Prisoners of a polarised political context, we are used to reading internal and external dynamics with a purely dualist view: good and evil, black and white, truth and lies. But in relations between states and in geopolitics in general, we need to focus on the nuances, i.e. on what happens beyond the electoral rallies and appearances on national television; dynamics that are complex to analyse and often inconsistent with the versions propagated to citizens.

The political relations between Israel and Turkey are emblematic of this complexity. Two seemingly opposite countries, competing for regional hegemony in the Fertile Crescent, with a political vision strongly conditioned by their respective majority religions: Judaism and Islam. However, this political-ideological impasse could be overcome by a pivotal concept of political realism shared by both states: ‘the question of survival’, i.e. the need, in an anarchic international arena, to provide by all possible means for the very survival of the state, even when dealing with a country that publicly condemns and despises itself.

In this article, we will try to understand the economic relations between Ankara and Tel Aviv, in the light of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan‘s openly anti-Zionist and anti-Israeli public statements.

A brief history of relations between Israel and Turkey

There can be no relationship between two sovereign states without mutual recognition and the establishment of diplomatic relations through official channels. The Turkish Republic was the first Muslim-majority country to recognise the State of Israel de jure in March 1949, some ten months after the ‘declaration of the establishment of the Jewish State’.

In order to preserve relations with other Arab countries in the Middle East, Ankara moved cautiously, ratifying the first trade agreements (worth $840,000) with Tel Aviv in July 1950.

The first cooling of bilateral relations occurred in 1956 with the Suez Crisis. Israel joined the United Kingdom and France in attacking Nasser’s Egypt, forcing Ankara, in a bid to protect relations with its Arab neighbours, to downgrade diplomatic relations with Tel Aviv to the level of ‘chargé d’affaires’, while maintaining trade.

This did not spare Turkey any criticism from Arab countries, especially Egypt. Two years later, Israeli Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion secretly met with his Turkish counterpart Adnan Menderes: thus was born the strategy of the ‘periphery doctrine’, aimed at creating alliances with non-Arab countries to counter pan-Arab hegemony.

In the 1960s, economic and diplomatic cooperation was consolidated until the Six Day War (1967). Ankara adopted an ambiguous position: on the one hand it joined Arab demands, on the other hand it did not break off relations with Israel. A choice dictated by pure realpolitik, supported by solid economic interests and intelligence cooperation.

The situation changed with the Yom Kippur War (1973): Ankara denied the use of the bases to the US and supported the UN resolution calling Zionism a form of racism. However, until the 1990s, relations never completely broke down.

The 1990s were the heyday: diplomatic relations re-established, economic and military cooperation strengthened, agreements on defence and technology, and official visits at the highest level.

The Mask and the Sword: the rise of Erdoğan and the Mavi Marmara crisis

“Mosques are our barracks...“: these verses by Ziya Gökalp led to Recep Tayyip Erdoğan ‘s condemnation in 1998. An episode that highlights the clash between secularist Kemalist Turkey and a vision more linked to Islamic identity.

Erdoğan, founder of theAKP, came to power in 2003, unhinging the Kemalist system. While maintaining economic and military relations with Israel, he adopted a highly critical rhetoric. At the same time, cooperation developed between Mossad and MIT against Islamic terrorism.

The breaking point came in 2010 with the Mavi Marmara episode: the Israeli assault on the ship bound for Gaza resulted in the death of nine activists, eight of them Turkish. Erdoğan called the event ‘state terrorism’, bringing relations to an all-time low.

It was only in 2013, thanks to the mediation of Barack Obama, that Israel officially apologised and compensated the victims, averting an even more serious crisis.

Beyond propaganda: the real numbers of economic relations

‘Between saying and doing lies the sea‘: this expression perfectly describes the relationship between Israel and Erdoğan’s Turkey.

After 7 October 2023, Turkish rhetoric has become increasingly harsh, with media such as TRT describing Israel in strongly accusatory terms. This narrative serves a specific purpose: to build a national rhetoric based on Muslim brotherhood, positioning Erdoğan as the leader oftransnational political Islam.

The reference to theOttoman Empire and the figure of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk serves to strengthen national identity and internal consensus. However, this ideological construction comes at a high cost when it clashes with reality.

Despite the 2024 trade embargo, figures show a recovery of economic trade as early as 2025. In 2026, the value of trade reached USD 176.1 million, with strategic goods such as machinery and metals.

Before the embargo, Turkish exports to Israel amounted to USD 5.3 billion, or 6.3% of Israeli imports. The reductions mainly concerned non-strategic, easily replaceable goods, generating a boomerang effect for the Turkish economy.

Realpolitik versus narrative: the structural contradiction

Ankara’s policies show a clear contradiction: on the one hand, a strongly anti-Israeli rhetoric, on the other hand, a solid and resilient economic cooperation.

This shows how, beyond propaganda, the logic of state survival and strategic interests always prevails. In an unstable international context, even the most conflictual relationships can turn into functional ones, where ideological distance coexists with close economic interdependence.

And it is precisely in this tension between political narrative and factual reality that the true meaning of relations between Israel and Turkey is at stake.

Embargo ploys: indirect routes and triangulations

Despite Ankara’s clumsy attempt to deny the evidence of a trade relationship with Israel, independent researchers have shown that there are several ‘ploys’ to circumvent the Turkish embargo.

One of the most important of these isrouting to third countries, through which goods are cleared through customs in other states and then shipped to Israel. A mechanism that, in fact, allows trade flows to be maintained while formally circumventing the restrictions imposed.

Not just trade: the energy node between Azerbaijan and Israel

However, economic relations with Israel are not Ankara’s only ‘sin’ of inconsistency.

Azerbaijan is in fact one of the main exporters of crude oil to Israel, and a significant part of this oil reaches the Holy Land via theBaku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline, which passes through Turkish territory.

Energy realpolitik: when profit trumps rhetoric

Despite this, Ankara has never shown any real intention to stop the flow of oil, for a clear reason of realpolitik.

In fact, Turkey earns around $1.27 per barrel in transit, a figure that clearly demonstrates that the economic gain is far greater than the political rhetoric proposed at home.

Once again, the facts confirm a now structural dynamic: between public declarations and strategic interests, it is almost always the economic dimension that dictates the real choices of states.

Erdoğan’s Turkey is nothing more than a dog that likes to bark, but knows it cannot bite, and ultimately does not even want to.
The populist anti-Israeli rhetoric serves as a distraction from Turkey’s real internal problems, from the devaluation of the Turkish lira to internal security flaws in preventing terrorist attacks.
How far will Erdoğan’s hypocrisy go that he likes to show himself strong, but whose frailties would require more prudence in managing his communication and foreign policy?
In October 2026, legislative elections will be held in Israel, which may bring with it a glimmer of change in the Knesset.

The question we must ask ourselves is whether the same change will also take place in the Sultan’s palace, or whether he will continue ‘feeding the beast he pretends to want to slaughter’?