Bosnia and Herzegovina is a sui generis state, born out of the 1995 Dayton Accords that ended the Balkan War.

The country is divided into two administrative entities: the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, with a Bosnian-Croat majority, and the Republika Srpska (RS), with a Serb majority. The latter enjoys a very large degree of autonomy – it has its own president, parliament, police force and governmental structures – while formally being part of the same state. It is in this semi-autonomous space that Moscow has found one of its most valuable outposts in Europe.

Belgrade on the Drina, Moscow behind the scenes

It is not simply a matter of cultural affinities or an ill-digested Slavophile heritage. The bond between Republika Srpska and the Kremlin is an explicit strategic alliance, publicly declared and operational on several levels: political, economic and security. A relationship that has not been interrupted even with the recent change in the entity’s presidency.
On 9 May 2026, as Moscow celebrated its annual ritual with the Victory Parade, a delegation from the RS was sitting in the Kremlin next to Vladimir Putin. Leading it was the new President Siniša Karan, in office since February 2026 and a loyalist of the SNSD party. His words left no room for interpretation: ‘Russia is our most important international strategic partner,’ he said, adding that the Russian invasion of Ukraine is ‘absolutely justified’. Textbook language of pro-Russianism, uttered in the Russian capital on the most symbolically charged day of the Moscow calendar.

Dodik: the puppet master remains

Karan is the new face, but the real architect of this alliance is Milorad Dodik, the founder and undisputed leader of the SNSD, the party that has ruled RS for more than a decade. Although he no longer holds the presidential office, Dodik was present in the delegation to the Kremlin along with the president of the National Assembly, Nenad Stevandić. A presence that makes it clear who holds the real power. Karan himself has promised to continue his mentor’s line ‘with even greater strength’: an ideological and strategic continuity that excludes any breakthrough.
Dodik has repeatedly called RS a ‘reliable ally of Russia’, describing bilateral relations as ‘excellent in all fields, with mutual support’. Not empty words: high-level meetings with Putin and Foreign Minister Lavrov have multiplied in recent years, turning a political closeness into a functioning axis.

A concrete alliance, not just rhetoric

The pro-Russianism of the RS is not only made up of speeches. In 2025, the Banja Luka government passed a law on ‘foreign agents’ modelled directly on Russian legislation, a classic tool for silencing civil society and independent media. On the energy front, the RS benefits from Russian gas supplies on preferential terms. Police and security cooperation with Moscow structures is documented by visits of officials and joint training programmes.

On the geopolitical level, the RS plays a systematic blocking function: it prevents Bosnia and Herzegovina from approaching NATO or adopting common positions with the European Union, particularly with regard to sanctions against Moscow. In return, Russia supports Dodik’s autonomist – and openly secessionist – demands and calls for the closure of the Office of the High Representative, the international figure in charge of overseeing the implementation of the Dayton Accords.

A proxy without tanks

The role of the RS as Moscow’s instrument in the Balkans is documented by several independent sources. The Jamestown Foundation has reconstructed how the RS was used as a base for Russian paramilitary training camps – with instructors linked to the Wagner group – for destabilising operations in Moldova. PONARS Eurasia systematically analysed how Dodik made his relationship with Putin the pillar of his domestic political strategy, transforming his alignment with Moscow into an instrument of electoral consensus as well as a geopolitical choice. The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace has documented how Russian support fostered the transformation of the RS security forces into a paramilitary structure, in violation of the Dayton accords.

The formula is effective for Moscow: a permanent pressure point in the heart of Europe, capable of destabilising an entire country and blocking Euro-Atlantic integration processes, without deploying direct resources or risking military escalation. The RS does the work institutionally and diplomatically; Moscow provides legitimacy, political protection, and economic and intelligence support.
The visit of 9 May 2026 to Moscow is not an isolated incident. It is the confirmation of a structural, ideological and strategic relationship that the change of president has not dented, and is unlikely to change as long as Dodik’s SNSD remains in power in Banja Luka.