In the Gulf crises, people talk about deterrence, aircraft carriers and missiles, while neglecting the dimension that, more than any other, decides the actual reopening of the routes: mine warfare. The Strait of Hormuz concentrates a decisive share of global energy flows and has geographical features that amplify the effectiveness of relatively cheap tools like naval mines. In a tight, busy environment dotted with coastal infrastructure, it only takes a small number of mines – or even their plausible presence – to slow down traffic, drive up insurance premiums and generate a price shock. This is why the central operational question is not so much about the ability to strike, but to restore safe navigation quickly and credibly.

Within this framework, the US Navy’s traditional superiority in power projection does not automatically translate into primacy in the domain of reclamation. Managing a strait under threat requires different tools, doctrine and chains of command from those governing air-sea attack groups. And here an often underestimated aspect emerges: European navies, and particularly the Italian one, have first-class mine countermeasures (MCM) capabilities, complemented by an equally solid land-based tradition in ordnance clearance.

The Geometry of Hormuz and the Mine War

The Strait of Hormuz is a global energy chokepoint not only because of the volume of flows through it, but also because of its geographical configuration: narrow shipping corridors, variable depths and proximity to the Iranian coast reduce freedom of manoeuvre and amplify the effectiveness of low-cost threats. In such a compressed space, even relatively simple tools can produce systemic effects.

It is on this basis that Iran has built a coherent asymmetric strategy for over twenty years. Unable to compete conventionally with the United States, Tehran has chosen to shift the confrontation to the terrain of the vulnerability of energy flows, aiming not at the closure of the strait, but at its controlled instability. Naval mines, drones, fast boats and anti-ship missiles constitute a set of capabilities that do not guarantee the domination of maritime space, but increase its risk, uncertainty and cost.

In this scheme, the mine is the most effective tool, because it acts both operationally and psychologically: you don’t need to block the strait to achieve an effect, you just need to make it insecure. In an interdependent system, a credible threat is already a pressure multiplier.

This approach directly affects the American posture. The US Navy maintains an overwhelming superiority in power projection, but has devoted less attention to mine warfare, and thus finds itself managing a scenario in which the deployment of high-value assets – aircraft carriers and large surface vessels – increases risk without solving the specific problem. Moreover, a prolonged engagement in Hormuz implies the redeployment of resources from priority theatres such as the Indo-Pacific, introducing a strategic cost that goes beyond the regional dimension.

The Iranian strategy hits exactly this point: not to impede American action, but to make it more costly, more dispersed and less efficient, turning the management of the strait into a systemic problem. In this context, demining capacity becomes the decisive factor, because it is the only tool capable of translating military superiority into effective control of the routes.

Added to this is an often overlooked dimension, which concerns the very nature of mine clearance operations. Mine warfare does not lend itself to quick fixes or visible displays of force: it requires time, operational continuity and a widespread presence that is ill-suited to a doctrine built on speed and impact. Every area must be surveyed, classified and secured according to strict standards, and this process inevitably slows down the reopening of routes, prolonging the economic effects of the crisis even in the absence of direct combat.

Finally, the management of a threatened strait is not only a military matter, but also a matter of systemic credibility. Shipping companies and the insurance market do not react to the declaration of security, but to its verifiability. Without a recognised and agreed demining capacity, traffic does not resume at full capacity, and the crisis continues to have an effect.

The European Critical Mass

The management of a threatened strait such as the Strait of Hormuz makes clear an often underestimated structural limitation: the US component dedicated to mine warfare has not kept up with the same pace of upgrading as its aeronaval projection. The US Navy still has Avenger-class units designed between the 1980s and 1990s, which, while retaining their operational usefulness, no longer represent the state of the art in a domain that has seen significant technological acceleration in recent years, especially on the side of sensors, automation and integration with unmanned systems. This distance does not imply inability, but introduces an operational friction in a scenario where reclamation requires speed, precision and continuity.

It is in this space that Europe’s critical mass emerges, built through constant investment and specialisation that has privileged mine warfare as an autonomous domain. Navies such as those of the UK and France (and to a lesser extent Belgium and the Netherlands) have developed advanced and interoperable capabilities, based on dedicated units, established doctrines and extensive use of unmanned technologies, building over time an operational ecosystem capable of sustaining sustained and complex operations. In a context like Hormuz, this critical mass not only complements the US effort, but increases its overall effectiveness, reducing clearance times and improving the quality of maritime space control.

Within this framework, the Italian Navy represents one of the most advanced. The Italian MCM component has around ten dedicated units and started production of a new class in September 2025, marking a qualitative leap forward in the ability to integrate traditional platforms and autonomous systems. This evolution concerns not only the vehicle, but the doctrine, which favours a modular and flexible approach, capable of adapting to different scenarios while maintaining high standards of safety and precision.

This excellence at sea is flanked by an equally relevant expertise on land. Over time, the Italian Army has developed a recognised capacity in mine clearance, which has also matured in the Balkan theatres, where clearance operations required continuity, accuracy and integration with local authorities. This dual dimension, maritime and land, allows Italy to operate along the entire security chain, from access routes to port infrastructures, strengthening the overall stabilisation capacity.

The coalitional dimension thus responds not only to a logic of burden-sharing, but to an operational and political necessity at the same time. Route clearance requires not only technical capacity, but also international legitimacy, because the security of the strait must be recognised as such by the economic and financial actors that determine its operation. A broad coalition increases the credibility of the intervention, spreads the risk and accelerates the return to normality, turning a military operation into a systemic stabilisation process.

Coalitional credibility

What was said in the last paragraph brings the discussion back to an often neglected terrain: the American operational need to work in coalition when the problem to be solved is not force projection, but day-to-day route security. The US can intervene autonomously, but doing so in a strait saturated with asymmetric threats increases the exposure of high-value assets and diverts resources away from priority theatres. In this context, cooperation is not an ancillary option, but a functional choice for the sustainability of intervention.

It is here that the European role takes on a significance that goes beyond the technical dimension. The capabilities developed over the years in the field of mine warfare are not a marginal complement, but an essential component of theatre management. To underestimate this contribution is to misunderstand the very nature of the problem, which does not end with deterrence, but requires the ability to re-establish verifiable and shared security conditions.

This dimension is directly linked to coalition credibility, which is a decisive element not only politically, but also operationally and economically. Security in the Gulf does not depend exclusively on military presence, but on the trust of the actors using that space: shipowners, insurers, energy operators. A broad and competent coalition reinforces this trust, accelerates the return to normality and reduces systemic uncertainty.

Ultimately, the handling of Hormuz demonstrates that stability is not built through force alone, but through the combination of capability and legitimacy. The United States remains the lynchpin of security, but its effectiveness grows when it is complemented by capabilities that, in this specific domain, Europe has advanced. It is not a question of rebalancing power relations, but of recognising that, in a complex system, security is always the product of credible cooperation.