Beyond rhetoric: the substance of the unspoken in the whispers of diplomacy

Bilateral meetings between great powers often offer more analytical insights in unspoken nuances than in official statements.

The first bilateral meeting between the United States and the Russian Federation, held on 15 August in Alaska, constitutes an emblematic case. Beyond the rhetorical exchanges and concluding statements, a careful reading of the joint declaration and the themes that emerged reveals a dialogue oriented towards the tacit recognition of common interests, the informal delimitation of the respective spheres of influence, and the definition of new strategic balances on a global scale. All this, with the European Union and Ukraine completely out of the playing field that counts.

The strategic bilateral: redefining mutual priorities away from third-party organisations

The meeting was not a multilateral summit, but a direct and structured dialogue between two systemic powers.

This format, not mediated by third-party bodies or public pressure, allowed for a concreteness-oriented negotiation, focusing on specific areas where the parties recognise the existence of spaces for convergence or co-management.

In this reading, which leaves in the background the sloppy declarations on the conflict in Ukraine*, a passage in the joint declaration is central:

“Russia and the United States have deep common interests.”

A seemingly general statement that, however, between the lines may reveal a substantial understanding on one point: direct military escalation must be avoided, particularly at the nuclear level.

This implies not only the renunciation of the use of nuclear weapons in the context of bilateral conflicts or proxy wars, but also an implicit agreement on the need to prevent new proliferations.

Broadening the view: the reference, albeit implicit, is obvious: Iran must not accede to nuclear power status.

The possible bipartisan commitment in this regard – which is to be added to the intensified diplomatic activity of the Arab League – could open up new scenarios in the Middle East as well, to be dealt with perhaps in future reports.

The possible role of the Arctic as a negotiating space: towards an ‘ice Yalta’?

It was not only nuclear deterrence that was discussed. It is clear that one of the main axes of the dialogue centred on the role of the Arctic space. In recent years increasingly strategic in terms of energy, infrastructure and trade, recently at the centre of media attention following Trump’s claims on Greenland. (We reported on this in the following article in L’Europeista)

Several observers of the bilateral have evoked the analogy with Yalta, not so much in form as in substance: namely the tacit intention to define the respective zones of influence.

The picture that emerges is as follows:

• Moscow is ready to recognise US influence over Greenland, Iceland, Svalbard and US Arctic territories;

• Washington prepared to accept Russian sovereignty over Franz Joseph Land and portions of the Arctic continental shelf;

In the following context, an agreement looms around a mutual recognition of freedom of navigation and cooperation in exploration.

For the Russian Federation, the agreement would imply valuable geopolitical recognition, but also an admission of technological vulnerability. It would seem clear that the development of the Arctic requires advanced technologies and partnerships that Moscow, due to sanctions and economic isolation, cannot guarantee on its own.

The United States, for its part, would gain significant advantages in terms of trade projection; with the systemic use of Arctic routes drastically reducing transport time and costs between North America and Asia, redrawing the geographies of global maritime trade. This, of course, at the cost of rehabilitating Russia in the international chessboard, especially in an anti-Beijing function.

The marginalised UN: the return of bilateral diplomacy

Perhaps the most systemically relevant aspect is the marginalisation of multilateral institutions.

The 15 August summit took place outside the UN perimeter, and without any mediation by supranational bodies. This confirms a well-established trend: the major powers resolve strategic issues in narrow bilateral contexts, relegating the multilateral arenas to advisory and non-decision-making roles.

The bloody war between Israel and Hamas further confirmed this irrelevance: UN resolutions and appeals had no real bearing on the ceasefire, while the decisive dynamics were driven by bilateral agreements and regional mediations.

The attempt to manage the ‘Ukraine’ dossier from above

The central theme of the meeting, particularly in the media, was undoubtedly the Ukrainian conflict. Although addressed in cautious diplomatic language, the geopolitical content of the two leaders’ message is clear: Ukraine is a regional balance problem. The solution therefore lies primarily with Moscow and Washington, to the exclusion of Kiev and Brussels.

In doing so, it gives rise to an implicit double recognition:

• On the American side: the impossibility of excluding Russia from a stable and lasting negotiation process is made clear;

• Onthe Russian side: the indispensable role of the United States in the security of Eastern Europe is recognised.

The interpretation of Ukraine as an object of joint management confirms the a-moral vision, common to Putin and Trump, in which every crisis is treated with the language of barter in ‘negotiable zones of influence’.

The European Union: structural absentee in the strategic dialogue

The meeting in Alaska also signalled Europe’s absence from strategy-intensive decision-making processes.

The European Union was neither present nor consulted at any concrete stage of the dialogue, confirming a structural difficulty: the inability to express a unified and coherent foreign policy.

This marginality has three main implications:

• Europe remains subject to the pressure dynamics exerted by Moscow, with no real power of deterrence;

• Future European access to Arctic routes will necessarily be confronted with the conditions set by the United States and Russia;

• Crises on the peripheries of the Union (Balkans, North Africa, Caucasus) will be treated as ‘local issues’, to be managed with internal political and financial resources, and not as priorities for global stability.

In other words, Europe is in a position of geopolitical heteronomy: it wishes to influence events, but remains constrained by structural, diplomatic and military limitations.

The value of strategic dialogue in multipolar 2025

Winston Churchill, in one of his best-known aphorisms, recalled that ‘it is always better to talk than to shoot’.

If we are to find positive elements, the summit in Alaska fully embodies this logic: even between structurally competing actors, direct communication remains a fundamental tool to avoid uncontrollable drifts.

The deepest lesson of this meeting lies in its unofficial content: a mutual recognition of spheres of influence, a pragmatic handling of the most sensitive dossiers and a shared containment of nuclear risk.

In an international system increasingly characterised by rivalry between great powers, the ability to negotiate in the shadows may weigh more heavily than visible disputes.

Anchorage, in this sense, represented not only a diplomatic episode, but a moment of reconfiguration of global geopolitical balances.

Russia, the US and the EU after Anchorage: realpolitik beyond ideas of power

Certainly, if in terms of communication there is a debacle of Trumpian rhetoric, in practical terms US interests have been preserved. Through dialogue with Moscow, Washington achieves a profitable result in the medium term at the economic-commercial level, putting on the table the strategic cost of Russian rehabilitation in the eyes of the world.

If for the United States the move may appear risky, for Putin the reopening of dialogue with the West represents a narrow but obligatory path. Little inclined to subjugate himself to the Chinese dragon, the Russian leader prefers to trade the admission of technological inferiority for the recognition of political power. An image gift strategically more than welcome and economically salvific, given the now vital need for the Russian market to reopen to the Atlantic routes.

Still missing from the roll-call isEurope, now more than ever called upon to show courage,

aimed at least at unifying the diplomatic and military intentions of the Old Continent. The day of 18 August, with European leaders and Zelensky expected at the White House, probably represents a last resort. Either a show of strength now, or the risk of irreversible fragmentation.