There is a secret unit under the Russian state, separate from the GRU and FSB but fed by their top cadres, with the task of eliminating Russian and non-Russian opponents, kidnapping dissidents and sabotaging military targets in Europe. It is called Centre 795 and, until 12 March, it operated in absolute shadows. It was brought to light by The Insider, the Russian investigative newspaper in exile, with an investigation that is making the rounds of Western chancelleries.

Centre 795 came into being in late 2022, in the months immediately following the large-scale invasion of Ukraine, initially as a conflict-oriented task force. Within a few months, however, its remit expanded like wildfire: political assassinations, kidnappings of Putin’s opponents, sabotage actions against military infrastructure in Europe.

As blogger and Russian dissident in Italy Daria Kryukova, whom we reached for comment, put it, “killing political opponents is unfortunately a long-standing tradition of the Kremlin, not only to eliminate an inconvenient person, but also to intimidate others: to kill one so that thousands will be afraid.”

A hybrid architecture between espionage and defence industry

What makes the 795 Centre an unprecedented case in the Russian security apparatus is its financing and command structure. The unit is formally subordinated to Chief of Staff Valery Gerasimov, but it is financed – and partly directed – by two figures of Russian state capitalism: Sergey Chemezov, head of the defence conglomerate Rostec and historical ally of Vladimir Putin, and Andrey Bokarev, co-owner of Kalashnikov Concern. It is precisely in the Patriot Park in Kubinka, Moscow oblast, that the Centre has established its base of operations, using the infrastructure of the Kalashnikov training centre as logistical cover.

According to The Insider’s reconstruction, the decision to incorporate operational capabilities within the defence industrial chain responds to a precise objective: to make the unit almost invisible in the eyes of Western counter-intelligence services, mixing military and civil activities in a single ambiguous architecture.

The commander and the internal structure

Leading the 795 Centre is 52-year-old Colonel Denis Fisenko, a veteran of the FSB’s Special Unit Alfa and a Russian tactical shooting champion among the special forces. As Kryukova pointed out, Fisenko is directly linked to Bokarev, who contributed to his appointment. The unit has around 500 personnel, organised in three directorates – intelligence, assault and combat support – with salaries significantly higher than the standard Russian army salaries: some operatives receive double pay, both from Chemezov’s facilities and the Ministry of Defence. The centre’s management also has the prerogative to transfer personnel from other state bodies without the need to obtain the consent of their hierarchical superiors.

The internal structure reveals a sophisticated organisation: the 12th department, the most sensitive, manages human agents abroad and is composed almost entirely of veterans from GRU Unit 29155 – the same one that organised the poisoning of Sergei Skripal in Salisbury. The 19th Department houses snipers, positioned not in the assault direction but in the intelligence direction: a detail that, according to The Insider, clearly indicates that their primary role is not battlefield fire support but the targeted liquidation of specific targets.

The stumble: Google Translate and an arrest in Colombia

Despite engineering secrecy, the 795 Centre was unmasked by a mistake as trivial as it was revealing. A unit operative, Denis Alimov, was arrested in Colombia at the request of the US on charges of organising the kidnapping of regime opponents. As Kryukova reported – and as confirmed by The Insider – Alimov had betrayed himself by using Google Translate to communicate with one of his sources: an elementary tradecraft flaw that allowed the US authorities to trace the entire chain of command.

The irony, notes The Insider, is that a unit designed to be the Kremlin’s most elusive instrument of coercion was exposed not by years of patient counterintelligence, nor by a defector or compromised source, but by two men who did not share a common language.

“Even the Russian special services are not what they used to be,” Kryukova observes sarcastically. “An almost childish mistake, which one would expect not to see from professional agents. Evidently the years of negative selection have left their mark there too.” That said, warns the dissident, “it doesn’t mean they are not dangerous: even so they remain perfectly capable of doing their job“.

Implications for European security

The existence of the 795 Centre poses direct questions for Europe. The Insider has documented how the unit’s tasks include sabotage against military targets on the continent – a front that fits into the broader Russian hybrid destabilisation campaign that has already affected European countries in recent years.

The picture drawn by Kryukova is broader than the investigation itself documents: ‘In recent years, especially since the beginning of the war in Ukraine, several defectors from the Russian army have been killed in Europe in a demonstrative manner. It is precisely the deserters who are treated with particular cruelty according to the logic of the Russian system. In some cases, there is a strong suspicion of poisoning. In France, not so long ago, a group was arrested that prepared murders and kidnappings of Russian dissidents.” The blogger continues: “Even journalists from The Insider were targeted: someone had planned to kidnap and kill them, and fortunately this plan was discovered and stopped in time. Not to mention the now well-known cases, such as the poisoning of Alexander Litvinenko. And it is likely that it does not only concern Russian citizens.“

The publication of the investigation, with names, photographs and whereabouts of key executives, explicitly aims – according to the authors themselves – to render the Centre inoperable: the same fate that befell the Rybar Group and Unit 29155 in the past after they were publicly exposed.

The question of Chemezov’s personal role remains open. According to sources in his entourage quoted by The Insider, the head of Rostec is personally uncomfortable with the fact that a facility connected to him is being used for political murders. But, as Kryukova wrote, ‘the process can no longer be stopped‘.

“The Kremlin is extremely sensitive about its image abroad and what is said about it,” the dissident concluded. “That is why I hope that the Western security services take this information seriously. It is not only Russian dissidents who are potentially in danger, but also citizens of Western countries: both those who openly criticise the Kremlin and simply people who might be in the wrong place at the wrong time.”