In recent years, we have witnessed a new wave of recognition of Palestine by various countries, including and especially Western countries, accompanied by mass demonstrations, public appeals, petitions and endless debates on talk shows and in political arenas.

The Palestinian issue, and of all of them the recognition of Palestine, now occupies the absolute centre of not only international, but also, in my opinion inexplicably, Italian politics; recognition has become for many a moral imperative, for others a purely symbolic act, for others still a calculated geopolitical move.

But what does it really mean to recognise a state?

And, more specifically, what does recognising Palestine today imply – and what is the point?

This article attempts to answer these questions with a multidimensional reading of Palestinian statehood, between international law, diplomacy, geopolitics and power games.

Legal foundations of statehood

When we say ‘recognise a state’, we usually think we already know what a state is. But the truth is that the matter is much less simple than it seems. Before becoming a legal concept, the state is above all something political and sociological.

Max Weber had found a definition that cuts to the chase: “the state is that human community that, within a certain territory, claims – and succeeds – in having a legitimate monopoly of physical force.” A few words, but they get straight to the point: the state only exists if it has power and if people see it as legitimate.

Curiously, however, not even the United Nations has ever said exactly what a state is. Thus, to fill this gap, international doctrine and practice look to the 1933 Montevideo Convention. Although formally a regional treaty, its principles have been so widely accepted as to be considered part of customary international law, which is binding on all states. An example of its importance can be seen in the Badinter Arbitration Commission, which in the 1990s used precisely the Montevideo criteria to judge the end of Yugoslavia and the emergence of new states in Europe.

Article 1 of the Convention lists the four classic criteria to be considered a state:

• permanent population: the presence of a community of people living permanently within the territory.

• defined territory: the state must exercise control over a defined portion of land area (practice confirms that border disputes do not affect the fulfilment of this criterion provided there is a coherent and controlled territorial core)

• government: political and administrative apparatus capable of exercising effective control over the population and territory

– the ability to enter into relations with other states: i.e. formal and substantial independence, the state must be free to act autonomously without being legally subordinated to another state.

Taken together, these elements establish the objective basis for recognising a state in contemporary international law.

But theory always clashes with politics. There are entities that meet all the criteria and remain invisible. Others, on the other hand, meet almost none, yet are accepted among the states. Between Montevideo and reality, in the end, runs that thin line where law gives way to geopolitics.

Theoretical divergences on statehood

In this critical juncture between politics and jurisprudence lies the divergence between constitutive and declarative theory. The constitutive theory states that a state only exists when other states recognise it. Recognition, therefore, is not a formality, but rather becomes the moment when a state really comes into existence.

The declarative theory radically changes perspective. It holds that a state exists if it meets the objective criteria set by the Montevideo Convention: population, territory, government and capacity for international relations.

Recognition is thus configured as a political act that takes note of an already existing reality, not creates it. The Montevideo Convention itself speaks clearly:Article 3 says that the political existence of a state does not depend on the recognition of others, whileArticle 6 adds that recognising a state only means admitting its international legal personality.

International law seems to leave no doubt, it is clearly in favour of the declarative theory, which is more consistent with the principles of sovereignty and equality between states.

However, there is not only recognition, there is also its opposite, i.e. not recognising

To deny recognition is to isolate a state legally and diplomatically, just as recognition is also a political act. So is there a kind of obligation to recognise? On this, once again, the leading theorists of recognition disagree, and international law does not budge.

But if international law does not get out of line, practice does. Modern diplomacy, in fact, moves in this grey area. Acknowledging has become a gesture steeped in political and geopolitical consequences.

There is no lack of ambiguity in international diplomacy, especially in the most sensitive cases: Kosovo, Taiwan, Transnistria, Northern Cyprus and, of course, Palestine.

The two theories unfortunately become tools to be used according to convenience, completely transforming the meaning of recognition.

If recognition under international law is the ultimate goal for a state, in our everyday life it has become the battleground where its fate is decided.

Premature recognition

States recognised but not functioning

Premature recognition, one of the most controversial elements of international law, is a child of this grey area. It happens when one, or more states, decide to recognise as an ‘Independent State’ an entity that has not yet met the necessary requirements clarified by the Montevideo Convention. We are talking about a gesture that, disguised as a legal act, represents a geopolitical gamble, often a very risky one. It is like putting a stamp on a house that does not yet have foundations. The danger is clear: if the state that is recognised lacks a capable government and does not really control the territory, the recognition does not photograph what is there but rather invents it.

It does not describe, but creates. By hoping to favour the construction of a state, one risks fabricating chronic instability, which often, after this illusion of sovereignty, collapses under the weight of its own weaknesses. It is enough to analyse recent history to understand how costly this mistake can be, especially in former colonial realities: Sudan, Congo, Central African Republic.

There is therefore a big difference between recognising a reality that already exists and trying to conjure it up out of thin air: in the first case a state is established, in the second it creates a house of cards ready to collapse at the first gust of wind.

Recognition absent

Unrecognised but functioning states

According to the constitutive theory, recognition is the act that makes a state function, a very simple geopolitical situation follows: recognised states function, unrecognised ones do not. But the reality, as often happens, is much more complicated and, in some ways, uncomfortable. There are in fact entities that, even without the recognition of the international community, operate as states fully meeting the Montevideo criteria.

There are unrecognised states, defined by international law as de facto entities, with functioning governments, real institutions, armies, customs, passports, schools and even central banks, in short, everything you would expect from a state.

Taiwan is the most striking case in point. It is one of the most advanced economies in the world; a non-state with a stable government, an efficient army, a permanent population and a well-defined territory. Yet, since 1971 – the year it lost its seat in the United Nations to China – Taiwan has been officially recognised by less than fifteen states. But in spite of this it manages to act actively, participates in global trade, signs agreements and runs an independent foreign policy, while also maintaining informal relations with almost all major powers.

But it is not the only ‘ghost of law’: Somaliland, Kosovo, Northern Cyprus, Transnistria. The history of these ghosts shows an uncomfortable but undeniable truth: being a state is a matter of capacity, not consensus. A state is not born because others say so, it is born when it begins to exercise power and legitimacy.

Recognition may amplify the existence of a state, but it does not create it from nothing.

From Ramallah to Montevideo

After a long and due theoretical-practical framing, we now come to the heart of the matter, analysing the issue of the recognition of Palestine.

Let us look at Palestine through the lens of Montevideo to see if, regardless of recognition, we can speak of a state, or is it still early days.

• Government; this is perhaps the most difficult requirement to fulfil, a sovereign and legitimate government is needed. The Palestinian territories are divided between the PNA and Hamas, two entities with incompatible political visions. Palestine therefore has no unitary, let alone sovereign, government.

• Defined territory; not only is Palestinian territory fragmented between Gaza and the West Bank, but it also totally lacks de facto borders.

• Population; if we use Montevideo’s definition, i.e. a stable set of people inhabiting a territory and subject to the authority of a government: the set is stable, but the government is not unique, as Gaza and the West Bank are subject to two different authorities, this criterion is not met.

• Capacity to relate to other states; this requirement is also problematic. The PNA has limited legal capacity to conclude treaties and Hamas is almost totally exposed to foreign influences(Iran), and international recognition is not enough to guarantee diplomatic autonomy.

Palestinian Recognition

Since Palestine does not fully meet any of the Montevideo criteria, the recognition of Palestine is therefore a paradigmatic case of premature recognition.

Moreover, the recognition of Palestine risks coming into conflict with Article 2 of the UN Charter, which prohibits the use of any kind of force against the integrity and independence of states.

As long as there is no sovereign Palestinian government that does not claim territories beyond Gaza and the West Bank, a recognition of Palestine, even if driven by the values of self-determination of peoples, threatens Israel’s territorial integrity and thus conflicts with Article 2 of the UN Charter.

For these reasons, states that recognise Palestine do so predominantly following the logic of constitutive theory, hoping to ‘create’ a state rather than recognise it. But on the ground, despite exogenous interventions, Palestine remains a fragile, divided entity, subordinate to external constraints and lacking full sovereign control.

Before 7 October and the Israeli response, it was mainly non-Western states that recognised Palestine, two numbers: the average quality of democracy(Democracy Index) among states that do not recognise Israel stands at around 3/10 (i.e. authoritarian regime, for comparison Cuba has a score of 2.8), while the average among states that do not recognise Palestine stands at around 8.5/10 (i.e. almost perfect democracy, for comparison the UK has a score of 8.3).

In recent months, however, there has been a major turnaround, and many Western states have made moves towards formal recognition.

But what did these recognitions entail?

Spain has not yet managed to open an embassy in Palestinian territory: it cannot find diplomats willing to work in Palestine, they consider Ramallah too unsafe. On the other hand, Israel has imposed restrictions on the Spanish consulate in Jerusalem, which can no longer offer services to Palestinians as it did historically.

Let us look instead at the Norwegian case, after the announcement on 22 May 2024, the Israeli government reacted by revoking the visas of Norwegian diplomats dealing with thePalestinian Authority. This move forced Norway to close its Representative Office in Al-Ram, which had been in operation for almost thirty years, both a step backwards and a paradox: the act of recognition led to a reduction of the Norwegian diplomatic presence on the ground, demonstrating unequivocally that ‘full’ de jure Palestinian so vereignty clashes with more than no de facto sovereignty.

In contrast, the behaviour of Canada and France has been characterised by more classic Weberian responsibility. Canada proceeds more cautiously, recognises Palestine but suspends normalisation until certain reforms are implemented and regular elections are held in 2026 without Hamas. The Palestinian Delegation in Ottawa does not immediately become an Embassy. It is a ‘step-by-step’ process.

France, too, makes recognition conditional: first a cease-fire and the release of all hostages is needed; so does Belgium, recognition depends on the release of the hostages and Hamas leaving the government, and an embassy will only open after the demilitarisation of the movement.

Conclusion

If in law, as in history, the declarative doctrine prevails, today’s politics act one-way following the constitutive theory. An attempt is made to create Palestinian statehood from the outside, with no unity of government yet and deep internal divisions. The political function prevails over the practical function, it is not about facilitating state-building but about sending symbolic, diplomatic and strategic messages.

With the recent waves of recognition, Palestine has now gained full formal legitimacy (Palestine and Israel are now recognised by an almost identical number of states), but still no concrete instrument of sovereignty

The following analysis comes to us following the recent visit of PNA President Abu Mazen to Italy and the wave of recognition of the State of Palestine over the past year. A more in-depth paper on the issue will be published in 2026 by the renewed Delphi Institute.