The convergence of axes: the forthcoming new members will demonstrate that the Modular Union is a natural process.

Two seemingly unrelated sets of negotiations – Icelandic fisheries and Ukrainian agriculture within the single market – lay bare a long-standing truth about the European Union that pro-Europe advocates have been arguing for some time.

The issue of fishing in Iceland

In Iceland, the referendum on 29 August could reopen negotiations on accession to the European Union. The real obstacle is not regulatory alignment but the incompatibility of sovereignty over the exploitation of fisheries resources – which is so dear to Icelanders – with the EU’s Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) . This policy establishes the EU’s jurisdiction over fisheries resources and obliges Member States to guarantee equal access to Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs). In previous negotiations, which were suspended in 2013, it was precisely Iceland’s refusal to relinquish control over its own waters that caused the talks to break down.

Today, the urgent need to shield the Arctic from Russian ambitions is driving Brussels to adopt an unprecedented degree of pragmatism. Ahead of the referendum, the European Commissioner for Fisheries, Costas Kadis, has declared his intention to grant Reykjavík a wide “margin of flexibility”, suggesting forms of exemption regarding access to territorial waters and the conclusion of “fish stock sharing agreements” based on “arrangements tailored to fisheries”. Fishing in Iceland is truly the defining issue of this referendum; the fear of joining the Common Fisheries Policy is one of the main arguments put forward by those opposed to accession.

In fact, the Commission has declared itself ready to institutionalise a permanent derogation from the CFP, acknowledging that the current regulatory framework is too rigid to accommodate nations with such a deeply rooted maritime identity. This proposal is not merely a compromise; it sets a legal precedent for breaking with the uniformity of EU law, marking an inexorable trend towards a modular Europe.

The Ukrainian agricultural issue

Ukraine’s accession to the European Union would pose an almost mirror-image challenge. In this case, the crux of the matter is the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), which is designed to support farms in member states. The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) accounts for a third of the EU budget and is based on utilised agricultural area. Kyiv’s accession would add over 40 million hectares to the single market, radically altering the distribution of subsidies. Under the current criteria, Ukraine would become the largest beneficiary, forcing drastic cuts to the funds allocated to long-standing farmers, particularly those in France, Poland and Italy.

Faced with this prospect, then, the Ukrainian Government – which is seeking accession as quickly as possible – has recently put forward a compromise proposal: as a member of the EU, Kyiv proposes to forego European agricultural subsidies for the first fifteen years – what they describe as ‘a generation’.

To cut a long story short: when in doubt, the Commission did not give a clear yes or no answer.

However … the EU’s position on Ukraine is that of a phased accession, with transitional periods and tailored balancing measures to avoid shocks to the internal agricultural market.

Exceptions are the new normal

It is becoming clear that these two sets of negotiations will rewrite the rules for accession to the Union, much to the chagrin of all those Balkan nations that are waiting in the wings. Driven to expand whilst others are expanding, Brussels is abandoning the paradigm of total integration. Whether it be fishing quotas in the North Atlantic or subsidies for cereals in the East, the European Union is preparing to institutionalise a ‘variable geometry’ structure. 

There are numerous previous examples to support this theory: Denmark, Ireland, Sweden, Poland, Croatia, Bulgaria, Romania, Greece and other countries involved in the major enlargement of 2014 saw exceptions of varying significance that were necessary to ensure the accession process was not hindered, but none of these were likely on the same scale as the cases of Iceland and Ukraine.

The Europe of the future will manage its enlargement no longer as a regulatory monolith, but through asymmetric treaties, where technical derogations will become the new normal. Once again, as we have already noted in other articles, Europe’s strength lies in the fact that it can change shape when necessary.

One might well wonder whether we are wasting our time. The ‘two-speed Europe’ we were supposed to have created is no longer enough; we need a ‘multi-speed Europe’. More than two, in short.