Michigan, Wisconsin and Minnesota paint a more complex picture than the Democratic Party’s supposed shift to the left

In the article published on 5 August, in the wake of Abdul El-Sayed’s victory in the Democratic primary for the Michigan Senate, we had noted how that result could be seen as an important sign of the growing strength of the progressive wing of the Democratic Party. El-Sayed, an openly progressive candidate backed by the party’s left wing, had defeated Haley Stevens – a representative of the party’s more moderate wing and the Democratic establishment – in a primary in which the party machinery had invested heavily to halt his rise.

The question we had asked ourselves was whether Michigan marked the beginning of something bigger: a gradual reorientation of the US Democratic Party, particularly in the Midwest, towards more radical positions.

The primaries in Wisconsin and Minnesota, which took place yesterday, suggest a far more interesting outcome: there does not appear to be one political line simply prevailing over the other. And perhaps that is precisely the good news for the Democratic Party.

Wisconsin defies the simplest interpretation

In Wisconsin, the response was almost the exact opposite of that in Michigan.

David Crowley, regarded as the most moderate candidate, defeated Francesca Hong, a Democratic representative from Milwaukee and an openly democratic-socialist candidate. 

Crowley’s victory came at the end of a surprising comeback and by the narrowest of margins, after Hong had been considered the favourite for weeks and had enjoyed a substantial lead in the polls.

Crowley, backed by the outgoing governor, initially appeared to be out of the running – so much so that he had even withdrawn from the race, only to re-enter at the very last minute, just as Hong’s candidacy had begun to gain momentum.

The political significance is considerable. If Michigan had marked the start of an inevitable advance by the Democratic left, Wisconsin would have been expected to confirm this trend, but exactly the opposite happened.

But it would be just as wrong to conclude that Wisconsin signals a return to centrism, because Crowley did not by any means trounce Hong; she won by a narrow margin in a contest in which the progressive candidate had long been considered the favourite. And Hong still managed to see her campaign through to the very end, demonstrating just how significant the progressive wing’s presence within the party has become.

The conclusion, therefore, is not that ‘the moderate has defeated the left’. It is that the moderate won a particularly tough primary because, in that particular context, a section of the Democratic electorate considered his candidacy to be more trustworthy.

Next up is Minnesota

If we were to stop at Wisconsin, we might be tempted to adjust our view and say: all right, El-Sayed was an exception, the left has reached its limit and the Democrats are moving back towards more moderate candidates, but Minnesota makes even this interpretation impossible.

In the Democratic primary for the Senate, Peggy Flanagan defeated Angie Craig, the more centrist candidate.

Flanagan won on the back of a strongly progressive campaign, centred on combating the influence of big business, defending social programmes and opposing Donald Trump’s agenda and ICE’s worst practices.

So: Michigan, progressive; Wisconsin, moderate; Minnesota, progressive.

Three Democratic primaries in the Midwest, three results that cannot easily be attributed to a single ideological trajectory. 

And that, in all likelihood, is precisely the point.

Democratic voters are not choosing an ideology: they are choosing a candidate

The most interesting interpretation of the three results may be far less ideological than the internal debate within the Democratic Party suggests, and than the comments of many observers would have us believe.

Democratic voters do not necessarily seem to be saying, ‘We want a moderate candidate!’ or ‘We want a progressive candidate!’. Rather, it seems they are asking themselves which of the various candidates appears to be the most credible, the most effective and the most reliable when it comes to winning and governing in a specific context.

And the answer may vary: in Michigan, that person was El-Sayed; in Wisconsin, it was Crowley; in Minnesota, it was Flanagan.

There is no contradiction; on the contrary, that is exactly what one would expect from a major party.

A major political party should not be an ideological sect

There is a tendency, particularly in contemporary political commentary, to view every primary as a referendum on the party’s political line. If a progressive candidate wins, people talk of a ‘shift to the left’. If a moderate wins, people talk of a ‘return to the centre’.

The Democratic Party is not an ideologically homogeneous party, nor should it be. 

Its ranks include progressives, liberals, centrists, trade unionists, environmentalists, moderate suburbanites, ethnic minorities, young city-dwellers, voters from rural areas and professionals from major cities. 

It is precisely this diversity that enables it, when it works, to be competitive in vastly different markets.

A Democrat from Wisconsin does not necessarily have the same priorities as a Democrat from Detroit. And a Democratic voter from Minnesota may have a different view of the relationship between progressivism and electoral competitiveness. 

To insist that everyone must choose the same sort of candidate would be to turn a major party into an ideological movement.

And the Democratic Party, by its very nature, is not like that.

The real common factor is reliability

There is, then, a word that might explain these results better than the concepts of ‘moderation’ and ‘progressivism’: reliability.

Reliability does not necessarily mean moderation and, above all, it does not mean stagnation. 

A candidate may be very progressive and come across as trustworthy.

That’s probably what happened with Flanagan in Minnesota.

Similarly, a moderate candidate may be perceived as more trustworthy, not because voters necessarily agree with every one of their views, but because they believe they would be better able to govern their state.

It is plausible that some of the Democratic electorate saw precisely this in Crowley, just as others saw it in El-Sayed.

Voters do not necessarily vote for the candidate whose views are closest to their own, but they may vote – and often do vote – for the one they believe is best able to turn their ideas into tangible results.

It is a far more rational mechanism than the narrative of a perpetual clash between the ‘establishment’ and the ‘grassroots’, between the ‘left’ and the ‘centre’, would suggest.

Michigan remains, however, an important indicator

This in no way diminishes El-Sayed’s victory; on the contrary, his success remains one of the most significant developments of this Democratic primary season.

El-Sayed defeated a candidate backed by a significant section of the establishment and demonstrated that a progressive candidate can win even in an extremely competitive and costly primary.

But Michigan should be seen for what it is: an important result, not a prophecy.

Wisconsin has just reminded us that even the Democratic electorate can vote differently when the candidate, the constituency, the type of election and the perception of what is at stake change.

Three states, three elections, three responses

Taken together, Michigan, Wisconsin and Minnesota therefore paint a much more interesting picture.

If we were to interpret these results through the lens of the conflict between the ‘left’ and the ‘moderates’, we would see a seemingly contradictory sequence: first the left, then the centre, and then the left again.

But perhaps the correct order is different: first the candidate considered the most reliable, then the candidate considered the most reliable, and then the candidate considered the most reliable again.

This second interpretation is less dramatic, but probably closer to reality.

A new progressive hegemony?

Not for the time being.

There are certainly strong signs of growth within the democratic left: El-Sayed won in Michigan, Flanagan won in Minnesota, and Hong still managed to take a democratic-socialist candidacy to the brink of victory in Wisconsin.

The democratic left is no longer a marginal faction that can be safely ignored by the party apparatus.

This is probably the most significant change.

But it would be premature to speak of a new progressive hegemony in the Midwest just yet, because hegemony implies more than simply the ability to win a few primaries: it implies the ability to set the criteria by which the party selects its candidates. And the results in Wisconsin demonstrate exactly the opposite: there is not yet a single set of criteria.

Democratic voters appear to retain a considerable degree of independence from ideological labels.

The Democratic Party is not adopting a particular line: it is seeking a balance

This is perhaps the most interesting conclusion to emerge from a comparison of the three countries.

The Midwest does not appear to be experiencing a mere wave of progressivism: it is undergoing a search for balance.

Following the Trump years, the Democrats’ defeats and the party’s struggles to come up with a convincing response, Democratic voters seem willing to give something new a go.

Sometimes they choose a very progressive candidate, sometimes a more moderate one.

Not because they are undecided about their own political identity, but because they do not necessarily regard the candidate’s ideological identity as the main criterion for their choice. They want to know whether that person is capable of representing them, winning the election and governing.

And this could well be the most important sign that the Democratic Party is in good health.

A major party must be able to accommodate El-Sayed and Crowley, Flanagan and Hong, without every primary turning into a civil war over the party’s soul.

It must be able to be progressive when voters believe that progressivism is the best answer; moderate when voters, in another constituency or in another election, believe that moderation offers greater assurances.

It is not inconsistency: it is political pluralism.

Perhaps the real mistake would be to try to determine, after three primaries, which of the two factions has ‘won’. Because, at least for now, it seems that neither has won.

On each occasion, the candidates who won were those who managed to convince Democratic voters that they were the most reliable choice for that particular election.

That is exactly what should happen in a major party: not the elimination of its various factions, but their democratic competition within a broad and shared framework of values.

Because a primary tells us which candidate the voters of that party or coalition prefer, whilst a general election tells us which candidate voters as a whole genuinely believe is capable of governing.