‘Do you think they’re fabricating a Russian threat to convince us that we need to arm ourselves to the teeth?’ Speaking from the stage in Piazza del Gesù in Naples on 8 July, Giuseppe Conte uttered this sentence, to which he added, in the tone of someone who believes he knows a thing or two:‘They don’t tell you these things; I’m telling you.’ A classic‘theydon’t tell you’ remarkthat kicked off the first joint rally of the broad coalition. 

At the very same time, in the European Parliament, those words were vividly confirmed by a parliamentary vote. The European Parliament was voting on a report on Ukraine: the PD voted in favour, as did Fratelli d’Italia and Forza Italia. The Five Star Movement (M5S) voted against it, as did the League and Vannacci. AVS abstained. On the very same day that the leaders of the broad coalition were proclaiming unity in Naples, their European parliamentary groups voted in three different ways on the same text, each aligning with a different opponent.

Incidentally, to provide some context, the rally had been interrupted for ten minutes by activists from Potere al Popolo, who accused the leaders of being an ‘oligarchy’ without a programme. The square was half-empty. Bonelli responded in the manner one would expect from a left-wing leader, namely by labelling the protesters “fascists”.

And yet another outburst from the former Ombudsman is still causing quite a stir, made from the stage at PiazzAsiago during an interview with Alessandro De Angelis: “We will vote ‘no’ to all measures to supply Ukraine”, “if I were to win the primaries, I would call Putin to immediately open a window for negotiations”. These are the words that are causing quite a stir within the broad coalition.

‘But is the “broad coalition” actually a coalition?’, one might be tempted to ask, to paraphrase Corrado Guzzanti in *Boris*. Is it a coalition? Does it have a recognised leader? Does it have shared positions on the issues a government is called upon to tackle from day one? Does it have a programme? The answer to each of these questions is no. All that exists is the name. There is a shared opposition to the centre-right. There is the constant postponement of any attempt at a thematic agreement to a later date that never arrives. And, of course, there are rifts and divisions.

A rift that cannot be mended with a simple formula

When it comes to Ukraine, the differences are not merely nuances: they are incompatible worldviews that no coalition programme will be able to reconcile in a coherent manner. This is borne out by the reactions that famous phrase has provoked within the Democratic Party. From Gori to Sensi, not to mention Avs’s nod to the Five Star Movement’s position. “There is still a LOT to be done”, as Sensi wrote on X.

The PD, for its part, supports Ukraine’s path towards accession to the European Union, authorises NATO assistance and training missions, and has voted unanimously – with a few defections that also demonstrate a certain blurring of the lines between the relative majority party and the opposition towards the minority partners – in favour of supporting Kyiv in every significant vote over the last twelve months. The Five Star Movement (M5S), during the Chamber of Deputies’ vote on international missions on 28 July 2026, accepted only the European mission whilst rejecting the NATO one. In Strasbourg in February, when the European Parliament called on Russia to immediately cease the war and withdraw, the M5S voted against the motion alongside Vannacci. Speaking from the podium in Naples, Conte described the Russian threat as “fabricated” and accused those supporting Kyiv of being part of a “rearmament party”. That rearmament party, in his own words, would include his main ally.

For a member state of the European Union – a liberal democracy for which supporting Ukraine, which has been attacked, is a political obligation even before it is a diplomatic one – this rift carries implications that go far beyond domestic politics. An Italian government that were unable to clearly define its position on Ukraine at the European Council – because that position does not exist as a coherent consensus amongst its members – would not be a weak government: it would be an absent government. And a country that is absent at the very moments when Europe is deciding on its security architecture will pay the price for years to come. This, moreover, is precisely what the ‘broad coalition’ itself criticises, albeit with varying degrees of consistency, about the current government: its absence from the European negotiating tables. But at European meetings, security, Ukraine, arms and cohesion are also discussed. These are all issues on which the proposed centre-left coalition ought to be working.

The other rifts that nobody wants to mention

Ukraine is the most visible point of division, but it is not the only one. On economic policy, the AVS is pushing for a wealth tax; the PD and M5S are holding back, seeking other solutions. On the universal basic income, the M5S is demanding its reinstatement; the PD would prefer different measures. On Rome’s waste-to-energy plant, the PD mayor Gualtieri is going ahead with its construction; the M5S has systematically opposed it. On nuclear power, the M5S is opposed to any move towards new-generation reactors. On coalition leadership, the PD and M5S seem in favour of open primaries (at least on paper); Avs is holding back, as it is smaller and weaker.

The issue of the primaries deserves a separate analysis, as it masks divisions that extend well beyond the coalition’s boundaries. Within the PD, the reformist minority led by figures such as Lorenzo Guerini, Lia Quartapelle and Giorgio Gori is in open conflict with Schlein’s leadership over defence, foreign policy and the coalition’s political positioning. These are the same figures who have publicly questioned how Conte’s stance on Ukraine is compatible with the alliance, and who have warned:‘If the coalition goes along with Conte’s unacceptable remarks, the issue is one of credibility’. Schlein’s term of office expires in early 2027, the PD congress is approaching, and the coalition primaries – if they go ahead – risk becoming the battleground for an internal clash that the party has yet to resolve.

The M5S, too, has its internal divisions. Alessandro Di Battista, through his organisation Schierarsi and with the backing of former leading figures such as Virginia Raggi, is seriously considering standing as an independent candidate in the 2027 general election, targeting non-voters and those disillusioned with the Movement. Giuseppe Conte has welcomed ‘Dibba’s’ return to politics, but behind the smiles and handshakes, Grillo’s support for this ‘back-to-basics’ move may well be lurking.

His possible entry into the political arena could have an impact on the Movement’s popularity. Beppe Grillo, who lost the legal battle over the name and symbol but has not stopped attacking the former prime minister’s leadership, continues to act unpredictably on the political fringes and has praised the potential of the former Grillo supporter’s new political venture.

On the other hand, Conte’s inner circle strongly denies any rumours of divisions of any kind, but the internal tensions are well documented and the denial itself – as communication theory teaches us – confirms them. Finally, there is also a – small, for now – ‘Vannacci’ problem for the M5S: the most recent electoral trends confirm what political science has been saying for decades: the fluid electorate of a ‘take-it-all’ party is, precisely, fluid and shifts from one anti-establishment group to another.

The ‘decoy’ list and the problem with the city centre

Within this coalition, or on its fringes, or at some unspecified point yet to be clarified, Alessandro Onorato has set up a civic initiative called ‘Progetto Civico Italia’, endorsed by Gualtieri and ambitiously presented as the entity that could unite the moderate centre still outside the scope of the broad coalition. I don’t think there’s any need to add anything further. Or rather, perhaps the aim should be made substantially clearer: to bring together those who do not want to vote ‘too far to the left’ but neither ‘too far to the centre’. In other words, to win back the votes of those who are leaving without warning.

The official launch took place at the Parco dei Principi hotel in Rome, with the leaders of the PD, M5S and AVS in the front row. Onorato himself stated:‘We are part of this progressive movement, but we are acting independently.’ A statement that the late Kent Brockman would consider ‘strange’, but, in terms of communication, it is a standard formula for projects launched shortly before an election.

Anyone familiar with the history of Italian politics and the scope of the centre-left will already have grasped the mechanism: it’s always the same old story. This time, however, there is an additional motive: to unsettle the true centre – the pro-European and pragmatic one.

The question nobody answers

On 29 July 2026, in the Chamber of Deputies, the structural mechanism of the broad coalition was repeated in a less severe, yet still paradigmatic, form. The bill on home detention for drug addicts – which allows sentences to be served in therapeutic communities within a prison system housing 64,645 inmates against a capacity of 46,242 places, and where there have been 24 suicides since the start of the year – received 153 votes in favour, 42 against and 82 abstentions. The PD and AVS abstained whilst supporting the principle. AVS MP Devis Dori put it bluntly in the Chamber: ‘We’ve been calling for this for some time. In fact, it’s long overdue.’ He then announced his abstention. The M5S voted against it. A law that the very same left had been calling for for years, passed by a government that is not their own: and the vote changes.

The stance does not depend on the merits of the proposal. It depends on who is putting it forward. When it comes from the other side, a way is found not to vote for it, even when one agrees with it, even when one has been calling for it for years. In a political system where this logic has become institutionalised, drawing up a shared government programme is not an exercise in mediation: it is an exercise in collective pretence destined to fall apart at the first concrete decision.

The only thing the PD, M5S and AVS truly have in common is this: their opposition to the centre-right. A coalition held together by a shared aversion to the opposition works in the opposition, where all you need to do is vote against them. In government, however, where one must vote in favour of something specific and accept the consequences, that glue dissolves at the first divisive decision.

The ‘broad coalition’ exists, for the time being, either as an electoral tool or as a semantic illusion. As a government programme, it has yet to be built from scratch. The campaign for 2027 has already begun; manifestos are being drafted now, and the answers to the questions that matter – whether or not to supply arms to Ukraine, whether or not to introduce a wealth tax, whether or not to pursue nuclear power, and who will lead the coalition – have not yet been provided. Perhaps they will be.