In a nutshell: Netanyahu chose Trump (and bin Salman) and not Smotrich (as was bound to happen).

Donald Trump and Benjamin Netanyahu presented the 22 highlights of the US Administration’s plan for Gaza, which to the careful observer is nothing more than a reworking of the 5 conditions presented by Netanyahu on 10 August to end the war (1. Hamas disarmed; 2. All hostages freed; 3. Gaza demilitarised; 4. Guarantees of security control of the Strip by Israel; 5. Management of Gaza by a civilian mechanism NOT Israeli, neither Hamas nor ANP), supplemented by some non-trivial concessions for the Hamas leadership

Efforts have been made to work on this kind of plan since Trump’s election. On 19 January 2025, one day before he took office, there was a ceasefire that could have led to this, except that on 1 March (when the first phase expired) the negotiations did not lead to the implementation of the second phase of the agreement, which included the return of all hostages and a permanent ceasefire. Hamas was not willing to release all hostages. After 16 days of waiting, Israel resumed bombing Gaza on 18 March.

What has changed today?

So what changes today, with the proposed agreement of 29 September 2025? First of all: Trump, having failed his attempts at mediation between Russia and Ukraine, has realised that the pressure he failed to exert on Putin, he can apply to his partner Netanyahu. Trump wants to see concrete results as soon as possible.

The second element: there was the 12-day war with Iran, which sealed the new Middle Eastern alliances (beyond the declarations on the face of it, remember which countries flew Israeli fighter jets over Iran and from which countries some interceptor systems departed).

Before that, there was the fall of the Assad regime in Syria, Trump’s trip to the Middle East (Saudi Arabia, the Emirates, Qatar), in which the Israeli press first and foremost and the international press in a chain took the apparent ‘break-up’ between Trump and Bibi at face value (‘Trump did not visit Israel on his first mission as President, an unequivocal sign of a break-up between the two‘ we were told) – which was instead an obvious dissimulation because at that time the attack on Iran was being prepared. In the meantime, the Lebanese government has approved the disarmament of Hezbollah and Israel is about to sign a non-belligerence agreement with Syria(ergo: all these countries continue to think about their own problems and have not made themselves heard on the Palestinian issue – apart from the New York Declaration which is the basis for the recognition of the Palestinian State, which in reality is not a true recognition, because if one reads the declaration one sees that it says that the precondition is the release of the hostages and the disarmament of Hamas. I believe that what we witnessed last week at the UN was de facto agreed between the Saudis and Trump because the Saudis had to put up a front that they were doing something for the Palestinian cause).

Back to today: how do we know that today’s is not Trump’s usual pompous announcement?

The real new element is point 19 of the proposal: Israel has accepted the agreement. Hamas’ response has not yet been received (they say“we haven’t seen it yet” or“we are evaluating it now“). The game changer is that even if Hamas refuses, the mechanism of technocrats basically led by Tony Blair, in cooperation with Palestinians not affiliated with either Hamas or the PNA, with US supervision and funding from the Gulf countries will take over in any case (in the plan below this system is called the Board of Peace working with an International Stabilisation Force): the Israeli army will hand over to this mechanism in the areas it now already has control of (thus with the practical exception of Gaza City and areas Deir al Balah and vicinity – where instead IDF will continue to operate militarily to dismantle tunnels, minefields and the last of the Iz Eddin el Qassam Brigades, and then gradually hand over these areas too to the Board mentioned above).

What Hamas risks

To recapitulate: if Hamas says no, it goes for the final suicide. Not least because even the toughest Muslim players like Turkey, Pakistan and Syria (as well as those with ambiguous behaviour like Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the Emirates, Indonesia, Lebanon, Jordan, Egypt and even the PNA itself) have told Trump that they support his plan. So Hamas would remain solely and solely with the support of Iran and the Houthis, practically isolated on the international stage. Small inconvenience: Iran just got its mega sanctions back with the activation of the snapback mechanism at the UN, which was voted on by the same countries that were pretending to recognise the Palestinian state in the same hours and in the same forum.

If Hamas says no, the fate of the Israeli hostages still in Gaza (48, of which presumably 20 are alive) is sealed with them, as well as that of other Palestinian civilian lives that Hamas will take with it to the grave.

If Hamas says yes, there are many unknowns because the 22-point plan is extremely articulate and its implementation gradual, but it would be the beginning of the end of the longest and bloodiest war in the centuries-old Arab/Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Potentially, it is also the beginning of a post-war era that can be compared to the second Post-War period in Europe (which brought countries that until recently had been sworn enemies into the then European Community). But let’s stay grounded for now.

Another game changer: whether Hamas says yes or no, the Israeli government could fall at short notice (elections are supposed to be held in October 2026, but could presumably be brought forward to February/March). This is because Netanyahu, in accepting Trump’s plan, not only scuttled the possibility of an annexation/resettlement of the Gaza Strip, but also agreed to a‘credible path towards Palestinian self-determination and sovereignty’ by recognising it as ‘the aspiration of the Palestinian people‘. This part in the last paragraph of the declaration is the crux of this long analysis.

What Netanyahu knows: without recognition of Palestine, no Abrahamic Accords

The writer has always maintained – even since the previous Trump administration, when Netanyahu had agreed to a Palestinian state within the framework of the so-called Deal of the century in January 2020 – that it was and still is clear and evident to the Israeli premier that the great prize, the widening of the circle of the Abrahamic Agreements, is entirely conditional on Israeli acceptance of a Palestinian statehood.

This is what the Saudis, Turks, Pakistanis, Syrians and others have been content with in order not to close the door in Israel’s face (prompted certainly by Israel’s recovered deterrence, but even more so by Trump’s fear that, in his unpredictability, he is deterrence personified):‘a credible path towards Palestinian self-determination and statehood‘.

Yet even this very vague statement of intent is a red line for Smotrich (Ben Gvir may be more pragmatic, but we shall see). The opposition has already made it clear some time ago that it is at Netanyahu’s disposal to push through any agreement that sees the return of the hostages and does not close off the prospect of new Middle Eastern alliances. If even by hypothesis Lapid does not yield, Gantz (who currently does not pass the threshold) has already said he is ready to immolate himself.

Then, in the run-up to the elections, there is the whole question of a pre-trial pardon or plea bargain for Netanyahu’s trials, on which I also have my own theory (very well documented, but far-fetched and speculative, so I’ll wait to share it).

To return to the title: Netanyahu chose the Trump line and not the Smotrich line. He has put a few points down on paper: 1) no to the reoccupation of Gaza, 2) yes to keeping an open window to new alliances with the Arab world. All this contradicts the analyses of the mainstream press in recent months, but it was obvious that it would happen for those who have followed the Donald-Bibi relationship and Ron Dermer’s critical role over the years(I enclose an article on the subject from May – and another background on the possible return of the Deal of the century version post 7 October).