Power operations do not ask for permission from the public debate. They happen when three conditions converge: a delegitimised regime, an unstable internal balance and an external actor willing to exploit the window of opportunity. Venezuela, in recent hours, has become the perfect intersection of these three dynamics.

The capture of Nicolás Maduro by the United States is not the result of improvisation nor the umpteenth coup de theatre by Donald Trump. It is the outcome of a long, layered process concerning the progressive loss of legitimacy of the Chavista regime, its transformation into an increasingly criminalised system of power, and the American decision to prove – to itself and to others – that it has not renounced its capacity for direct intervention in the Latin American strategic space.

Those who read this event exclusively through the categories of violated law or international ethics miss the central point

The question is not whether the operation was ‘right’ according to abstract criteria, but why it happened now, why against Maduro, and why in this way. In international politics, timing is always a signal. And when a leader is picked up in the middle of the night, it means that the system that supported him was already much more fragile than it appeared.

Venezuela did not suddenly enter a crisis today. It is today that that crisis has become operationally exploitable. And this is where you have to start, if you want to understand what is really happening – and what could happen in the coming weeks.

A de facto regime: Maduro’s structural illegitimacy

Defining Nicolás Maduro as a de facto president is neither a rhetorical stretch nor an ideological stance. It is an analytical qualification that derives from a sequence of verifiable facts. The Venezuelan crisis did not originate with the American intervention: the latter was grafted onto a crisis of legitimacy that was already overt, which had transformed Chavista power into a system of control with no verifiable electoral basis.

The breaking point is the 2024 presidential elections. According to the National Electoral Council (CNE), Maduro would get 51.2% of the vote. However, the results were never accompanied by the publication of disaggregated data per seat, a minimum prerequisite of any credible process. In the face of this opacity, the opposition published more than80 per cent of the minutes collected directly from the polling stations, documents that indicate an opposite outcome: Edmundo González Urrutia is said to have obtained around 67 per cent of the consensus, overtaking Maduro by a margin of more than two to one.

This asymmetry has never been clarified

The government did not allow independent verifications, revoked the invitation to European observers and delegated all ‘control’ to a Supreme Court structurally subordinate to the executive. In institutional terms, this is a breach of the principle of electoral accountability, depriving power of one of its fundamental sources of legitimacy.

The reading was not confined to internal opposition. The UN, EU and several regional governments repeatedly demanded the publication of the minutes. The Carter Centre, the only admitted observer, stated that the elections did not meet the minimum standards of transparency. Hence a crucial consequence: the distinction between power exercised and power recognised.

Since 2024, the West does not recognise Maduro’s presidency

The United States, Italy and the European Parliament have recognised González Urrutia as a legitimate president, denying Maduro political recognition while noting his de facto control. It is a familiar configuration in international relations: an authority that rules without recognised legitimacy, sustaining itself through coercion and repressive apparatuses increasingly intertwined with criminal dynamics.

It is against this background that the operation carried out between 2 and 3 January should be placed

The US intervention did not target a legitimate government, but a leader already classified as a fugitive from justice by Washington and indicted for drug trafficking and terrorism. In realist terms, the question was not whether Maduro was still in charge, but whether he was still a legitimate political authority. In light of the facts, the answer is no.

The American operation made explicit a pre-existing reality: Maduro was no longer a contested president, but a residual power, sustained by inertia and coercion applied to the system. It was in this fracture – between formal legality and material control – that the window of opportunity exploited by the United States opened.

The right time: internal vulnerability and choice of equipment

Regime change operations present a historical constant well known to the political literature: they do not work if the target system is cohesive. The US apparatuses acted when the Venezuelan regime was showing clear signs of structural ageing: international isolation, erosion of legitimacy, tired military elites, internal tensions and loss of consensus even in traditionally Chavista sectors. In other words, when the cost of loyalty was beginning to outweigh the benefits of loyalty.

In this context, it is scarcely credible to imagine an operation of this magnitude in the absence of at least benevolent neutrality, if not passive collaboration, from segments within the system. Personalist regimes survive as long as the leader acts as the glue between apparatuses, interests and protection networks. Once that figure is removed, there is no automatic collapse, but a phase of individual strategic recalculation opens.

Someone opened the door of Maduro’s house to the Americans, or at least pretended not to.

It is the mechanism that Timur Kuran has called the defection cascade: as long as the regime appears stable, even those who dissent continue to feign loyalty; when stability breaks down, silence becomes irrational.

Maduro’s capture was therefore not just a symbolic blow. It broke the glue that held together military elites, the security apparatus and economic interests. Since then, every general and power broker has been faced with a brutal choice: remain loyal to a decapitated regime or adapt to a new equilibrium.

It is in this framework that the behaviour of Vice-President Delcy Rodríguez should be read. The harsh speech to the nation – ‘we will not yield’, ‘Maduro remains president ‘ – is an attempt to re-establish a semblance of vertical cohesion and reassure the apparatus. But public communication only tells half the story. As Marco Rubio confirmed, contacts between the vice-president and the United States have taken place.

This double track – internal rhetorical firmness and external tactical openness – is typical of the terminal phases of authoritarian regimes. It serves to buy time, test the balance of power and explore options for survival or a negotiated exit without exposing oneself too soon.

The future of Venezuela is played out here: not in official declarations, but in the silent choices of the apparatuses, in confidential contacts and in the weak signals that indicate whether the cascade of defections will be contained, slowed down or accelerated. On this will depend whether the transition will remain controlled, implode or be temporarily reabsorbed by a new authoritarian balance.

Maria Corina Machado: political legitimacy without power (for now)

If the United States is in contact with what remains of the Venezuelan regime, it may mean that negotiations are underway. The fact that Washington seems to have identified Rodríguez as the main interlocutor suggests two relevant elements.

First: the United States chose a figure formally inside the outgoing system as a channel of communication, probably considered more functional for the immediate management of the crisis than other Chavismo actors. Second: neither Edmundo González Urrutia, president-elect in July 2024, nor María Corina Machado are today considered priority interlocutors by the White House. This is not a judgement on their legitimacy, but a contingent assessment of governability and control of the apparatuses.

The motivations for this choice remain opaque. Tactical considerations may weigh in – the relationship with the Venezuelan Armed Forces, the fear of internal reactions, the need to avoid an institutional collapse – as well as more personal elements linked to Trump’s decision-making style. But the politically relevant point is another: Machado is not Washington’s candidate, and precisely for this reason her position must be read on an autonomous basis.

This also helps explain his initial silence after Maduro’s capture

It is highly likely that Machado was not informed of the operation in advance and that, at least at this stage, there is no direct coordination with the United States. This does not imply its definitive marginalisation, but it does signal that Washington is favouring a technical and transitional management of the post-regime phase.

The hypothesis that Delcy Rodríguez could act as a temporary bridge-figure, useful to ensure administrative continuity, reassure the military apparatus and contain the risk of violence, is part of a short-term stabilisation logic. It is not the democratically desirable solution, but it is plausibly preferable to Maduro’s permanence. The reality of transitions, as comparative history teaches us, rarely coincides with symbolic expectations.

This does not diminish the role of the Nobel Peace Prize 2025

On the contrary: its political capital remains intact. González Urrutia and Machado are recognised, inside and outside Venezuela, as central figures of the opposition, which in the last electoral round proved to be a majority. The United States may temporarily favour different interlocutors, but they will hardly be able to evade the constraint of internal consensus that Machado represents for long.

In this sense, the fact that Trump does not openly sponsor her may even turn out to be an advantage: Machado does not appear as a leader imposed from outside, but as the product of a popular mandate systematically denied by the regime. If she knows how to transform this legitimacy into coalition capacity, avoiding the trap of frontal confrontation and playing on the internal terrain, she will be able to fully re-enter the game. Also in view of future elections.

Washington speaks to several worlds

The operation against Maduro was also an act of multilevel strategic communication. Depending on the target audience, it conveys different messages: to the neo-conservatives, it shows that the US does not accept hostile platforms in its own hemisphere; to the MAGA world, it speaks the language of drug trafficking, law and order, and internal security; to the security apparatuses, it reaffirms the capacity for planning, coordination, and intervention; to strategic adversaries, in particular Russia and China, it signals that America has not abdicated coercion or active management of regional balances.

That Donald Trump wanted to personally claim the operation is pure performance diplomacy

But the message was not only addressed to Washington or the great powers. Trump also spoke to South America. Maduro’s Venezuela was not just a hostile regime, but an energy and financial hub functional to governments openly antagonistic to the United States, starting with Cuba. Venezuelan oil, bypassing sanctions and official circuits, fed networks of political survival and ideological alliances in the area.

With the Americans physically back in Venezuela, this balance changes. Not only on the level of domestic power, but on the regional level: flows, dependencies, informal protections change. It is a clear signal to Latin American actors: the space for a structured and protected anti-Americanism is no longer guaranteed as in the past.

Venezuela reminds us of an uncomfortable truth: international politics is not a moral tribunal, but a system of power relations, legitimacy and vulnerability.

The US operation does not automatically solve the country’s future

On the contrary, it opens an even more complex and risky phase. But it marks a milestone: Maduro was no longer untouchable, because he was no longer legitimate, indispensable or sustainable.

The questions that arise in this regard are many, but one thing should be clear to everyone: those who continue to read the world with the wrong categories – formal sovereignty, legal automatisms, selective moralisms – are looking at the wrong world. Maduro’s capture is not the end of Venezuelan history. It is the moment when history has returned to hold illusions to account.

Read also:

Refrain optimists. Trump’s military operation in Venezuela is not a democratic project- C.Palma; L’Europeista

Maria Corina Machado: the Nobel who challenges Venezuelan socialism- V.D.Arienzo- L’Europeista