On 3 February 2026, the Justice Committee of the United States House of Representatives released a report entitled The Foreign Censorship Threat, Part II, an interim report drafted by the committee’s Republican staff that accuses European institutions of conducting a systematic campaign of regulatory pressure on large digital platforms over thepast decade, which has also directly affected freedom of expression in the United States. The document was released under the political supervision of the committee’s chairman, Jim Jordan, a leading Republican Party member and a central figure in theconservative wing of the House.

The institutional and political context of the relationship

Jordan, a congressman from Ohio since 2007, is known for his combative profile and his close alliance with Donald Trump. In the past, he has been among the most vigorous opponents of the so-called Russiagate investigation and has led several parliamentary initiatives against what he considers government interference or undue restrictions on constitutional freedoms. Hailing from the Freedom Caucus, the most conservative group of Republicans in the House, Jordan has built his political identity on his defence of the First Amendment and a strongly sceptical view of international regulation of digital platforms. His leadership of the Judiciary Committee has directed itsinvestigative work towards the relationship between governments, big tech and free speech.

Political profile and ideological line of leadership

The report alleges that the European Commission has over the years exerted increasing pressure on large technology companies to adopt more restrictive content moderation policies, formally to combatonline disinformation andhate. At the heart of theaccusation is that regulatory instruments such as the Digital Services Act, although legally valid only within the borders of theEuropean Union, have led global platforms such as Meta, Google, TikTok and X to apply uniform standards on a global scale, in order to avoid sanctions or regulatory conflicts. In the Committee‘s view, this standardisation would have resulted in an indirect restriction of freedom of expression also for American users, on topics that fall within the scope of constitutional protection in the United States.

Extraterritorial effects of European regulation

Examples cited include content related to the COVID-19 pandemic, the immigration debate and gender identity issues. The report states that, under the category of ‘disinformation’, legal content would sometimes be removed or de-indexed, generating a chilling effect on public debate. The documents collected by the committee, according to the republican reconstruction, would show frequent interactions between European regulators and platform managers, with calls for swift action and structural adjustments of internal policies.

The document is not signed by an individual parliamentarian as author, but is presented as an interim staff report of the Justice Committee, reflecting the political position of the Republican majority that controls it. In this sense, while formally a technical product, the report is part of a broader political strategy that sees Jordan and his allies engaged in opposing what they call a convergence of European regulation and private platform moderation, which they see as potentially incompatible with the American tradition of free speech.

Thearticle comes at a time of growing tension between Washington and Brussels over digital rules. For House Republicans, theextraterritorial effect of European rules represents a new frontier of global regulatory conflict, where the risk would not only be commercial or technological, but constitutional. The issue raised by the report is not only about the governance of platforms, but the deeper knot of the relationship between legal sovereignty, the global digital space and the protection of fundamental rights.

Digital regulation and the conflict between sovereignty

But what do the European provisions stipulate in summary? With the Digital Services Act (DSA), for example, large platforms(VLOPs) are obliged to assess and mitigate systemic risks, including misinformation andhate speech, while the Code of Conduct on Countering Illegal Hate Speech Online stipulates that providers must examine reports of hate speech within 24 hours.

While there is a well-founded fear that the definitions of ‘hate’ or ‘fake news’ are too broad and can therefore be used to block dissenting opinions, this effect can be avoided by formulating such expressions more precisely and circumstantially. On the other hand, it cannot be ignored that a lack of regulation brings with it greater risks, such as the systematic spread of fake news on social media or its invasion by trolls, capable of creating theerroneous impression that false and misleading opinions are prevalent, thereby significantly influencing citizens‘ political choices.

Adjust better, not less

In short, the debate should not be aboutwhether or not to regulate, but how to regulate. With this publication, however, the Committee for Justice does not merely denounce a regulatory phenomenon, but prepares the ground for legislative initiatives to strengthen the protection of freedom of expression in the United States against foreign regulatory influences. The report thus becomes not only an indictment of theEuropean Union, but also a piece of the broader domestic American political battle over the role of platforms, content regulation, and thecontemporary interpretation of the First Amendment.

Domestic political implications in the United States

All this might appear as the normal product ofparliamentary activity, were it not for the fact that it paradoxically ends up calling into question the right to hold different opinions, particularly on a regulation that many consider necessary for global platforms such as Meta, Google, TikTok and X. In order to prevent this from becoming the breeding ground for an ideological battle that could reduce the space for free expression and increase tensions between Europe and the United States, the best solution would be to address the issue in a dedicated international body.

The need for a multilateral forum

Today, there is no such body worldwide, although there are several international fora where these issues are discussed and negotiated. The most important is theUnited Nations Organisation, in particular through theHuman Rights Council and theOffice of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. Within the UN also operates the Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Opinion and Expression, who intervenes in cases of censorship, platform regulation and digital rights; however, his decisions have mainly political and moral value, not binding legislative.

The role of international institutions

Another central forum is theInternet Governance Forum, also under UN auspices. TheIGF does not produce binding standards, but brings together governments, technology companies, civil society and academics to discuss Internet governance, freedom of expression, digital security and platform regulation. It is a forum for discussion, not aregulatory authority.

On the economic and regulatory level, a relevant role is played by the World Trade Organisation when digital regulations affect cross-border trade and services. In such cases, the issue can become the subject of trade disputes between states.

Global trade and digital rules

In the West, the action of the Council of Europe – as distinct from theEuropean Union – is particularly relevant for the adoption of the European Convention on Human Rights, which protects freedom of expression inArticle 10. Disputes can reach the European Court of Human Rights, whose rulings are binding on the member states.

The judicial protection of rights

As far as telecommunications and technical aspects of the network are concerned, theInternational Telecommunication Union, a specialised agency of the United Nations, operates. TheITU deals mainly with technical standards and infrastructure, rather than with content or freedom of speech.

Technical standards and limits of competence

Finally, there are influential non-governmental bodies, such as theOECD, which draws up guidelines on the digital economy and platform regulation, or multilateral initiatives such as the Summit for Democracy, promoted by the United States, where the issues of disinformation and online freedom have been central.

Informal actors in global governance

The crucial point remains that there is neither a World Internet Court nor asupranational authority capable of definitively harmonising digital freedom of expression. Global Internet governance is thus fragmented between international human rights law, regional regulation, national sovereignty and private self-regulation.

Fragmented governance

In this context, democratic countries are at a disadvantage compared to autocracies, which can close themselves off from outside influences, while Western democracies are permeable to foreign interference aimed at influencing their political choices or destabilising their institutional framework.

Open Democracies and Structural Vulnerabilities

In light of this, those parties that have not resisted the hybrid war waged by autocratic regimes through social platforms, central tools of a strategy aimed at dividing and weakeningEurope and theAtlantic alliance, are suspected of collaborationism.

Hybrid warfare and political responsibility

The fact that the initiative comes from the Justice Committee of the United States House of Representatives, dominated by Trumpian members of the Republican Party, starting with Jim Jordan, seems to confirm the existence of a collaborationist design with the dictatorship in power in Moscow. A design that, behind the rhetoric of defending the First Amendment, ends up favouring the historic enemies of the democracies, promoting deregulation on vital issues in a context of hybrid warfare, with potentially decisive effects onWestern public opinion and global geopolitical balances.