On 19 September 2025, three Russian MiG-31s entered Estonian airspace over the island of Vaindloo. They remained there for about twelve minutes, with transponders switched off and without a recorded flight plan, until Italian F-35s of the NATO Air Policing mission intercepted them. Tallinn spoke of an ‘unprecedented’ violation, emphasising the depth of the raid and the absence of communications. Moscow denied everything, claiming that the jets flew over international waters on their way to Kaliningrad. Commission President Ursula von der Leyen immediately pledged solidarity with Estonia and called on member states to approve a new sanctions package.

Twelve minutes cannot be explained as a misdirection. They are a choice, a political message and not an isolated incident. In recent weeks, Russia has multiplied its air and drone incursions into Poland and Romania, conducted nuclear exercises with Belarus, and regularly tested NATO’s reaction time on the Baltic front. The Alliance’s response has been Operation Eastern Sentinel, with tighter patrols and better equipped bases.

The script repeating itself and credibility wearing thin

The script is now predictable: Moscow provokes, the West reacts; Moscow denies, the West protests; Moscow tries again, the West responds with new solemn declarations. The penultimatums, as someone called them. A cycle that wears down our credibility more than our capabilities.

The comparison with the Turkish precedent of 2015 is inevitable. Back then, a Russian Su-24 was shot down by a Turkish F-16 after a violation of just 17 seconds and after ten radio warnings. Ankara drew a red line and enforced it. Today, twelve minutes of violation over the Baltic produces only a diplomatic note and some temporary reinforcements. The gap, more than chronological, is political.

The question is not whether Europe has the means to defend itself – it does, and Vaindloo’s interception proves it – but whether it has the intention to use them in a way that makes the violation costly for the perpetrator. Deterrence lives in the mind of the adversary. As long as the Kremlin perceives that the most likely exit from a crisis is a joint communiqué and additional fighter rotation, it will continue to push forward.

In theory, the tools exist. The regional defence plans adopted by NATO in Vilnius offer the architecture of advanced protection, with faster mobility times and integrated commands. But Europe must turn them into reality through bold national decisions, anticipating the Baltic urgency with stricter scramble rules and clear protocols on where pursuit becomes engagement. Telling in advance how one will react is often the best way to avoid having to actually react.

Equally urgent is bridging the industrial and cost gap. The drone war has shown how inefficient it is to respond to systems costing a few thousand euros with missiles worth a hundredfold. The European Union has fielded the European Defence Industrial Strategy and programmes such as ASAP to increase munitions production to millions of rounds per year by the end of 2025, and is discussing a ‘drone wall’ along the eastern border. But unless these initiatives are quickly translated into binding contracts, interoperable standards and common supply chains, they will remain on paper. For now, Russian production of projectiles and missiles remains superior, supported by dual-use component supplies from China.

Tallinn has already invoked Article 4, but NATO must establish a shared protocol: switched-off transponders, no flight plan and unresponsive communications must automatically result in a forced escort out of the airspace, with drastic countermeasures if the intrusion persists. Diplomacy works best when the chain of consequences is clear, brief and credible.

Provocations risk becoming war

All this must be decided soon. Not only for Moscow to continue ‘probing’ our defences, but because the darkest scenarios cannot be dismissed as political fantasy. RAND war games already in 2016 showed how Russian forces could reach Riga and Tallinn in less than 60 hours. Today, with Russia’s booming industrial supply chain, North Korean supplies and Chinese technological support, the prospect of a blitzkrieg testing the cohesion of the Alliance is not far-fetched. This is not a matter of predicting an invasion tomorrow morning, but of recognising that the risk of escalation towards Europe is not an exercise in pure propaganda.

The material conditions – reconstituted arsenals, available strategic partners, Russian doctrine of constant pressure – make a large-scale coercive offensive more plausible, which could start as a test and turn into a crisis.

In this context, statements by Ursula von der Leyen are not enough. Concrete steps are needed. An extraordinary package to strengthen air defences along the eastern front, common and unambiguous rules of engagement, and a real – measurable – acceleration in munitions production. Europe must show that its skies are not a laboratory for cheap provocations, but a protected, inviolable and politically sacred space.

The message must not only be that every violation will be condemned. It must be that every violation will have a price. Deterrence is not the desire for peace: it is the assurance that the cost of aggression will always outweigh the benefit. After Vaindloo, Europe cannot afford to continue living on communiqués. It must decide to make itself believed.