Let’s face it: if at Friday’s summit in Alaska the Russian dictator proposed to freeze the Ukrainian front along the current lines and think no more about it, the Americans and Europeans would be scrambling to accommodate him.

The real interest of Europe

Of course, for Europe it would by no means be the optimal solution. By 2030, as data collected by the Kiel Institute has shown and as the Russian state media are repeating every day, the Kremlin would be ready to attack the Baltic countries. Such anaggression would force at least Poland and Finland (if not also Germany) to intervene and would cause an unprecedented economic shock even in those countries that feel themselves far away and safe.

If we Europeans do not want to lose what little prosperity we still have and thousands of people we love in less than five years, we should support Ukrainian resistance as much as possible until the invader’s financial and military means are exhausted, at which point he could no longer use them against us.

The illusions of appeasement

This, however, is said in a whisper by few so-called “warmongers”.
The vast majority of our continent’s politicians, who reflect on this topic the sentiment of their voters, only want the shooting to stop in Ukraine as soon as possible and, in some cases, even to go back to doing business with the Moscow oligarchs.

If this were Putin’s proposal, it would be greeted with relief not only by Trump and American Republicans, but also by European leaders of all political parties.
The Ukrainian government would have little choice in the face of such a universal consensus.

Why bother for international law torn to shreds, for the more than 19,000 Ukrainian children kidnapped and destined to remain in Russian hands forever, for more than 100.000 rapes destined to stay unpunished. These would be details of little importance in the face of the supposed ‘return of peace’.

The question, therefore, arises: why does Putin not make this demand that anyone would accept?
Why does he persist in demanding impossible concessions, such as handing over the Donetsk towns he has not yet conquered?

The devil is in the details

The first explanation is that, even once it is established that the occupied territories will remain occupied, significant obstacles would remain.

First of all, the question of security guarantees for the Ukrainians. Given what happened after the 2014 and 2015 agreements, which froze the front but did not prevent further Russian invasions, this time the Ukrainians demand in return entry into NATO or at least a European military mission to defend their borders.

There is also the issue of sanctions: if they were maintained after the 2014 and 2015 invasions, what would be the point of lifting them after the 2022 invasion, which was much bloodier?

It is one thing to stop the conflict here, but with sanctions continuing to crush the Russian industrial machine and with international deterrence preventing the Russians from attacking again.
It is quite another to stop the conflict here by leaving Ukraine defenceless and restarting Russia’s industrial growth.

It would be two radically different ‘peaces’, although in both the occupied territories would remain occupied. And Putin, for obvious reasons, cannot agree to the former.

It is easy for the US Congress and European parliaments to shrug their shoulders and accept the fait accompli of Putin’s achievements: after all, it is not in their power to undo them.
Much more difficult is to renounce sanctions and military support for Ukraine, which are instead entirely within their power. On this matter, the consensus (thankfully) would not be as universal as (unfortunately) it is on the occupied territories.

Is there a Ukrainian “Caporetto” in sight?

In making Putin so stubborn, however, other elements may also weigh in. One of these is the impression that a landslide victory is possible on the battlefield, and that there is therefore no reason to stop now.

Just in the last few days there has been an alarming leak from the Dobropillya area on the eastern front: for the first time since 2023, some Russian units have allegedly managed to infiltrate more than 13 km beyond the Ukrainian lines, risking the collapse of a fortified line hundreds of km long.
A re-enactment (with motorbikes and drones) of what happened to the Italians at the defeat of Caporetto in 1917.

Some OSINT (Open-source Intelligence) analysts have magnified the scale of this breakthrough, taking advantage of it to impeach Syrsky’s corruption and nepotism.
Others downplayed it, noting that these were small, scattered groups that the Azov battalion had already been hunting for four days. It would not be the first time, after all, that the Ukrainians ‘let in’ some Russian units and then confront them under more advantageous conditions: it already happened a few weeks ago near Sumy.

Finally, there are those who, with the sense of moderation that is always necessary in following this war, have commented that it is a potentially very dangerous operation, which highlights the difficulties of the Ukrainians in garrisoning large stretches of the front, but it is neither a breakthrough nor a decisive victory.

There is no doubt, however, that Putin, on receiving the news, will undoubtedly have smelled blood and felt even more in a position of strength.

Let us remember what Russian opponents have long been telling us: the Kremlin’s tenant, as much and more than other dictators, lives in an information bubble where defeats never exist and successes always appear more promising than they are.
It is strange for us to look at Putin with these eyes, because we are convinced that ‘the masters of the Earth’ have access to detailed and confidential information that gives them perfect situational awareness.

But Putin, as well as Trump (who has repeatedly shown in the last few hours that he understands nothing about Ukraine, starting with geography and constitutional law), stand there to show us that this is not always the case.

The Heart of Pharaoh

And, in connection with this, there is a third explanation that cannot be ruled out.
For years, Vladimir Putin has built a propaganda myth around himself, which Russians have to put up with in the media, on street signs and even in primary schools: this myth makes him the avenger of Russia’s wrongs, the restorer of the Soviet empire (if not the tsarist empire, including Alaska) and the destroyer of the sick Western society.
He has compared himself to Stalin and Peter the Great. He swore that ‘the Nazi junta in Kiev’ would be annihilated and, with it, ‘the collective West’ (whatever it is).

Is it really so unlikely that Putin himself fell victim to his own propaganda and began to seriously believe in this myth?

And if he seriously believes in this myth, how can he explain to his followers that he grabbed ‘only’ 20% of Ukraine, leaving ‘the Kiev Nazi junta’ and ‘the collective West’ unharmed ?

How can the heir of Peter the Great return home without even the village of Pokrovsk, where, through one year of siege, more Russians fell than Americans fell in Vietnam, than Germans fell at Stalingrad, or than Romans fell at Cannae?

Maybe the Russian people would accept this meagre result, since they are only interested in an end to the fighting and a return to normalcy.
But would Putin accept this meagre result from himself ?

The Bible tells us that God hardened Pharaoh’s heart so that he stubbornly refused to free the Israelites and ended up plunged into the abyss with his entire army.
Even in more recent history, there has been many rulers who, prisoners of their own myth, have been deaf to the voice of calculation and expediency: we know very well that at Stalingrad all those German soldiers died because their führer had given the foolish order not to retreat.

On Friday, the Russian dictator will undoubtedly enjoy an image triumph that will nourish his myth even more. But it is not certain that the concrete consequences will be pleasant for him.