With just a few months to go until the 2026 mid-term elections, the Republican primaries are providing an interesting snapshot of the state of the Republican Party and, above all, of the relationship between the GOP and Donald Trump.

This snapshot reveals a seemingly indisputable fact: ten years after his burst onto the American political scene, Trump remains the dominant figure in the party he conquered and transformed.
Yet it is precisely this apparent strength that may conceal a structural fragility set to emerge in the November elections.

The primaries already held in several states paint a clear picture.
Candidates backed by the president continue to achieve significant results. In Georgia, for example, MP Mike Collins, a member of the party’s most staunchly pro-Trump wing, has secured the Republican nomination for the Senate and will face Democrat Jon Ossoff.
In other states, candidates openly aligned with the MAGA movement have prevailed without any particular difficulty, confirming just how much Trump’s political brand continues to be a powerful tool for mobilising the Republican electorate.

But to focus solely on this figure would mean failing to grasp the more profound transformation the party is undergoing.

The 2026 primaries, in fact, also tell another story: that of a GOP that has now changed radically from what it was before 2016.
Over the course of a decade, the Republican Party has not merely welcomed Trump into its ranks. It has been progressively reshaped by his presence.

The party’s language, political priorities, electoral base and even its cultural identity have all changed.
What was once the party of liberal conservatism, the free market, Atlanticism andthe economic establishmenthas increasingly become the party of identity-based populism, distrust of institutions, cultural polarisation and constant mobilisation against internal and external enemies.

In this context, the primaries have taken on a particular role: they no longer serve merely to select the most competitive candidate, but often to gauge the level of loyalty to Trump.

The result is that many candidates structure their campaigns to appeal almost exclusively to the more ideologically driven section of the electorate in the primaries, adopting positions that prove effective amongst the Republican base but are far less viable in the general election.

It is here that the true political paradox of Trumpism comes to the fore.

Trump continues to win within the party, but it is by no means certain that the party will be able to win outside it.

The November elections will not, in fact, be decided solely by the most loyal Republican voters.
In competitive constituencies and swing states, the outcome will depend above all on independents and that section of moderate voters who, in recent years, have shown growing unease at the radicalisation of the political debate.

The primaries that have already taken place offer some significant indications.
In Georgia, for example, Lieutenant Governor Burt Jones, backed by Trump, was defeated in the race for the gubernatorial nomination by billionaire Rick Jackson, a figure outside the traditional MAGA sphere who was able to build a broader coalition.
Also in Georgia, Vernon Jones, one of the candidates most closely associated with the 2020 election challenges, was defeated in the race for Secretary of State. In Iowa, Randy Feenstra, who was also backed by the former president, failed to secure the nomination for governor.

This is not yet an anti-Trump revolt. Trump remains by far the dominant figure in the party. However, these results show that there is a growing section of the Republican Party that does not fully identify with the idea of personal allegiance to the former president.

Particularly interesting is the emergence of a third category of candidates: the outsiders.
They do not necessarily belong tothe traditionalestablishment, but nor do they fully identify with militant Trumpism.
They often have substantial personal financial resources or strong local networks andmanage to present themselves as pragmatic administrators rather than cultural warriors.
The case of Rick Jackson in Georgia is probably the first significant example of this trend.

The gubernatorial elections also deserve special attention.
Historically, governors have represented the most pragmatic side of American politics: they manage budgets, infrastructure, schools and public safety. In this context, voters tend to prioritise competence and reliability over ideological affiliation.
For this reason, several Republican candidates strongly associated with Trumpism may face greater difficulties than they did in the primaries, particularly in the more closely contested states.

The strategic problem for the GOP is clear.
The more Trump consolidates his control over the party, the greater the likelihood that candidates will emerge who are perfectly aligned with his political vision. But it is precisely this homogenisation that risks reducing the party’s ability to appeal to voters who do not belong to the hard core of the MAGA movement.

This is a pattern that the United States has already observed in the past.
In 2022, several candidates backed by Trump won the primaries only to be defeated in the general election, precisely because they were unable to win over moderate voters.
Today, the risk appears even greater. After years of polarisation, a significant proportion of the independent electorate seems, in fact, to favour candidates perceived as more balanced and less ideological.

From this perspective, the 2026 mid-term elections could turn into a referendum not so much on the Democratic administration as on the very future of the Republican Party. Should pro-Trump candidates prevail in the primaries but fail in the general election, this would inevitably prompt an internal debate on the electoral cost of the party’s radicalisation.

Paradoxically, therefore, Donald Trump could find himself in a position where he achieves the most comprehensive victory of his career within the GOP, taking complete control of it and, at the same time, with a party moulded in his own image and likeness – one that is hostile to anyone who is not perfectly aligned with him – contribute to the most crushing Republican defeat in recent years.

Never before have the US mid-term elections taken on such significance, extending far beyond the borders of the United States.
The November polls are probably the most eagerly anticipated mid-term elections in contemporary history, being closely watched not only by Americans, but also by governments, markets, Washington’s allies and adversaries across the globe, and particularly in Europe.
At stake is not merely the composition of Congress or the balance of power on Capitol Hill. At stake is the geopolitical future of the US, which is closely linked to that of Donald Trump.

The vote will determine whether Trumpism still represents a force capable of winning a national majority. 

This election will provide the answer the whole world is waiting for: what the United States will look like in the second half of the decade, and which version of Trump will emerge from the November polls.
Will it be a strengthened Trump, ready to definitively consolidate his dominance over American politics, or a leader who remains dominant amongst his loyalists but is increasingly unable to translate domestic support into electoral victories, facing a Congress ready to do battle?

For this reason, the upcoming mid-term elections are not merely a milestone in US politics: they represent a crucial turning point for understanding the political, economic and geopolitical balance of power in the years to come.