Trump, the Druzhba and the double-cross on Europe
A few weeks after the Anchorage summit, where scenes were witnessed that for many observers took on almost dystopian traits compared to the reality on the ground, Donald Trump is back in the news. The former US president, instead of launching the usual bombastic proclamations against the Russian Federation and Vladimir Putin, has expressed a surprising stance: he has opposed Ukrainian attacks against theDruzhba pipeline, a strategic infrastructure that connects Russia with central Europe and ensures the supply of gas to Slovakia and Hungary.
The matter immediately assumed international prominence. Budapest and Bratislava instructed their respective foreign ministers, Péter Szijjártó and Juraj Blanár, to present the matter to the European Commission in an official letter. The letter emphasises that ‘the physical and geographical reality is that without this pipeline the secure supply of our countries is simply not possible’. In other words, for two nations that have always been dependent on Russian gas, energy survival inevitably depends on keeping the Druzhba alive, beyond the current geopolitical tensions.
Slovakia, Hungary and dependence on Moscow
Since the beginning of Russian aggression in 2022, this dependence on Moscow has turned into a real political wild card for the governments of Robert Fico and Viktor Orbán: every time Brussels pushes for a full alignment to the Euro-Atlantic front, Slovakia and Hungary invoke their cultural and economic proximity to Moscow, the energy link and the need to preserve contract stability. However, the reality is different: while theEU has embarked on a painful but concrete path of energy diversification – increasing LNG imports from the US and strengthening relations with Norway, Algeria and the Gulf countries – Hungary and Slovakia continue to keep one foot in the West and the other within the sphere of the BRICS and the multipolarity promoted by Russia, China and Iran.

In this context, instead of favouring responsible mediation, Trump seems to prefer the role of agitator. In his statements he says he is ‘very angry’ about the Ukrainian attacks on the oil pipeline, but completely ignores Europe’s efforts to reduce dependence on Moscow and limit Russian energy revenues, which are considered the lifeblood of the Kremlin’s war machine. The question to ask Orbán and Fico, more than whether they are ‘with’ or ‘against’ Ukraine, is rather where they were in past years when discussing structural alternatives to Russian gas and how to build a more resilient Union.
Trump’s communicative duplicity is evident: on the one hand he shows himself as an Atlanticist leader in official photos, sitting next to Western allies; on the other hand he winks at those who maintain cordial relations with an aggressor state and its satellites. His praise for Lukashenko, the Belarusian leader who has held power since 1994 through coercive strategies and a double-stranded alliance with Putin, remains in the annals. An attitude that risks weakening not only the American position, but the entire Western front, precisely when cohesion represents the most important diplomatic weapon.
Trump and the divided West
The problem is not only about the immediate handling of the war in Ukraine. Trump’s words undermine the credibility of an alliance that, albeit with difficulty, has demonstrated its ability to move in a coordinated manner in economic sanctions, military support and humanitarian assistance. To present the Druzhba as an untouchable red line, without considering the bigger picture, is to create loopholes in strategies to contain Moscow.
The impression is that Trump, instead of strengthening the American position, ends up turning into his own worst ally: a leader incapable of maintaining consistency between words, deeds and public messages. His constant temptation to distinguish himself with positions that favour, directly or indirectly, the aggressor reveals the weak point of Western influence: a united front but vulnerable to divisive statements, which risk nullifying diplomatic efforts and making mediation based on the aspirations and will of the Ukrainian people even more difficult.
Today, the only hope for Europe is to find itself again, overcoming internal nationalist resistance and finally building a European state. Only in this way would despot attitudes, such as those of Trump and Putin, lose their effectiveness: they would no longer be able to divide us in the sphere of decision-making and would face a genuine alternative front to theauthoritarianism advancing in the world.









