For over thirty years, Europe attempted to build its unity through law, market and governance, in the belief that the history of ideologies was now definitively over. The end of the Cold War nurtured in the Western ruling classes the idea that the great collective affiliations would gradually evaporate within an international order regulated by trade, economic interdependence and multilateral institutions. In this scenario, the European Union represented the most advanced laboratory of a post-historical conception of politics: a construction based on technology, regulation and the progressive neutralisation of identity conflict.

Yet, the 21st century is showing exactly the opposite. Ideologies have not disappeared. They have been transformed. They continue to exist in the form of civilisational narratives, historical myths, cultural affiliations and grand collective narratives capable of mobilising entire societies. Political communities do not survive through administration alone. They survive because they share symbols, memory, destiny and a certain idea of themselves.

The European Union probably possesses the largest historical, cultural and symbolic heritage on the planet, but continues to tell its story almost exclusively through economic parameters, regulatory constraints and administrative language. The result is a politically sophisticated but emotionally fragile construct, capable of producing regulations much more easily than it can produce belonging.

The problem of contemporary Europe is thus not the absence of history, identity or common references. It is the absence of a true mobilising European ideology, capable of transforming a sum of states into a self-aware political community.

The return of ideologies in the post-historical world

The belief that globalisation would dissolve historical identities has turned out to be one of the greatest political illusions of the contemporary West. The United States continues to live around the myth of American exceptionalism, the frontier and the universal democratic mission. China has built its geopolitical renaissance around the narrative of the ‘century of humiliation’ and the return of Chinese civilisation to the centre of the world. Contemporary Russia continuously mobilises imperial symbols, historical memory, Orthodox tradition and the idea of civilisational continuity.

In all these cases, ideology does not simply coincide with a theoretical system. Rather, it becomes a form of collective political energy. A community ceases to be merely an administrative structure and becomes a historical reality capable of mobilising consensus, sacrifice and belonging.

The European Union, on the other hand, has progressively renounced this dimension. Fear of the great narratives of the 20th century has led European elites to distrust any identity, historical or symbolic discourse. The very idea of political myth was perceived as dangerous, almost incompatible with the European memory of world wars and totalitarianism. Thus the EU tried to construct itself as a neutral space of economic and legal cooperation, replacing the language of history with that of governance.

This approach has certainly ensured stability and economic integration, but it has not produced a true European demos. No political community can stand solely on financial parameters, treaties and regulatory compatibility. Peoples still need symbols, emotional references and shared historical horizons. When these elements disappear, the oldest affiliations, national identities and historical rifts that European integration had attempted to overcome inevitably re-emerge.

Europe already has its own myths

The great European paradox is that the European Union already has almost all the necessary elements to build a common political narrative. Few civilisations can boast a historical continuity comparable to that of Europe. Athens, Rome, medieval Christianity, the Renaissance, the Enlightenment, modern constitutionalism, the industrial revolution and the birth of the contemporary state represent a shared heritage that runs through the entire European experience.

The common Christian roots, beyond the progressive secularisation of the continent, probably constitute one of the main unifying elements of European history. Christianity has not just been a religion, but a cultural, symbolic and anthropological structure that has helped shape the European idea of the person, law, community and human dignity. From mediaeval cathedrals to universities, from canon law to political philosophy, much of European civilisation was born within a common horizon that European public discourse today often tends to remove or marginalise for fear of appearing exclusive or identitarian.

Yet no political community can build belonging through cultural amnesia. The great contemporary powers continue to mobilise their historical memory, while Europe often seems incapable of narrating itself without reducing itself to an economic or legal space. This symbolic emptying produces a profound consequence: the absence of a truly shared emotional bond between European citizens.

The Union also possesses symbolic figures capable of embodying a common idea of continental construction. Personalities such as Robert Schuman, Alcide De Gasperi and Altiero Spinelli represent more than just institutional protagonists. They are the historical symbols of an attempt to overcome destructive European nationalism through a new form of continental political community. Yet these figures have never really become part of a shared European civic imagination, often remaining confined within an institutional or academic memory.

European symbols also already exist. There are historical capitals that embody fundamental moments of European civilisation, places that could represent nodes of a common narrative: Rome as imperial and legal heritage, Athens as the philosophical and political origin of Europe, Strasbourg as a symbol of continental reconciliation, Ventotene as a federalist myth, Berlin as the memory of European division and reunification. There is even a shared memory built through the tragedies of the 20th century, from the destruction of the world wars to the fall of totalitarianism.

What is lacking, however, is the political will to turn this into a truly mobilising European ideology. For decades, Europe has preferred to describe itself as a post-identitarian space, almost fearing its own historical depth. The result is a construction that has immense cultural roots but still struggles to produce emotional belonging and collective mobilisation.

Transforming disunity into belonging

TheEuropean Union continues to experience a structural contradiction. It aspires to exert global geopolitical weight, to defend strategic interests, to build industrial and technological autonomy, but still struggles to perceive itself as a unitary historical subject. The war in Ukraine has clearly shown this tension. For the first time in decades, Europe was faced with a crisis capable of bringing back to centre stage issues that the post-historical paradigm had progressively removed from the European public debate: continental security, border defence, balance of power, sovereignty and common European destiny. Ukraine, in this sense, represents more than just a geopolitical theatre. It represents an identity and symbolic challenge for Europe itself.

The war forced the Union to confront a reality that most European elites had believed to be outdated: history is not over, conflict between powers continues to exist and political communities only survive if they possess cohesion, will and capacity to mobilise. For years, Europe thought of itself almost exclusively as a regulatory and commercial space, convinced that economic interdependence and international law would be sufficient to definitively neutralise the return of force, geopolitical competition and great historical dynamics. The Russian invasion of Ukraine shattered this illusion.

The Ukraine crisis could therefore turn into one of the founding moments of a new European consciousness. Not only for strategic or military reasons, but because it has brought back to the centre the issue of common security, the defence of the continent and the need to think of itself as an integrated political space. For the first time in a long time, millions of Europeans have perceived the existence of a collective European interest that goes beyond individual national affiliations. And it is precisely at times of crisis that great political identities are often born.

The confrontation with China is also producing a similar effect. Beijing does not only represent a commercial or technological competition, but a civilisation-state endowed with historical depth, strategic vision and strong identity self-awareness. China continuously mobilises its historical memory, the myth of national rebirth and the narrative of returning to the centre of the world. Behind China’s economic growth, there is in fact a precise idea of historical continuity and collective destiny. The Chinese leadership does not only speak of GDP, infrastructure or industrial development: it speaks of civilisation, historical humiliation, national redemption and China’s future in the world.

In the face of this capacity for symbolic mobilisation, Europe often appears as a normative power lacking a real common narrative. It discusses parameters, regulations, governance and sustainability, but still struggles to produce emotional belonging and shared historical will. Yet the European paradox is obvious: no other area on the planet possesses a comparable historical, cultural and symbolic stratification. Europe has a common cultural matrix, a long philosophical and legal tradition, shared symbols, founding historical figures and even a collective memory built through the tragedies of the 20th century.

And it is here that the crux of the European question emerges: without a shared ideological and symbolic dimension, the Union risks remaining an economically integrated but historically incomplete structure. The market does not automatically produce political belonging. Norms are not enough to build solidarity in times of crisis. The great historical communities survive because they share a common imagination, memory and perception of their destiny.

Europe already possesses the necessary elements to build this narrative. What is lacking is the will to transform this historical depth into political consciousness and a truly mobilising European ideology, capable of transforming a sum of states into a self-aware historical community.