool. The aim is to offer Trump a more flexible reading of the Taiwan issue, less rigid and more open to room for negotiation, even while sensitive issues such as certain US arms sales packages to Taiwan remain unresolved.

Xi Jinping is aiming precisely at this: to reduce the US president’s unpredictability, to lure him onto more controllable negotiating ground, and to use every diplomatic lever to steer Washington’s position on Taiwan, at least in part.

The United States meanwhile sends a signal: senators in Taipei

Meanwhile, the US is not standing idly by. Bipartisan delegations of US senators have visited Taiwan, including stops at technological and military institutes to closely observe the development of drones and defence capabilities.

Such trips have a specific meaning: to reiterate support for Taipei and strengthen security cooperation. It is a way to balance the Chinese narrative and keep the Taiwanese government’s international visibility high.

A strategy across the Straits and beyond

What emerges is a layered picture, where signals count more than formal decisions.

Xi Jinping tries to move on several levels, seeking to influence Taiwan’s internal debate and give visibility to alternative interlocutors to the government.
Taipei, with Lai Ching-te, maintains a prudent but firm line, aiming to strengthen its international positioning and ties with the United States.
Washington remains balanced between deterrence and strategic ambiguity, carefully watching every move in the Strait.

Figures like Cheng Li-Wun, then, assume a specific weight that goes beyond the immediate result. They represent a possible parallel channel, useful for Beijing to feed the idea that the future of relations between the two shores may also pass through different, more negotiable paths, less aligned to the line of the current Taiwanese government.