The war between the United States (and Israel) and Iran has in recent weeks become an emblematic case not only of geopolitical tension, but also of contradictory political communication. In the space of a few days, the administration led by Donald Trump has gone from proclaiming a flash victory to invoking the support of NATO allies.

A sequence of declarations that, when viewed as a whole, gives the image of a foreign policy oscillating between sudden triumphalism and demands for help formulated in ultimatum tones.

From the war ‘won in an hour’ to the sudden appeal to NATO

In the aftermath of the US bombing, the US administration spoke of an immediate success. According to the initial narrative, the operation would neutralise Iran’s nuclear capabilities and re-establish a new strategic balance in the Middle East.

In several public statements, Trump himself had implied that the confrontation was essentially over, almost a surgical operation completed in a matter of hours.

Yet, barely two weeks later, the rhetorical scenario changed dramatically.

With the conflict still ongoing and tension growing in the energy routes of the Persian Gulf, Washington has begun to call for support from the Atlantic alliance to ensure maritime security in the Strait of Hormuz, a passage through which a decisive share of the world’s oil transits.

The request, however, is ambiguously formulated. It is unclear which legal basis of the alliance should be invoked: not Article 5, which concerns collective defence in the event of aggression against a member state; not Article 4, which merely provides for consultations between allies.

The request therefore appears more like political pressure than a mechanism provided for in the treaties.

The paradox of Atlantic memory and the alliance under threat

The episode takes on even more paradoxical contours when one considers the recent history of the alliance itself.

The only time NATO Article 5 was activated was at the request of the United States after the 9/11 attacks.

At that moment, the allies, not only Europeans, responded without hesitation. Soldiers from numerous countries participated in the war in Afghanistan, an operation formally led by the alliance but in fact built around Washington’s strategic interests.

Many of those soldiers never came home. Those same soldiers whose memory was later vilified by Trump with his usual anti-Allied rants on the occasion of his umpteenth delirium of omnipotence, arrogance and arrogance on the Greenland issue.

It is therefore difficult to ignore the contrast between that solidarity and the language often used by Trump towards his allies. An attitude that seems to oscillate between assertive nationalism and a purely transactional conception of international relations.

In today’s call for greater NATO involvement, the American president has not renounced his usual muscular rhetoric.

According to various public statements, the alliance should either support the US or face ‘a very bad future’.

This is not the first time. In recent years Trump has repeatedly attacked European allies, accusing them of taking advantage of American military protection, even going so far as to question the very usefulness of NATO.

The credibility problem

The central question, however, is not only about rhetoric.

It is about the strategic credibility of the United States.

An ally who claims to have won a war in an hour and two weeks later asks for military assistance to deal with the consequences of that conflict sends an ambiguous message.

Add to this the systematic use of threats against the very partners from whom support is sought, and the risk is that an alliance built on decades of cooperation will turn into an increasingly fragile relationship.

The American super (pre)power

The crisis linked to the war with Iran therefore poses a question that goes beyond the Middle East.

What role does the United States really want to play in the international order?

That of a leader who leads a system of alliances or that of a power that only asks for support when it is needed, only to question the same allies the next day?

It is a question that not only Europe, but NATO itself, will have to answer sooner or later.

At this point, the question is no longer only military or strategic. It is above all political and psychological: how long can Europe and NATO itself withstand Donald Trump’s strategic schizophrenia and diplomatic arrogance?

On the one hand, Washington proclaims quick victories and claims its military supremacy; on the other hand, when the situation gets complicated, it calls for the support of the allies. But it does so not as an equal partner, but with the language of an ultimatum: either the American line is followed or the alliance would have ‘a very bad future’.

A method that, beyond individual crises, risks wearing down the trust on which the Atlantic alliance has been built over the past seventy-five years.

The fallen mask: the true beneficiary of chaos

In this context, the crisis in the Gulf appears almost as a geopolitical paradox: Washington calls for Western unity while its own president has spent years undermining its foundations and continues to do so at the same time as he calls for support.

In the great global strategic game, every crisis produces winners and losers.

And if one looks closely at what is happening in the Persian Gulf, one question emerges forcefully: who really benefits from the chaos?

The answer is simple: Vladimir Putin with his Russian oil.

Many observers were already of the opinion at an early stage that Trump’s line towards Russia was not a tactical ambiguity but an obvious political choice. Today Trump is giving more and more substance to what plastically emerged in Anchorage with the rolling out of the red carpet under Vladimir Putin’s feet.

Since then, the picture has gradually become clearer.
Trump has never hidden his admiration for the Kremlin leader: the administration’s condescending language and almost submissive posture towards Vladimir Putin are radically different from those used towards European allies who are always questioned and threatened.

A divided Atlantic alliance, a Europe uncertain of its own security and a destabilised Middle East are exactly the scenario that has favoured Russian strategy for years.

Moscow does not need to intervene directly: all it needs to do is wave the lever of Russian oil and wait for the first European pro-Putinists to take the opportunity to call for the easing of sanctions against Russia, obviously always preceded by the US president who first circumvents the embargo on Russian oil.

In this sense, the current crisis appears to be the perfect playground for Kremlin diplomacy, a terrain well ploughed by Trump and Netanyahu who, in four years, has never uttered a word of condemnation against Russian aggression against Ukraine.

Europe in front of the mirror

All this puts Europe in front of a choice that can no longer be postponed.

For decades, the continent’s security was almost entirely guaranteed by the US military umbrella. Today, however, that certainty seems less solid than it has been for generations.

Not because the US no longer has military capability – it remains the greatest military power on the planet – but because its political leadership has become unpredictable.

An alliance can survive strategic differences, but it is much more difficult for it to survive a leadership that alternates between proclamations of victory, threats to allies and sudden calls for support.

The question that Europe can no longer avoid does not only concern the handling of the Iranian crisis, it concerns the very future of the Western order.

If the Atlantic alliance is to continue to exist as a pillar of European security, it will have to find a balance that does not depend solely on the political fluctuations of the White House.

In other words, Europe will sooner or later have to decide whether it wants to remain protected or finally become responsible for its own security.

Because an alliance between democracies can withstand many tensions.
But it can hardly survive the combination of unpredictability, arrogance and strategic chaos for long.

And it is precisely in this space of uncertainty – between an America that is wavering and a Europe that is still hesitating – that the Kremlin and China continue to move with the patience of those who know that sometimes the best victory is to let the adversaries disorient themselves.

The question of questions

Will Europe manage to emancipate itself from a strategic-military point of view or will it wait for the Americans to rid it of Trump and the dregs of the MAGA universe, thus deluding itself that it has escaped danger and postponing the issue until a new and perhaps worse Trump comes along?