In the private rooms of Palazzo Chigi, the map of Italy’s strategic interests has also become a geopolitical map. On the table are Pirelli, CDP Reti, Ansaldo Energia and a constellation of companies in the most sensitive sectors: energy, transport, technology, finance. In each of these there is, to varying degrees, a share of Chinese capital. And in each dossier, the Meloni government must decide whether, and to what extent, to reduce that presence to avoid friction with Washington.

According to sources quoted by Bloomberg, Rome is considering plans to push Chinese investors to divest shares in key companies, whether public or private. The most striking case is Pirelli, the tyre supplier for Formula 1, in which Sinochem – the Chinese state giant – holds 37%. In the United States, Chinese ownership has already raised alarms: Washington has warned that tyres equipped with ‘smart’ sensors could be restricted for fear of data collection. Already in 2023, the Italian government had used the instrument of golden power to limit Sinochem’s influence, imposing ‘prescriptions’ to protect the most sensitive technologies. In April this year, at the request of the Italian authorities, Pirelli’s board of directors formally reduced the governance status of the Chinese shareholder, sanctioning the loss of control over the company.

Pirelli, however, is only the tip of the iceberg. Also in the crosshairs are CDP Reti – which controls national energy networks and has a 35% stake in State Grid Corporation of China, with two representatives on the board – and Ansaldo Energia, one of the world’s largest power plant producers. Although Shanghai Electric has reduced its share from the historic 40% to a symbolic 0.5%, the mere Chinese presence continues to block the company’s participation in tenders and contracts in the US.

The overall picture is broad: there are around 700 companies with Chinese capital in Italy, but the government’s priority is focused on the big players in strategic sectors. A Foreign Ministry spokesman in Beijing has already warned that cooperation with Italy is ‘mutually beneficial‘ and ‘should not be hindered by third parties‘, calling for a ‘fair, equitable and non-discriminatory‘ environment for Chinese companies.

Behind these moves is a rapidly changing European and global context. After having welcomed Chinese capital with open arms in the post-crisis period of 2008, Europe is now engaged in a difficult exercise of de-risking: reducing dependency without cutting relations. The von der Leyen presidency has pushed member states to carefully filter foreign investment, directing it towards less sensitive sectors – such as gigafactories for electric vehicle batteries – and away from critical infrastructure such as ports and energy networks.

Italy’s exit from Xi Jinping’s Belt and Road Initiative in 2023 marked a crucial step. It was the only NATO country to sign the memorandum in 2019, a choice that irritated Washington. The disengagement was handled with caution: it took months of diplomatic work to mend relations with Beijing, culminating in Meloni’s visit to Beijing last summer, celebrated by the Chinese press as a success. Now, however, Rome must calibrate every decision: moving the needle too far towards Washington risks thwarting that work, while remaining too open to Beijing could cost dearly on the Atlantic front.

Meanwhile, the transatlantic relationship is redefining itself. After Donald Trump’s return to the White House, the American line towards China has tightened further, especially in the high-tech, automotive and critical infrastructure sectors. Restrictions on connected vehicles controlled by Chinese companies will come into force already in the coming years, and European companies will have to adapt if they want to maintain access to the US market.

The challenge for Italy, as for Europe, is to avoid being crushed. This was recently summarised by Beniamino Irdi, former advisor to Minister Giulio Terzi di Sant’Agata and now head of the consulting firm Highground: ‘Europe is suffering an asymmetric shock: China is accelerating its industrial self-sufficiency while eroding Europe’s production base. Without concerted action, we will continue to be divided and reactive, not proactive‘.

Italy is today a test-bed for this concerted action: every choice on Pirelli, CDP Reti or Ansaldo Energia is a message to both Washington and Beijing. The risk is high, but so are the stakes: the ability to maintain margins of manoeuvre in a world in which value chains, investment and geopolitics are now intertwined.

What is clear is that, in a world dominated by superpower rivalry, an uncertain and weak Europe remains at the mercy of the age-old clash between America and China, which in all likelihood lies at the heart of all the economic, financial and geopolitical tensions of our time. In a context in which the great powers use economics and technology as weapons, one is either master of one’s own destiny, or destined to suffer that decided by others.