Tulsi Gabbard, the new Director of US National Intelligence, is at the centre of a momentous transformation. The architecture of US intelligence is changing rapidly.
These are not mere administrative reforms: the operation, desired by Donald Trump, aims to reshape the services as a political, diplomatic and narrative lever.

In this historical phase, Gabbard’s choices mark a breaking point.
On the one hand there is the centralisation of decision-making power, on the other the drastic cuts in the CIA and NSA. Added to this are new directives that break trust with the Five Eyes‘ historical partners. The most striking case concerns the NOFORN classification, which excludes London, Canberra, Wellington and Ottawa from information on the Russia-Ukraine negotiations.

The immediate consequence is twofold. America risks weakening its own internal security, while the Western allies find themselves without Washington’s support.
Paying the highest price is, of course, Europe.

The international context amplifies the impact of these decisions. While Putin’s Russia uses negotiating time to gain military advantage, the US dismantles its instruments of cooperation. Intelligence becomes a terrain for internal political confrontation and a means of external pressure. In this scenario, the war in Ukraine remains the epicentre of the crisis.

Tulsi Gabbard at the head of intelligence

Tulsi Gabbard became Director of National Intelligence in February 2025, after being nominated by Donald Trump and confirmed by the Senate.
A former Democratic congresswoman and National Guard officer, Gabbard has distinguished herself by positions often considered pro-Russian. In 2022 he had criticised NATO, claiming the Kremlin’s ‘legitimate security concerns’.
Even then, he had spread Russian disinformation about ‘biological laboratories’ in Ukraine, playing down Moscow’s responsibility in the invasion. His figure is thus an outsider to the traditional security establishment.

Gabbard’s first decisions confirmed analysts’ fears. He revoked 37 security clearances to former Democratic officials, accusing them of politicising the services.

It closed down the Foreign Malign Influence Centre, set up to monitor Russian and Chinese interference.

It downsized units dedicated to countering cyber threats and weapons of mass destruction, calling them ‘redundant’. These choices have raised doubts about the ability of the US to cope with increasingly sophisticated hybrid campaigns by Moscow and Beijing.

The weight of deeds, but also of words

Gabbard’s public rhetoric reinforced the perception of politicisation. In his speeches he spoke of ‘internal betrayals’ and a hostile ‘Deep State’, adopting the Trumpian narrative.
American intelligence thus risks losing neutrality and credibility, transforming itself from a technical and impartial instrument into the political arm of the White House. In a field that requires analytical independence, systemic politicisation weakens the trust of allies and demoralises personnel.

This mutation affects the whole set-up of theIntelligence Community. The ODNI, created after 9/11 to coordinate 18 different agencies, should guarantee coherence and integration. The Gabbard leadership, on the other hand, centralises political control and introduces divisions. In the past, criticism of bureaucratic excesses was shared, but the current reform goes beyond rationalisation: it represents a functional redesign for a political agenda. Trump and Gabbard seek to bend intelligence to a logic of personal loyalty, with dangerous implications for national security.

Structural cuts and chaos in the intelligence community

In May 2025, the Washington Post documented the massive downsizing plans of the CIA and the NSA: over 1,200 posts cancelled in Langley and thousands of cuts elsewhere.
Pre-retirements and hiring freezes have accelerated the loss of strategic expertise.

CIA director John Ratcliffe announced a strengthening of surveillance on China and drug trafficking. But the cuts decided by Trump and Gabbard have subtracted vital resources. It is not a simple spending review: it is a political dismantling, which privileges loyalty over professional efficiency.

The model is reminiscent of Elon Musk‘s DOGE (Department of Government Efficiency). Although not formally involved, the ‘streamlining at any cost’ approach drove the logic of the cuts. And the consequences of this approach are, by now, well-known history.

Here again, it is not difficult to foresee the immediate consequences: a less reactive apparatus, unable to guarantee the same prevention, and a growing risk of counter-espionage. Russia and China have already intensified their attempts to recruit former American agents. Such a measure will accelerate this process by providing strategic information for American (and European) national security to direct competitors and hostile powers.

The overall picture shows an Intelligence Community in crisis: this is not a rational reform, but a political-organisational dismantling that erodes the shared mission.

The NOFORN case and the Five Eyes crisis

Tulsi Gabbard’s most controversial decision, however, concerns the NOFORN classification of information on the Russia-Ukraine negotiations. It means ‘noforeign dissemination‘: no sharing with foreign partners.

This is a historic change. For the first time since the post-war period, even the Five Eyes alliance – the US, UK, Canada, Australia and New Zealand – has been excluded from a crucial intelligence stream.

The United Kingdom reacted with astonishment and irritation. For London, which has always been Washington’s primary interlocutor, the decision was perceived as an act of mistrust. It is not the substance of the negotiations that is surprising, but the method: no notice, no consultation.

At Vauxhall Cross, MI6 headquarters, there is open talk of ‘politicisation’. The collaboration remains, but with new caution: information broken down to reduce dependence on Washington and a new, sad, awareness: the special relationship has officially entered a crisis.

The fracture, in fact, strikes at the heart of the Western intelligence system. The Five Eyes, dubbed the ‘G5 of espionage’, have ensured technological interoperability and trust for over 70 years. Gabbard’s move undermines the credibility of the US as a reliable ally. In Europe, the episode is read as a clear signal: the American intelligence umbrella is no longer guaranteed.

Intelligence as leverage over Ukraine

The use ofintelligence as an instrument of pressure onUkraine became evident as early as March, when the Trump administration temporarily suspended information sharing on the ground. The measure was presented as a ‘technical pause’, but actually functioned as political leverage: it served to push Kiev to accept a compromise with Moscow.

Tulsi Gabbard’s NOFORN directive reinforced this mechanism. By restricting the dissemination of data, Washington controls what Ukraine knows and when it can act.
For Kiev, this means almost total dependence on America for satellite intelligence, intercepts and technical support. Without this flow, military operations become slower and less effective.

The model is not new. Elon Musk had already shown how powerful the technological leverage was with Starlink. In early 2025, he threatened to shut down the service if Kiev did not make ‘steps forward’ towards Moscow. Today, Musk is no longer part of the government, but the precedent shows how information infrastructure can influence the course of war.

Trump and Gabbard apply the same logic tointelligence. The importance in the field of sensitive information is crucial to ensure military success: identifying targets, location, providing key information with possible scenarios, personalities to target and probability of success, are fundamental tools for any army.

On top of this, there is news about the use of ATACMS missiles that force Kiev to apply for permits to strike on Russian territory. According to the Wall Street Journal, European weapons such as the Storm Shadow are also constrained by American systems. Ukraine fights, but with operational margins restricted by decisions made in Washington, which also provides know-how and personnel to the EU.

This dependence undermines the credibility of the American promise of ‘peace through strength‘. If the US uses information as blackmail, not support, Kiev becomes a limited actor.
It is a fragile balance that risks turning the war into a negotiation process imposed more by data management than by battlefield realities.

The end of the American umbrella?

The picture that emerges is unequivocal:American intelligence is no longer the neutral pillar of Western security, but a politicised tool used as tactical leverage by the White House.

With Tulsi Gabbard at the helm of National Intelligence, the agencies lost their institutional neutrality: staff cuts, dismantling of key units and NOFORN classifications undermined domestic and international trust. The rift with Five Eyes has shown that even London can be excluded from vital information.

Ukraine is the most obvious case of this new strategy: constraints on the use of ATACMS missiles, limits on Storm Shadow operations, ‘technical’ breaks in data sharing. Everything works as an instrument of political pressure. It is no longer unconditional military support, but continuous blackmail.

ForEurope, the lesson is clear. If the UK also finds itself vulnerable to Washington’s arbitrariness, the other partners are even more so. The American umbrella is no longer guaranteed. Information dependence becomes strategic weakness.

The response cannot be wait-and-see. We need to start again from a unified and autonomous European intelligence, capable of integrating national capabilities, feeding the Brussels decision-making process and ensuring that Europe does not remain a spectator. The geopolitics of the 21st century does not forgive dependencies: those who renounce intelligence renounce the possibility of counting.