In the last days of the year, the world does not slow down and in the Taiwan Strait, history accelerates. Ships, fighter jets and missiles redesign the maritime and air space around the island, turning military exercises into political messages, armed deterrence and signals directed far beyond Taipei. It is certainly not a sudden crisis, but yet another chapter in a systemic pressure that Beijing is exerting with increasing precision.

Last days of fire: what is happening around Taiwan

In the last days of 2025, the situation in the Taiwan Strait became noticeably hot again. China has initiated new and elaborate military exercises around the island, simultaneously involving army, navy, air force and missile forces. These are not simple demonstration manoeuvres, but complex operations simulating scenarios of encirclement, isolation and control of key areas.

Beijing has called these exercises a ‘serious warning‘ against what it calls ‘separatist forces‘ and against outside interference. The message is directed at Taipei, but also at Washington and Tokyo. The context is one of growing military cooperation between Taiwan and the United States and an increasingly explicit Japanese role in the Taiwanese dossier.

‘Justice Mission 2025’: the Chinese army enters the scene

The manoeuvres, named Justice Mission 2025, are coordinated by thePeople‘sLiberationArmy (PLA) Eastern Theatre Command, which is responsible for operations in the Taiwan Strait. The choice of the name is in fact not accidental: Beijing insists on a narrative linking the use of force to an alleged sovereign right and a ‘historical mission‘.

According to the information disseminated, the exercises include joint sea-air patrols, simulated naval blockades, taking control of ports and critical infrastructure, and ‘three-dimensional‘ deterrence, i.e. integrated between sky, sea and missiles.

The affected areas are not limited to the Strait in the narrow sense, but surround Taiwan from the north, south, east and south-east, reinforcing the idea of a progressive and modular encirclement.

Matsu, Wuqiu and the strategy of isolation

A particularly significant element of these manoeuvres is the focus on the smaller Taipei-controlled islands, such as the Matsu, Kinmen and Wuqiu archipelago. Beijing seems to be testing selective isolation scenarios: striking or blocking outlying islands before the main island, reducing reaction time and testing the Taiwanese chain of command.

It is a strategy that has been theorised for years: avoid animmediate invasion and instead focus on graduated pressure, capable of paralysing Taiwan economically and psychologically even before militarily.

Taipei’s response: active defence and military exercises

Faced with the intensification of Chinese manoeuvres, Taiwan did not remain passive. Taipei’s Ministry of Defence confirmed that it had detected numerous Chinese assets – aircraft and ships – in the areas surrounding the island, responding with the immediate deployment of its own forces.

In particular, theRepublic of China (ROC)Air Force has scrambled F-16 fighters to intercept and monitor the PLA’s J-16s. A confrontation that goes beyond the technical: it is symbolic of two opposing visions of the Strait, one based on control and one on defending the status quo.

The shadow of the United States and the arms knot

The Chinese exercises come at a politically sensitive time. A few days earlier, Washington had announced one of the largest military supply packages to Taiwan in recent years. Beijing reacted with harsh diplomatic protests and sanctions against US defence companies, reiterating that any military support to Taipei constitutes a ‘red line‘.

From the Chinese point of view, the manoeuvres also serve to test the deterrence capability beyond the first island chain, signalling that a possible conflict would not remain confined to the Strait.

Japan gets into the thick of things

Another key player is Japan. Relations between Beijing and Tokyo have dropped to their lowest level in recent years, partly due to statements by Japanese politicians who do not rule out involvement of the Self-Defence Forces in the event of a crisis over Taiwan.

On the same days of the exercises, there were tense episodes between Chinese fighters and Japanese aircraft, with mutual accusations of ‘threats’ and radar targeting. For China, the Japanese involvement represents a direct threat; for Tokyo, Taiwan’s security is now inseparable from its own.

Lai Ching-te and the ‘do not provoke, but resist’ line

Taiwanese President Lai Ching-te has maintained a cautious but firm line. On the one hand, he reiterates his commitment to maintain the status quo and not to provoke Beijing; on the other hand, he insists on the need to raise the cost of any invasion scenario.

A strategy combining military build-up, civil preparedness and international diplomacy. Polls show that the majority of Taiwanese still prefer the status quo: neither unification with China nor a formal declaration of independence.

Deterrence and calculated risk in the Taiwan Strait

End-of-year exercises are not an automatic prelude to war, but neither are they mere military routines. They are part of a strategy of constant pressure, calibrated to stay below the threshold of open conflict but intense enough to change behaviour, alliances and perceptions.

At the end of 2025, the Taiwan Strait remains one of the most dangerously ‘stable’ places in the world: stable because no one really wants war, dangerous because everyone is preparing for it.Miscalculation remains the greatest risk.