Donald Trump may raise his voice on tariffs (and on social media) against India. But in defence – where long timeframes, political reliability and access to technology count – New Delhi reasons like a power: calmly, and with a precise objective, strategic autonomy. It is in this framework that the news of the strengthening of the India-France aeronautical partnership around the Rafale should be read.

The Rafale is a French multi-role fighter from Dassault Aviation, designed to perform very different missions (air superiority, ground attack, reconnaissance, electronic warfare) with the same platform. There are versions for the Air Force and an embarkable naval variant(Rafale M), designed to operate from aircraft carriers; its ‘strength’ lies not only in its performance, but in the integration of sensors, armament and the ability to operate in complex scenarios with high autonomy.

A piece of the agreement between Paris and New Delhi is already a reality: last April , India signed an agreement worth around USD 7.4 billion to purchase 26 Rafale aircraft in the naval version, intended to strengthen its airborne aviation and modernise its navy component (with deliveries scheduled by 2030). It is a contract that is part of a consistent trajectory: the Indian Air Force has for years been looking for a credible and relatively quick (due to the overheated regional context with China and Pakistan) solution to replace the remaining Soviet-made squadrons.

The other piece is, to date, the ongoing negotiations with Paris. India has a structural need around 114 multi-role fighters (the MRFA programme), and the most recent rumours speak of an acceleration of contacts with Dassault: a possible new purchase of Rafale ‘in continuity’ with the fleet already in service; a choice that, on an operational level, would simplify life (same standards, maintenance and spare parts, faster training, potentially faster deliveries) and, on a political level, would reduce exposure to external conditions, pressures or restrictions, increasing India’s margins of autonomy. The Rafale topic will most likely return central with Emmanuel Macron’s planned visit to India in February 2026.

The Rafale as a military platform and as a political rejection of US bullying

French success does not only depend on the performance of the aircraft. It depends on the political-industrial package that Paris is willing to offer New Delhi: the acceptance of ‘Make in India’. Buying yes, but above all bringing production capacity and supply chain back home. In June 2025, Dassault announced a partnership with Tata Advanced Systems to produce Rafale fuselage sections in India, a piece that speaks directly to localisation and supply chain.

This is the point that Washington often struggles to metabolise: for India, alliance does not mean automatic alignment, and purchase does not mean permanent dependence. The Rafale thus becomes a symbol of a broader strategy: diversifying suppliers, reducing exposure to geopolitical shocks, and gradually building the technological space for future domestic programmes.

Unlike the French offer, the American proposals did not guarantee India the same level of operational and industrial autonomy: more limited technology transfer, greater dependence on Washington’s political authorisations for upgrades and armaments, and more stringent constraints on local production and long-term maintenance. Moreover, it was not only the industrial conditions that weighed on the American offers, but also the political climate created by Washington: the Trump administration’s muscular and blackmailing approach pushed India to seek partners less prone to strategic bullying.

France, from this point of view, offers a profile that India likes: a Western power, but with a tradition of strategic autonomy and a defence industry capable of negotiating ‘tailor-made’ packages.

The lesson and a temptation for Europe

The Rafale naval contract is part of the competition in theIndian Ocean, where India wants to be a security power and not just an emerging economy. The modernisation of the embarked component and the projection capacity are messages, even more than capabilities: to Beijing, which is expanding its presence and infrastructure; and to Islamabad, which is watching.

For those watching from Europe, and for us pro-Europeans in particular, the news is doubly instructive. First: when Europe sells defence, it sells influence. Not in the caricatured sense of the arms dealer, but in the concrete sense of interoperability, training, standards, industrial exchanges, and strategic trust. France is proving that European industry can also compete outside its perimeter, provided it presents itself with technical credibility and political coherence.

Second: avoid the temptation of intra-European jealousy. The Rafale is a French national product, certainly, but it has more and more continental supply chains. Competition between European national champions exists (and will not disappear) but it can and must be a lever to strengthen the common industrial base, coordinate exports and strategic partnerships, and use large customers (such as India) to consolidate technological capabilities that also serve European defence.

The conclusion we draw from this is as follows: India is using military procurement to build industrial sovereignty, and France – with an approach that is anything but moralistic and more negotiating – is today among the Western partners that best intercept this demand. If Europe wants to count in the world to come, it would do well to study the Rafale case as a textbook of applied European power: industry, diplomacy and strategy, in the same contract sheet.

Read also:

French Defence bets on AI: Mistral at the heart of national military strategy, by Luca Cadonici