Yesterday morning at the Élysée Palace, Emmanuel Macron welcomed Volodymyr Zelensky with a message that was, above all, a political act: to show the world — and Moscow in particular — that the war in Ukraine will not be eclipsed by the Iranian crisis, and that Russia is mistaken if it believes it can exploit the geopolitical chaos now engulfing the Middle East. It was no coincidence that the meeting took place less than a week before the European Council of 19–20 March, the summit that could — and must — unlock the €90 billion loan promised to Kyiv for 2026 and 2027.

The story of those €90 billion is, in miniature, the story of Europe in recent years: a power that wants to do the right thing, yet keeps stumbling over its own machinery. The agreement was reached in December, through a laborious but genuine consensus — minus two: Hungary and Slovakia. The European Parliament then approved the package by an overwhelming majority in February. Economy Commissioner Valdis Dombrovskis put it plainly, like a man repeating a mantra to stay awake: “We will honour our commitments, one way or another.” And yet the money has still not arrived. According to the International Monetary Fund, Kyiv’s coffers could run dry as early as April.

The vaudeville of vetoes

Viktor Orbán has declared his veto on further aid until the transit of Russian oil through the Druzhba pipeline is restored — a pretext, as is so often the case with blackmail dressed up as a technical issue. But the latest development is even more revealing, and throws into sharp relief the cynicism with which Moscow handles its European interlocutors. On 8 March, Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico announced in a Facebook video message that his government was “ready to replace Hungary” in the role of blocking state, should Orbán and Fidesz lose the Hungarian parliamentary elections on 12 April. In plain English: if one of Putin’s proxies falls, another is already prepared to take up the baton of sabotage.

It is a coordinated game that does not even pretend to hide itself. Fico and Orbán coordinate openly, shield one another, and alternate in the role of saboteur — as though the Kremlin had handed out scripts before the start of the season. The striking thing is that no one in Moscow seems to realise how clearly this pattern exposes the true nature of these relationships.

The tools already exist

The good news — and here lies the answer to those who would have us believe in Europe’s impotence — is that the Union already possesses the instruments needed to bypass this obstacle without violating a single rule of EU law. The €90 billion package was adopted through enhanced cooperation, the procedure that allows a group of at least nine Member States to move forward even in the absence of unanimity. Twenty-four of the twenty-seven have already said yes. The three non-participating countries are Hungary, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic. The Czech case, however, is distinct: Prague has raised no political objection linked to the war and has taken no pro-Russian stance, but has opted out for technical and fiscal reasons related to its exposure as a guarantor of common debt.

The loan will be financed through the issuance of common debt on the capital markets, backed by the EU budget, with an explicit clause stating that non-participating countries will not bear the costs. This is not a rupture. It is Europe functioning despite those who would prefer paralysis. What is missing is not the legal instrument; what is missing is the political will to use that instrument fully, without hesitation, before April arrives.

The greatest responsibility

There is a question every European leader should ask each morning in the mirror: what will we tell future generations about this moment? That we promised €90 billion to a country under assault in the heart of Europe, that we had the means to honour that promise, and that we stopped short because of the veto of a government playing for the other side?

Macron reminded the G7 that “we must not change our position on Russia and must maintain our effort for Ukraine.” It is the simplest truth of these years, and also the most demanding. Helping Ukraine endure in 2026 is not philanthropy, and it is not ideology: it is the most concrete form of self-defence Europe can practice. Every month that Kyiv holds is another month in which the principle that borders cannot be changed by missiles remains standing. And it is another month gained to prepare Europe for the possibility — which would likely already have become a certainty had Ukraine fallen on Putin’s hoped-for timetable — of a direct confrontation with Russia.

Europe cannot afford to lose through fatigue. One way or another, those €90 billion must be delivered. And they must be delivered now.