The conflict in Ukraine and the debate onEuropean strategic autonomy have brought the issue of common defence back to the political centre stage. General Vincenzo Camporini, former Chief of Defence Staff and an authoritative voice on the international security scene, speaks on these issues. Gathering his analysis for L’Europeista is Luca Cadonici, Forensic Computer Consultant and lecturer in Cyber Security.

An ‘Article-5-like’ model for Kyiv: reality or illusion?

Luca Cadonici: General Camporini, do you think it is realistic to imagine an ‘Article-5-like’ model for Kyiv today, under the current conditions and with this administration, or is it rather a scenario that can only be envisaged over a longer time horizon?
Gen. Camporini: It seems to me a rather fanciful hypothesis. Such a prospect would in fact presuppose the readiness not so much of NATO as a whole, but of some specific countries, to intervene in the event that Moscow, after signing an agreement, an armistice or any other understanding, decided to resume operations.

For such a mechanism to be effective, one would need to have units already on the ground: one cannot imagine reacting by sending them later from one’s own bases, it would be a battle lost from the start.

From a technical point of view – I leave the political aspect to others – an ‘Article-5-like’ would therefore require the presence of Western troops on the territory, a hypothesis that Moscow has absolutely rejected. The preconditions for a concrete and effective application of such a guarantee are therefore lacking. Lavrov was very clear on this: to think of external protection without troops on the ground, from a technical point of view, seems quite fanciful.

Supporting Ukrainian operational capabilities among Moscow’s demands

Luca Cadonici: If sending troops on the ground is unrealistic, how could Europe and the US still provide Kyiv with concrete and effective security guarantees?

Gen. Camporini: I would say that it is fundamental to guarantee continuous support to Ukrainian operational capabilities. However, here we come up against one of the central demands made by Moscow, explicitly reiterated from the beginning of this so-called ‘special operation’: a disarmed, neutral Ukraine without substantial military capabilities. They even went so far as to speak of armed forces limited to no more than 100,000: in practice, the equivalent of an urban police force, totally inadequate to defend the country against a new invasion.

Weapons for 100 billion: sustainable plan or illusion?

Luca Cadonici: There has recently been talk of Kiev’s proposal to buy US armaments worth around 100 billion dollars, financed by the European Union, in exchange for security guarantees from Washington. Is such an offer really sustainable?
Gen. Camporini: From a financial point of view I am not an expert, but from what I read and am told, the operation would not be impractical: I therefore rely on the assessments of the economists who have analysed the issue. On the production side, on the other hand, it is clear that a detailed examination is needed. The United States certainly has the capacity to increase production levels and meet demand on this scale in a relatively short time. Targeted industrial initiatives are also underway in Europe, but it is mainly a question of timing: how quickly this capacity can be brought up to speed. It is not an instantaneous process, it takes time, while demand remains continuous.

In principle, then, yes: it can be done. The fundamental condition is to have the political will to carry out a commitment of this magnitude and to keep the entire organisational chain intact, starting with the financial chain. Businesses in fact operate in a western economy: an entrepreneur invests to increase his production capacity, but he only does so with the reasonable guarantee that that investment will generate an economic return. There is nothing ethically questionable about this mechanism; what is important, however, is that there is certainty that governments will maintain this effort over time.

Meanwhile, Russia continues to produce armaments, as we read daily. The results, however, remain modest: when an army of over 600,000 deployed men boasts of having conquered a village in the space of a day, the disproportion between the forces deployed and the results achieved is obvious.

The negotiating table as the conflict rages on

Luca Cadonici: Europe is calling for a ceasefire before starting negotiations, while the United States seems to be pushing for negotiations even during hostilities. What political and strategic risks does it entail to sit at the table while the conflict is still going on?
Gen. Camporini: It entails a total lack of logic, which after all is one of Trump’s characteristics. We know that at the beginning he insisted on the need for a cease-fire, arguing that if this did not happen there would be serious consequences. Then, in the space of a few minutes, he changed his mind: I don’t know what Putin may have told him to convince him, and I don’t want to make inferences about the arguments used, but the fact remains. It is clear that a negotiation can only start when the cards are firmly laid on the table: if there are no clear and definite conditions, it is not possible to negotiate seriously.

EU: not one army, but integrated structures

Luca Cadonici: Can the so-called ‘coalition of the willing’ become the seed of a real European army? And how would it fit in with national armed forces?
Gen. Camporini: So I’ll say it for the tenth time: let’s stop talking about a European army. This is a long-term perspective, which we will perhaps arrive at if there are developments in a federal direction in the Union or at any rate among a number of member states. Let us rather talk about the collective military capacity of European countries.

This can also be achieved immediately, using the same mechanism employed by NATO. NATO does not have its own army, and this should be an eye-opener for many commentators: it simply uses the forces made available by the individual countries, according to a schedule planned with great care by what is the key element of the Alliance, namely its chain of command and control, starting from the headquarters in Mons, the famous SHAPE (Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe), based in Belgium.

SHAPE is the headquarters of the Allied Operations Command (ACO) and is responsible for the strategic planning, command and control of NATO operations. It is where the forces provided by individual member states are coordinated and deployed efficiently and effectively. This planning, command and control centre is the one that concretely commits the forces provided by the countries and does so with great efficiency and effectiveness.

The entire NATO chain of command starts from Mons and is articulated in various commands, both geographic-regional and functional. In Italy, for example, we have the command at Lago Patria, near Naples. Then there are functional commands: the air command, the land command and the naval command, such as the naval command at Northwood, in Great Britain.

This entire structure employs about 18,000 people: we are therefore not talking about a few hundred men, but about a highly articulated complex that performs fundamental functions, starting with intelligence gathering and ending with detailed planning, which is then passed on to the individual member states.

In practice this means: Italy, I need your Brigata Sassari; France, I need your Mirages – just saying. Operations are built on this basis, through a process that has been tried and tested for decades and works very well. It is thanks to this mechanism that today we can guarantee monitoring and deterrence missions in Eastern countries: we regularly send our combat aircraft to Estonia and Lithuania to participate in force rotations.

So, coming back to your question, the moment the Europeans define a proper chain of command – which has to be built, because it is not something that can be achieved overnight – the mechanism for deploying national forces would allow for an operational capability not within years or months, but within a week. And this would guarantee that strategic autonomy that we have been chasing for so long, as if it were a phoenix.

What the ‘willing’ countries – in particular France, Germany, Great Britain, with the contribution of some Scandinavian nations – are doing goes precisely in this direction: harmonising their respective structures to achieve this goal. In this sense, Finland’s presence at the recent meeting in Washington was very significant. Has Italy decided to be there halfway? This is an Italian problem, unfortunately.

European Strategic Autonomy: Potential and Current Limits

Luca Cadonici: Can Europe really assume autonomous leadership in defence, freeing itself at least in part from NATO and the US umbrella?
Gen. Camporini: With reservations, because there are capabilities that the Europeans have not yet developed sufficiently. One of these is anti-missile defence: today, Europe’s capabilities are minimal, with just a few American Patriot batteries and the Italian-French SAMP/T systems, which do not, however, provide adequate cover.

Another critical issue, perhaps even more serious, concerns the collection of intelligence data, their processing and fusion for operational use. We need reconnaissance satellites – and we have them, but in insufficient numbers – and we need electronic reconnaissance aircraft – here, too, there is something, and in this field Italy is relatively well equipped, but it is not enough. Fundamental then is the ability to integrate all this information to provide it in real time to the operator on the ground, so that he can plan effectively and minimise the risks of operations.

This is a capacity that must be developed and strengthened if we really want to achieve European strategic autonomy. The preconditions are there, we know what is missing: it is a matter of coming together and working together in a coordinated manner.

However, it is not a goal just around the corner, especially if unaccountable political attitudes emerge in some countries: I am thinking, for example, of figures like Salvini, who tends to behave more like a middle school boy than a political leader.

Cyber and intelligence: Europe between resistance and the need for sharing

Luca Cadonici: On the cyber front, what posture should the European Union, and Italy in particular, take to strengthen its security and contribute to a possible common European defence?
Gen. Camporini: Sharing in the cyber area, which is a fully-fledged intelligence area, is an area where significant progress needs to be made. In the intelligence world, and therefore also in ours, there is a strong national sensitivity everywhere – not only in Italy. The exchange of information, experience and support is still based on predominantly ‘commercial’ criteria: “I give you this, which has a certain value, but you must give me something else in return.” Or: “I give you this information, but from now on you owe me a debt.” It is a two-way approach, which unfortunately does not translate into a true collective centre where experiences and data are freely shared.

It must be acknowledged that there is strong national resistance on these issues, but this is where a decisive step forward is needed. Instead, I have the impression that we are taking steps backwards, losing sight of the European dimension.

You are certainly familiar with the Five Eyes concept: United States, Great Britain, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. These Anglo-Saxon countries have an agreement that provides for the full exchange of information: they all contribute to a ‘common container’ and each freely draws from it what it needs. Yet, according to recent reports, Tulsi Gabbard has decided to restrict the exchange of US information with the other Five Eyes members for reasons of national security. If the US, under this administration, takes a step backwards in data sharing, we are clearly not on the right track.

In Europe, relations are good, no doubt about it. But they should become more organic and less occasional. That is my impression.