On 28 January, through his Truth social channel, Donald Trump relaunched harsh rhetoric against the Iran of the ayatollahs, threatening new military action if Tehran does not agree to sit down at the nuclear negotiating table and does not stop its political, economic and military support for its regional actors, from Hezbollah in Lebanon to the Houthis in Yemen.

According to the US president’s statements, a substantial American naval presence has been deployed in the Gulf waters, with the aim of strengthening deterrence and preparing the ground for a possible escalation, even evoking a new attack after the one that took place in June 2025. While Washington goes back to making the military threat an instrument of political pressure, on the other side of the Atlantic, the European Union continues to move along a different track: the Twenty-Seven states have in fact included the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (Pasdaran) in the list of terrorist organisations, favouring the sanctioning and diplomatic strategy over the use of force.

Is military action along the lines of what has happened in other contexts of US pressure, such as Venezuela, really aviable option, or should Trumpian rhetoric be read primarily as a tool for deterrence and negotiation?

Why Iran is not Venezuela

On a superficial reading, theUS action against the Maduro regime in Venezuela could be read as a litmus test for what might happen in the coming hours in Iran. But a closer reading of the social, political and institutional structures of the Middle Eastern state shows that the two cases are not analogous.

The Islamic Republic of Iran is a much more entrenched and highly institutionalised theocratic regime. Its apparatus of power is more complex and solidly built around the figure of the Supreme Leader (Ayatollah) and the Revolutionary Guards Corps (Pasdaran), which acts as the backbone, military and social control pillar of the state. This structure, while not democratic and repressing dissent and fundamental rights in a systemic manner, is characterised by an internal cohesion at the level of the elites and the institutions of control, such that a rapid dissolution of central power by the simple removal of a figure or external intervention is unlikely.

Internal cracks in the Venezuelan regime

On the contrary, the situation in Venezuela – although showing an authoritarian structure – has been shaken by deep corruption, political volatility and a strong crisis of legitimacy of the leader. These elements have weakened state structures and eroded consensus with the leader. Iran presents a picture in which the religious-political power exercises a control that is not only institutional, but also symbolic and ideological, based on a theocratic legitimisation that binds large sectors of the state and military apparatus to a loyalty that goes beyond the contingent political calculation.

This structural difference in power and institutional cohesion is crucial: while Venezuela has shown more pronounced signs of internal fragility – with a stinging economic crisis and little room for coherent opposition – Iran, while facing acute social tensions and strong internal repression, remains a theocracy with a durable command structure, less exposed to the logic of ‘regime change’ induced from outside or by internal pressure itself. It is precisely this structural solidity, combined with peculiar geographical and military factors, that makes Iran a radically different target from other cases of US pressure or intervention in Latin America or the Middle East.

Geographical factor

A large-scale military operation in Iran appears extremely complex, precisely because of the physical geography of the territory. Iran is dominated by imposing mountain ranges and criss-crossed by deserts that act as a natural barrier, difficult to overcome or control, making both a conventional military action and a special task force operation impossible. The Zagros mountain range, which stretches 1,500 km from north-west to south-east, forms an arc of high reliefs and deep valleys, difficult to overcome or control.

Running parallel to the north are the Alborz Mountains, this mountain range runs along the entire southern shore of the Caspian Sea, forming a veritable natural wall that is difficult to negotiate. The large desert plateaus, such as Dasht-e Kavir and Dasht-e Lut, create an impassable territory where transport infrastructure and supply routes are scarce and unsuitable for any military action. This conformation makes it possible to protect sensitive facilities, military installations or nuclear sites by means of tunnels and underground systems embedded in rock. Iran’s physical geography makes it a natural fortress.

The regional domino effect of a conflict with Iran

In addition to geographical and institutional problems, the broader political and security context of the Middle East, which is already riddled with open conflicts and latent tensions, must be considered. A possible US military operation against Iran, even a limited or indirect one, would risk triggering a regional domino effect, involving key players such as Israel and the main Iranian proxies, starting with Hezbollah in Lebanon and the militias active in Syria, Iraq and Yemen.

In a framework already marked by the war in Gaza and growing instability along the Red Sea routes, a new escalation with Tehran would end up multiplying the crisis fronts, making any attempt at regional containment or stabilisation extremely fragile. The Arab-Israeli question, unresolved since 1948, would continue to act as a political and symbolic detonator, capable of reactivating conflicts even outside the Iranian theatre. It is precisely this interconnection between the different regional scenarios that makes themilitary option against Iran particularly risky: striking Tehran would mean affecting an already precarious balance.

Use of force and the limits of reality

The occupant of the White House has by now accustomedpublic opinion to a foreign policy of twists and turns, bombastic threats and sudden reversals. In light of the factors analysed, a direct attack on the ayatollahs’ regime seems highly unlikely, however, not least because the Trump administration does not seem to have either a coherent ‘regime change’ strategy or a credible state-building project.

The Tycoon’s statements thus appear more like an attempt to pressure through the rhetoric of force than the expression of a clear and structured military strategy aimed at toppling the Khamenei regime. It remains true that when Donald Trump is involved, all scenarios remain theoretically open; however, the rhetoric of threat clashes with the concrete limits of geopolitical reality, which make direct military action extremely costly and difficult to sustain.

The European Union and the choice of diplomatic pressure

On the other side of the Atlantic, the European Union seems to be moving along an opposite track: a less noisy, but potentially more effective strategy in the long run. The designation of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (Pasdaran) as a terrorist organisation is not a mere symbolic act, but constitutes a political act that recognises the systemic nature of human rights violations perpetrated by the Iranian regime, even beyond its borders.

The protection of fundamental rights through the instruments of international law and legal procedures is undoubtedly a long and bumpy road, but it remains theonly sustainable way to promote an order based on the rule of law. The experience of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq shows how theexportation of democracy through the use of force has proved ineffective and often counterproductive during this century.

If history is indeed a teacher of life, Europe seems to have learned a lesson from it that the United States, at least for now, is still struggling to internalise.