Hungary as a geopolitical hub

On 12 April 2026, parliamentary elections will be held in Hungary. It will be a crucial date for the political fate of the European Union, and of those who, as we will see later, aspire to be part of it.

For the first time in 16 years, the sun may no longer rise in the east, but in the west. Indeed, Viktor Orbán is reportedly behind in the polls in a head-to-head with opposition leader Péter Magyar, a leading figure in Hungary’s centre-right party, Tisza.

In this article, we will analyse the history and figure of Péter Magyar, who is anything but a stranger to Orbán, his main ideas on foreign policy, and how he intends to move on the Ukrainian issue in light of recent events.

A hypothetical Magyar victory would be revolutionary not only for Magyar foreign policy, but also for the future of Europe. Indeed, there are great interests at stake in these elections: the EU could find an ally, Russia could lose one, and Ukraine would find more than a friend, a true brother.

Tu quoque, Péter, fili mi: who is Péter Magyar leader of Tisza?

As even local politics teaches, it can happen that a man who is regarded as loyal to the party can then decide not only to go his own way, but also to put a spoke in the wheels of those who had previously launched him onto the political and institutional scene.

Well, if you thought that Roberto Vannacci’s recent ‘ ‘betrayal” of Matteo Salvini was a ”unicum” in Italian politics, upon analysing Péter Magyar’s biography, you might reconsider this position.

Péter Magyar (born in 1981) is the President of the Hungarian political party Tisza and an MEP. After a short but relevant career as a lawyer, he made his political debut in the 2010 elections with Fidesz, the current rival party. He quickly climbed the party hierarchies: he joined the Hungarian Representation to the EU, became one of Viktor Orbán’s main collaborators and served, albeit for only three months, as party vice-president.

The final break with Fidesz came in 2024 with the scandal of the presidential pardon of Endre Kónya . In short, former Hungarian President Katalin Novák granted a pardon to the aforementioned Endre Kónya, who was guilty of concealing sexual abuse by the director of the children’s home where they both worked.

The request for pardon was countersigned by the former Minister of Justice Judit Varga (former wife of Péter Magyar), who resigned together with the President of the Republic following the extent of the scandal.

From that moment on, he began his opposition to Orbán and his leadership, formalised by joining the opposition party Tisza, which to date seems to be successful, taking him ahead in the polls up to 46%.

West-politik, but with reservations

If we analyse the foreign policy points in Tisza’s election programme and in Magyar’s most important public statements, they can be summarised in three basic pillars: the EU, NATO and good neighbourliness . To our ears, these three pillars might sound revolutionary for the Hungarian political landscape of the last decade, but the reality is that these foundations are the mainstay of Hungary’s post-communist foreign policy, values that were also foundational for the Fidesz itself of the early 1910s, which saw in the figure of former foreign minister Janos Martonyi in the Orbán II government (2010-2014) one of the major implementers.

Péter Magyar is therefore not proposing a new doctrine, but simply a return to the basics, the same ones that were proposed by Orbán 16 years ago; from which he has now clearly gone off the rails.

Let us therefore analyse the foreign vision of Magyar and Anita Orban, candidate for the Foreign Ministry for the Tisza party

Tisza’s main goal is to restore Hungary’s reliable position within the EU, which today is in danger of being undermined due to an excessive unbalancing of Hungarian policies in favour of Russia, while always keeping the national interest not outside the Union but with the Union as a priority.

However, for Hungary’s rapprochement to be plausible, Magyar must resolve a number of issues, both internal and external.

Starting with the domestic ones, Magyar will necessarily have to make up for Hungary’s democratic, rule of law and fundamental rights shortcomings, causes that have caused European funds, which Tisza will attempt to renegotiate, to disappear. The party will have to reckon with the national institutions, which, even after the elections, will remain in Fidesz hands in any case. At the European level, Tisza will have to remain consistent with the principles stated in the election campaign, which include negotiating certain European political issues from a more ”sovereignist” perspective.

Starting with the Mercosur agreement, Magyar affirms his clear opposition to the agreement, claiming that it would harm the interests of Hungarian farmers, and on this issue he has already taken action by breaking with the supportive European People’s Party (of which Tisza is a member) by asking for a referral to the European Court of Justice.

Another knot to be untangled with Brussels will be migration policy, Magyar has already made it known that he wants to maintain strict border control with a consequent maintenance of the fences at the border with Serbia, and he is also unwilling to accept the relocation quotas set by June 2026 by the EU’s New Pact on Migration and Asylum.

Despite these discrepancies with the EU, which at a glance would appear to be a policy of continuity of the current government, Magyar himself highlighted two visions that would contrast with Orbán’s vision.

The first is that the current opposition wants to renegotiate the above-mentioned aspects, possibly with derogations, unlike the current prime minister who has merely violated European rules by putting the Magyar Republic in a bad spotlight.

The other major difference liesin considering the idea of ”sovereignty” not in antithesis to Brussels, but in contrast. The European Union is seen by Tisza as the means to achieve and protect its own goals and interests.

Good neighbourly relations and the Ukrainian junction

Following theRussian invasion of Ukraine, Hungary has seen its relations with the so-called ‘Visegrad Group’ progressively deteriorate, and to date they are struggling to be restored.

Magyar wants to overcome this impasse, seeing the ‘Visegrad Group’ as an opportunity to be exploited also to have more influence from a European perspective, and for this to happen one must start from the core of the issue, namely Ukraine.

Originally, Magyar’s position on Ukraine’s accession to the EU was almost favourable, but with one reservation, Kyiv would have to meet all the criteria necessary to join the Union (Copenhagen criteria); no shortcuts.

Magyar’s victory would also be a triumph for Brussels; it would overcome the stumbling block of Orbán’s veto on Kyiv’s accession, and consequently cut off Russian influence in European decision-making.

With regard to the war with Russia, Magyar would be able to unblock possible financial aid, thus removing the impasse created by the current prime minister.

In contrast to humanitarian and economic aid, where Magyar seems to be willing to extend a hand to Zelensky, there is clear opposition even from the opposition on the possible sending of weapons and troops.

Energy, politics and strategic calculation

Which is understandable, since a complete change of approach towards a country on which one is largely dependent in terms of energy could prove to be a fatal political-strategic mistake, both before and after the polls.

However, the recent tensions between Kyiv and Budapest risk negatively influencingpublic opinion and, consequently, Tisza’s policy towards Ukraine.

The gas knot and the origin of the clash

The clash began withKiev cutting off Russian gas flowing through Ukraine via pipelines to the Magyar Republic, a key resource on which the country is heavily dependent for daily and industrial activities.

In Zelensky‘s intentions, the move was only meant to affect Prime Minister Orbán, who has always been reluctant to help Kyiv on the battlefield. However, by affecting such a strategic and vital sector for Hungary, it also ended up involving theopposition, which was forced to intervene.

Tisza’s position and the national line

It is worth remembering that Tisza is a centre-right party and has the protection of theHungarian national interest as its cardinal principle. Precisely for this reason, it issued a press release on 5 March entitled: ‘Neither Russia nor Ukraine can threaten Hungary’.

Magyar ‘s foreign policy vision is a form of realpolitik, dictated by a need for strategic survival. Anita Orbán, an energy policy expert, has no illusions: Hungary remains highly dependent on Russia in terms of energy. Therefore, the Ukrainian issue should be approached with caution, in order to avoid potentially fatal retaliation from Moscow.

With this in mind, Tisza has already declared his intention to review the negotiations with Moscow, described as ‘opaque’, with the aim of reducing energy dependency and diversifying supply routes.

The ultimate goal is clear: to progressively disengage from Russia in order to build a more autonomous foreign policy that can best protect national interests.

The possible friction with the European Union

On a technical level, however, a conflict could arise with the European Union, which has set a deadline of 2027 to block all energy imports from Russia.

Should the energy diversification strategy promoted by Anita Orbán materialise, it is estimated that full independence from Moscow would not be achieved until 2035.

The internal political risk and the role of Fidesz

Crucial now is the recovery of relations between Magyar and Zelensky. Such heated tension between the two countries can turn into a perfect assist for Fidesz, both in its attempt to portray the opposition as ‘Brussels puppets’ and in reinforcing Orbán‘s narrative, which tends to view Ukraine more as an enemy than an ally.

The decisive game of energy routes

The recovery of relations can only take place through the re-establishment of energy routes. Therefore, it is crucial that Zelensky grit his teeth and find a compromise with Orbán, at least until 12 April.

Otherwise, the risk is to alienate the Hungarian electorate, which, feeling threatened, might identify Fidesz’s foreign policy as a more credible and reassuring solution.

The significance of the elections

Next month, the Magyar people will be asked not only to elect the National Assembly, but to take sides geopolitically in a fragmented Europe. The eventual victory of Magyar, besides closing a chapter that lasted sixteen years, could finally bring Budapest back under the wing of Brussels. But it is far from a foregone conclusion.

Magyar will have to manage the disengagement from Russian energy dependency and the crisis with Ukraine without causing the country to collapse; at the same time, the EU will necessarily have to find common ground and yield, if necessary, to Tisza’s new leadership.

From this challenge we will understand what the Union is made of: it is imperative not to miss the opportunity to re-embrace Hungary, thus severing a key asset for Russian influence in Europe.