“The earth is shaking under our feet, with ever stronger tremors”.
The recent speech of EU High Representative Kaja Kallas at the EUISS 2025 annual conference could be a turning point in the debate on the role of the Union in the international scenario.

For Kallas, being a geopolitical player does not only mean having ‘military power and economic strength’, but also being able to use them when necessary.
If on Ukraine, for example, ‘so far we have always moved together’, on Gaza ‘we have not been able to use our geopolitical power because we have not been united’.

Finally, and here is the real novelty, exercising geopolitical power means taking the risk of ‘withdrawing an offer of cooperation when our interests are not respected’.
The implicit reference was probably to Netanyahu, since the former Estonian premier was talking about the Gaza conflict.
But soon afterwards she hastened to add: ‘Simply put, if a country considers supporting a war in Europe, we must deprive it of funds’. It is hard, here, not to think of Orbán, Fico, Vučić and the other would-be autocrats at home who have avoided or curbed sanctions against Russia.

In short, the Union must show itself capable of using ‘both the stick and the carrot’: rewarding partners who share common efforts and goals, while limiting the benefits to those who undermine European stability.

The knot of foreign policy instruments

Kallas’ analysis brings to light an often-overlooked issue: Europe has enormous economic, commercial and diplomatic strength, but struggles to translate this potential into effective geopolitical power.
The lack of binding instruments and the requirement for unanimous decisions in foreign policy make the EU vulnerable to vetoes and paralysis.

Hence the High Representative’s call for ‘changing the rules’ to make faster and more consistent decision-making possible. A call that is not new, but which today takes on particular relevance in a context marked by wars, systematic rivalries and attempts to reorganise the world order.

Carrot and stick: a balance to be defined

The idea of balancing incentives and sanctions may seem logical, but it opens up a political and strategic question: how ready is the EU to assume a truly assertive role?

While the threat of depriving partners of funding may strengthen the European position, the use of overly strict conditionalities risks fuelling rifts and pushing some countries towards other spheres of influence.
We have already mentioned Vučić, who is always threatening to sell out Serbia to China’s industrial and even military interests. But his is far from an isolated case.

Kallas’ message, therefore, should not be read as an invitation to permanent confrontation, but as an exhortation to build a framework of credibility.

The EU is already the number one trading partner of 72 countries, has agreements in the military sector with the entire arc of liberal democracies (including the well-armed ones in the Far East) and mints a currency that the world considers a safe haven.

“When it gets stronger, it is never at the expense of others,” noted Kallas proudly, perhaps knowing that 75 nations will default on their debt to the Chinese this year.

But in each external relationship one must have the courage to clearly show both the benefits of an alliance with the EU and the costs of a contrary choice.